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In electronic marketplaces, buying and selling agents may be used to represent buy-
ers and sellers respectively. When these marketplaces are large, repeated transactions
between traders may be rare. This makes it difficult for buying agents to judge the re-
liability of selling agents, discouraging participation in the market. A variety of trust
and reputation systems have been proposed to help traders to find trustworthy partners.
Unfortunately, as our investigations reveal, there are a number of common vulnerabil-
ities present in such models—security problems that may be exploited by ‘attackers’ to
cheat without detection/repercussions. Inspired by these findings, we set out to develop
a model of trust with more robust security properties than existing proposals.
Our Trunits model represents a fundamental re-conception of the notion of trust.
Instead of viewing trust as a measure of predictability, Trunits considers trust to be a
quality that one possesses. Trust is represented using abstract trust units, or ‘trunits’, in
much the same way that money represents quantities of value. Trunits flow in the course
of transactions (again, similar to money); a trader’s trunit balance determines if he is
trustworthy for a given transaction. Faithful execution of a transaction results in a larger
trunit balance, permitting the trader to engage in more transactions in the future—a
built-in economic incentive for honesty. We present two mechanisms (sets of rules that
govern the operation of the marketplace) based on this model: Basic Trunits, and an
extension known as Commodity Trunits, in which trunits may be bought and sold.
Seeking to precisely characterize the protection provided to market participants by
our models, we develop a framework for security analysis of trust and reputation sys-
tems. Inspired by work in cryptography, our framework allows security guarantees to be
developed for trust/reputation models—provable claims of the degree of protection pro-
vided, and the conditions under which such protection holds. We focus in particular on
characterizing buyer security: the properties that must hold for buyers to feel secure from
cheating sellers. Beyond developing security guarantees, this framework is an important
research tool, helping to highlight limitations and deficiencies in models so that they may
be targeted for future investigation. Application of this framework to Basic Trunits and
Commodity Trunits reveals that both are able to deliver provable security to buyers.
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In the field of artificial intelligence, the term agent has come to represent a software
program acting on behalf of a user. An agent may act autonomously and pro-actively to
determine appropriate actions for a user, according to that user’s perceived preferences
[33].
Multiagent systems consist of multiple intelligent software agents acting indepen-
dently [33]. In co-operative multiagent system environments, each agent tries to select
the most effective partners in order for them to collectively achieve a task on behalf of a
user. Modeling the trust and reputation of each agent then becomes important.
In other environments, self-interested agents acting on behalf of users compete with
other agents for existing resources. At times, these agents must engage in activities that
involve other agents. Under these circumstances, an agent’s success may also depend
on its ability to wisely choose partners; a bad choice might have grave implications. For
example, a partner might actively seek to take advantage of the agent in pursuit of its
own goals. As such, the topic of modeling trust and reputation has begun to receive
significant attention within the context of competitive multiagent systems.
The design of electronic marketplaces is one area where multiagent systems ap-
proaches have become prevalent. Here, trading agents (acting on behalf of buyers and
sellers) evaluate other trading agents, seeking to choose the most appropriate trading
partners for their users. The issue of trust is especially important in these marketplace
scenarios, where transactions are essentially economic in nature, and where an agent
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may benefit directly from the act of cheating a trading partner. One might argue that
issues of trust are magnified in electronic marketplaces, compared to conventional ones,
because in electronic marketplaces traders often do not have the opportunity to inspect
goods or to confirm identities prior to committing to a purchase. Typically, electronic
marketplaces are also very large, making repeated transactions between pairs of traders
infrequent; this, coupled with the remote execution of transactions, inhibits the forma-
tion of trusting relationships.
As we explore how best to model the trustworthiness of agents in electronic mar-
ketplaces, we begin by looking for insights from several researchers designing trust and
reputation models for multiagent systems. For the remainder of the thesis, we use the
term trust to reflect an agent’s view of another agent’s degree of trustworthiness. Trust-
worthiness may be represented as a value in a numeric range (e.g., [0, 1] as in [12], or
(-1, 1) as in [31]) with values at the top of the range reflecting a high degree of trust, and
values near the bottom, distrust. Reputation commonly refers to the trustworthiness of an
agent as perceived by a community of agents, and is also typically represented by values
in such a numeric range (e.g., [26]). In the discussion that follows, we acknowledge that
an agent’s view of another’s trustworthiness may be determined by direct observation or
by reports from other agents, and in both cases we simply refer to this as trust.
Predominant amongst current proposals for modeling trust is an approach we charac-
terize as ‘predictive’. Essentially, a predictive model attempts to determine the likelihood
that any given agent will be trustworthy, or that he will cheat. While there are many such
proposals, there are two main themes. In the first, sophisticated learning techniques are
employed to estimate a potential partner’s trustworthiness; as experience is gained with
partners, the agent learns over time which partners are likely to be honest. In the second,
recommendations are sought from other agents in order to evaluate the trustworthiness
of a potential partner; the agent must evaluate the credibility of the recommendations,
and integrate them into a single estimate. In both cases, ongoing work attempts to in-
crease the predictive accuracy of models, to improve the chances for agents to achieve
their goals.
While this work constitutes substantial progress, it leaves important issues largely
unaddressed. In our view, the most important omission is explicit consideration of system
Introduction 3
security. The goal of a predictive model is to predict the actions of an agent; if strategies
are available to an agent that defy the predictive power of the system, then we might
consider such a system to be insecure. More generally, if there are cheating strategies
that a model is helpless to prevent, then that model might be considered insecure. Our
work began with an investigation of existing proposals for modeling trust, seeking to
determine if vulnerabilities exist within them. In fact, such vulnerabilities are common—
every model in our survey suffered from multiple serious weaknesses. We present a
catalogue of vulnerabilities in Chapter 2, and an examination of existing proposals in
Chapter 3. Ultimately, while these models may be accurate when agents are not actively
attempting to circumvent them, in the face of educated attacks the protection fails.
Inspired by these findings, we sought to develop a model that would be more robust in
the face of such attacks. Our findings armed us with a catalogue of known vulnerabilities,
and more importantly, recommended techniques to counter these problems. Moreover,
ongoing work on predictive models appeared to be making incremental improvements
over older systems, without recognizing or addressing the fundamental security issues.
This motivated us to consider the problem from a fresh perspective, one informed by
work in an area known as mechanism design [19]. Mechanism design, a field closely
related to game theory, concerns itself with setting up the rules of a ‘game’ so that self-
interested players will exhibit the behaviour that the system designer desires—the rules
make the desired behaviour the best self-serving behaviour for players as well. Mecha-
nism design depends on the rationality of agents. A rational agent is one that “acts in its
own best interests” [32] (or when acting on behalf of a user, in that user’s interests). The
notion of ‘best interests’ typically is specified as a set of preferences; the agent acts so as
to achieve the best outcome based on these preferences [32].
If we consider the primary goal of a trust system for electronic marketplaces to be
the protection of the interests of market participants, rather than the prediction of be-
haviour, then non-predictive approaches may offer that fresh perspective. In the spirit of
mechanism design, we endeavour to structure the marketplace to provide the required
protection to participants, by providing financial incentives for honesty. If agents are ra-
tional and self-interested, then we might ensure trustworthiness by making honesty the
most profitable (and hence, best self-serving) strategy.
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Our model, known as ‘Trunits’, is described in Chapter 4. Trunits is a fundamental
re-conception of the nature of trust. Rather than trust being seen as a measure of pre-
dictability, it is viewed as a quality one possesses, which is gained over time through
honest behaviour. In the Trunits model, abstract units are used to represent trust in
much the same way that units of money represent value. In a manner similar to money,
trunits flow during transactions. A trader’s trunit balance determines if she is trustwor-
thy enough to engage in a given transaction. Faithful execution of a transaction results
in a larger trunit balance, permitting the trader to engage in more transactions in the
future—a built-in economic incentive for honesty. Dishonest behaviour results in lost
trunits (i.e., lost trust), which both punishes for the dishonest action, and protects other
agents by inhibiting the cheater’s future transactions. While Trunits is a model of trust, it
has characteristics of a mechanism, since its rules align the goals of agents with the de-
sired behaviour—honesty. Based on this model, we introduce two specific mechanisms.
Basic Trunits, described in Chapter 4, is a direct implementation of the Trunits model.
In Chapter 5, we introduce an extension to Basic Trunits known as Commodity Trunits,
in which units of trust may also be bought and sold by traders, and we show that this
feature provides enhanced security.
Trunits has a number of important strengths; we list a few here. First, it directly
addresses many of the important vulnerabilities common in existing models, because the
rules of the system make these forms of cheating less attractive (i.e., less profitable) than
honesty. Second, because protection is provided by the structure of the market, every
buyer is equally protected. This is in contrast to predictive models, where protection
may be limited by individual agents’ information and capacity for prediction. Third, in
one important way Trunits is ‘fairer’ than existing models, in that every seller with the
required number of trunits is considered trustworthy for a given transaction—recent en-
trants are not discriminated against in favour of established sellers. This is in contrast
to certain predictive models, in which the most trustworthy seller is selected and new
entrants may begin with a very low trust rating. Fourth, Trunits has extremely low com-
putational and storage requirements. As will be shown, long transaction histories need
not be stored under Trunits, and a limited number of simple mathematical operations
are required after each transaction. Finally, Trunits provides an interesting possibility:
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marketplaces in which buyers and sellers can be anonymous to one another, but can still
trust one another.
A list of strengths, however, does not directly address our overriding concern: se-
curity. While Trunits combats many of the vulnerabilities common in existing systems,
other unknown weaknesses might be present, perhaps even introduced by our very ef-
forts to combat vulnerabilities. This raises a key question: how can one be certain of a
system’s security? In our view, if ‘security’ requires the absence of vulnerabilities, it is not
sufficient simply to show that a system does not suffer from any known vulnerabilities—
unless an exhaustive list of possible vulnerabilities were to be developed, one could never
trust in the security of the system. Instead, we borrow ideas from two fields as the basis
for our notion of security. First, from cryptography we adopt the view that for a system to
be considered secure, it should be provably secure; further, if a system cannot be shown
to be absolutely secure, we might specify and prove the precise degree of security it does
provide [20]. Second, from the field of formal methods we make use of the idea of safety
properties—to verify that our system will not allow harm to occur, we formally define a
system specification consisting of a set of properties that must hold for participants to be
‘safe’ [25].
Ultimately, this is the key goal: to assure users that the trust system itself is trustwor-
thy, so that they can feel safe in adopting or participating in the system. To that end, we
have developed a framework for evaluating the security provided by trust and reputation
systems, presented in Chapter 6. The application of this framework results in a precise
characterization of the security properties of a model; in particular, it enumerates a set
of conditions that must hold in a marketplace for the system to guarantee the security
of participants. This set of conditions is an important research tool for the designers
of trust and reputation models in multiagent systems. Application of this framework to
both Trunits mechanisms reveals that they do offer provable protection under specific




Our consideration of trust and reputation models begins with an examination of the
system used by eBay. Using eBay as a example, we are able to identify a number of
important vulnerabilities in trust models—weaknesses that might allow unscrupulous
participants to damage others and/or to profit unfairly at others’ expense. In Chapter 3,
we examine a number of existing proposals, identifying multiple vulnerabilities present
in each. The presence of these vulnerabilities, i.e., the insecurity of the models, is a key
motivation for our own work.
2.1 The eBay Reputation System
While eBay’s reputation system [10] is not itself derived from (published) research, it has
been widely discussed and deeply studied in current research in the field. eBay typifies
the type of ‘new market’ with which many investigators are concerned, and has demon-
strated considerable success in implementing a reputation system that allows traders to
have confidence in one another. A discussion of eBay’s system is a valuable starting point,
for two main reasons:
1. It provides a convenient framework within which to discuss the issues faced by
trust/reputation systems for marketplaces, with real world context, and
2. It provides a benchmark against which other systems might be measured. Given
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that eBay is an established, implemented system, any proposal that specifically
targets markets of this type must improve upon eBay’s system in some way to be
interesting. (It should be noted that ‘improve upon’ does not mean only that a sys-
tem must outperform eBay in terms of effectiveness; a system might be important
in other ways, e.g., by being applicable outside the marketplace scenario, by being
implementable in intelligent agents, etc.)
The eBay system is simple in operation, compared to many proposed models. In
the eBay marketplace, sellers advertise goods that they wish to sell. Buyers seeking to
purchase goods search through those offered by sellers, choosing goods (and sellers)
that they believe will meet their needs. Before engaging in a transaction, both buyer and
seller have the opportunity to view each other’s ‘feedback profiles’ (discussed below).
After a transaction has been completed, both buyer and seller have the opportunity to
give feedback on one another’s performance, although they are not obliged to do so.
Giving feedback consists of choosing a rating of ‘positive’, ‘neutral’, or ‘negative’, for
the trading partner, and optionally leaving a single line, free-form text comment. Once
feedback has been given, it is added to the rated user’s feedback profile, and is visible to
all future potential trading partners.
A view of a feedback profile is shown in Figure 2.1. The profile presents two key
pieces of information about the user:
1. The feedback score, which is calculated as the number of unique users giving pos-
itive ratings, less the number of unique users giving negative ratings. This score
seems intended to give a rough idea of the volume of trustworthy transactions in
which the user has engaged.
2. The positive feedback percentage, calculated as the number of unique users giving
positive ratings, divided by the total number of unique users providing ratings. This
score seems intended to give a rough idea of the likelihood that the user will be
trustworthy in a given transaction.
Based on this information, the user may decide if she considers the potential partner
trustworthy enough to trade with him. For example, if a seller has too many negative
ratings in his profile, a buyer may decide that he cannot trust in that seller’s reliability.
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If a seller has too few ratings in his profile, a buyer may decide that there is not enough
evidence of the seller’s reliability to trust in him.
Figure 2.1: A feedback profile
While the system is quite simple in operation, there is no question that eBay has
achieved a substantial degree of success in convincing traders that it is adequate for
them to participate in the market. Superficially, the mechanism is extremely successful
in ensuring the satisfaction of traders, with 99.1% of feedback being positive [8]. A
deeper examination, however, suggests that the system may not be as effective as it first
appears.
2.1.1 Possible problems with the eBay System
While feedback scores indicate a high degree of trader satisfaction, there is reason to
believe that the data does not accurately reflect real satisfaction levels. In [2], it is
noted that in systems such as eBay’s, an agent who receives a bad rating may retaliate
by likewise leaving (undeserved) bad feedback for the trading partner. Fear of receiving
such a retaliatory rating discourages users from leaving negative feedback, artificially
inflating rankings. A study cited in [35] found that there is a high correlation between the
ratings of buyers and sellers in transactions, implying that feedback may say more about
the smoothness of the bilateral execution of the transaction, than about the reliability
of a single participant. The authors of [24] find that there is often pressure on traders
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to give positive ratings, causing traders to be more lenient in their feedback. (Having
personally experienced this, we can anecdotally testify that such pressure exists.)
Aside from the validity of rankings, there are also questions about whether users can
effectively and accurately make use of the ranking data. One problem, discussed in [8],
is that users are required to interpret feedback profiles themselves, without any context
or information about the users who have given this feedback. Reputation impacts both
the likelihood and price of sale, but not consistently so, indicating that individual buyers
interpret the reputation data very differently. Thus, it is hard to measure the value of
reputation, and hard for users to make decisions based on such value.
2.1.2 Vulnerabilities in the eBay System
Beyond these more abstract problems, there are specific vulnerabilities within the eBay
reputation system that dishonest sellers might use to take advantage of buyers. That such
vulnerabilities exist should not be surprising, even given the high levels of satisfaction
noted above. According to Battacharjee and Goel [2], studies have shown a substantial
amount of fraud in electronic marketplaces; if trust/reputation systems were perfect,
there would be no such fraud.
Several key vulnerabilities are identified and illustrated below. (Most of the names
assigned to the problems are our own, and are not yet standard terminology.)
The Reputation Lag problem
In many marketplaces, buyers are required to pay for goods before the seller delivers
them. After payment, there is usually some delay before the buyer actually receives
the good (due to processing, shipping, etc.), and has the opportunity to evaluate the
transaction and/or give feedback. For example, on eBay the lag between payment by the
buyer and registering the buyer’s feedback is typically one to three weeks.
This lag opens a window of opportunity for a seller to engage in unlimited cheating.
Consider a seller who decides to cheat a buyer on a transaction; the situation is depicted
in Figure 2.2. The seller may know that he intends to cheat from the time of sale, but
the buyer will not know until some time later (after he receives an inferior good, or
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gives up waiting for a good that never arrives). Due to the lag in the buyer’s negative
feedback being posted, the seller’s reputation will not deteriorate immediately, and other
buyers will not be alerted to the cheater’s dishonest behaviour until some time after it
begins—for the duration of the lag, only the cheater knows that he is cheating. Thus,
for the entire period of the lag, the seller can make use of his good reputation to cheat a


















 Figure 2.2: The Reputation lag problem
The Value Imbalance problem
In [7], Dellarocas identifies the value imbalance vulnerability. This vulnerability stems
from the fact that in many systems (including eBay), the impact of each piece of feedback
is not related to the value of the transaction—feedback on very small transactions is
weighted equally with feedback from very large transactions. A dishonest seller can take
advantage of this property to build up reputation by honestly executing a number of
small-value trades, and then using the accumulated reputation to cheat a seller in a very
high-value transaction.
For example, if the seller were to engage in 5 honest transactions, each of $1 in value,
his feedback score would be 5, with a feedback percentage of 100%. To potential buyers,
he appears to be quite honest. Using this honest appearance, he might lure a buyer into
making a $1,000 purchase, and cheat by not delivering the product. In this example, the
seller was able to cheat a buyer out of $1,000, based on the trust earned in $5 worth
of transactions. Worse still, after receiving the negative feedback, the seller would still
have a feedback score of 4, and feedback percentage of 83.3%—his reputation is far from
being irreparably damaged.
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The Ballot-Stuffing problem
Trust/reputation has value—good reputation is likely to result in greater sales volume,
and may allow higher prices to be charged. Further, good reputation can be used to lure
buyers into transactions in which they can be cheated.
Many authors ([2, 8, 36]) identify the opportunity for buyers to engage in ‘ballot-
stuffing’. Ballot-stuffing is collusive behaviour in which parties engage in fake transac-
tions in order to artificially inflate their reputations.
Some systems (such as eBay) have attempted to limit the ability of users to ballot-
stuff by only counting feedback from unique users. However, the vulnerability remains,
due to the ease with which new identities can be created; it is trivial to create many new
accounts, allowing ballot-stuffing transactions to be generated by ‘unique users’.
The Bad-Mouthing problem
Closely related to ballot-stuffing is a problem known as ‘bad mouthing’. Here, agents give
unfairly negative reviews of the victim, in an effort to damage the victim’s reputation.
This is often an attack launched against a seller—if a competitor’s reputation is damaged,
the attackers may be able to win additional sales.
The Re-entry problem
The ease of creation of new accounts introduces another vulnerability, identified by nu-
merous authors ([2, 8, 36]). In many systems (such as eBay), it is preferable to have
no reputation rather than a bad reputation; while users may be hesitant to deal with a
trader with no history, they are more hesitant to deal with a disreputable user. If a seller
has engaged in a significant amount of cheating, he will develop a bad reputation, which
should warn users not to deal with him. However, he can start fresh by simply creating
a new account, freeing himself of the restrictive reputation. In essence, the seller has
improved his reputation without engaging in even a single honest transaction. The seller
can repeat this cycle as many times as desired, cheating until his reputation is destroyed,
and then beginning again with a new identity.
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The Exit problem
The exit problem occurs when a seller who has gained some positive reputation decides
to leave the market. The accumulated reputation can induce buyers to engage in trans-
actions with the seller. The seller has no further need of her good reputation, since she
does not plan to make further sales in the market. Thus, the entire accumulated reputa-
tion can be used to cheat buyers, until it deteriorates to the point that no buyer will deal
with the seller; at this point, the seller completes her exit. This is an extremely difficult
problem to address, and one that afflicts most trust/reputation systems (including eBay).
2.1.3 A catalogue of vulnerabilities
The problems outlined in this chapter may be seen as a catalogue of known vulnerabili-
ties in trust and reputation systems. We make no claim, however, that it is an exhaustive
catalogue. In fact, it is very likely that other potential attacks, and potential vulnera-
bilities, exist. Thus, it is important to understand the role of this catalogue. It may be
useful in establishing the insecurity of a model (by citing vulnerabilities present in it),
and in informing researchers as they seek to develop more secure methods. It cannot
be used to declare a model secure, on the basis that it does not suffer from the known
vulnerabilities.
In the next chapter, we consider a number of existing proposals, using this catalogue




As discussed in Chapter 2, several important vulnerabilities exist in the eBay reputation
system. Such vulnerabilities are of great importance to a trust/reputation system: they
can allow an attacker to cheat without repercussions. Specifically, weaknesses of this
nature can allow cheating actions that are not predictable or preventable by the system,
or that have no negative consequences for the cheater.
Ideally, a ‘secure’ trust/reputation system would prevent each of these problems,
without introducing substantial new ones. Unfortunately, as our survey below will re-
veal, these vulnerabilities also affect many of the other trust/reputation systems that
have been proposed. In our examination of related work, we use the vulnerabilities
catalogued in Section 2.1.2 as important criteria with which to appraise and compare
proposals. In later chapters, we use this same catalogue to evaluate our own proposed
mechanisms.
An enormous amount of work has been conducted in this field, and it is well beyond
the scope of this thesis to examine all of it. Instead, we examine a sample of systems that
we believe to be representative of the breadth of work in the field.
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3.1 Predictive models
First, we examine models that we consider to be primarily predictive in nature. These
systems attempt to help agents to find better partners by predicting the behaviour of
potential partners. Candidates that are seen as likely to be dishonest can be avoided
by the agent, while those that have a high likelihood of being honest can be favoured.
Predictive models employ a variety of techniques; we discuss a number of such models
in this section.
In the survey of trust/reputation systems conducted in [27], the authors characterize
systems in a number of dimensions. We use one of these dimensions, that of ‘information
sources’, to group systems for convenience of analysis.
3.1.1 Direct Experience models
Direct experience models are those in which an agent evaluates the trustworthiness of
a potential partner based on the agent’s own experience with that partner. Models fre-
quently make use of multiple information sources, but here we consider only models that
exclusively use direct information.
General/Situational/Multi-Dimensional Trust
So-called ‘general trust’ models like those described by Marsh [18] and Griffiths [12]
can be applied to marketplaces—Griffiths specifically discusses this scenario in his paper.
Under these models, an agent’s trust of another is based solely on its own experience
with the other agent.
Marsh’s work represents some of the earliest in the formal consideration of trust in
computational scenarios. In his model, agent x’s Basic Trust (Tx) constitutes x’s dispo-
sition, her general tendency to trust others. General Trust refers to the agent’s degree
of trust of other specific individuals, but outside any specific consideration of situation:
agent x’s trust of agent y is denoted Tx(y). The author also notes that trust may be sit-
uation specific; I may trust you to pass along a message to another, for example, but I
might not trust you with my money. He thus defines Situational Trust: Tx(y, α) denotes
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x’s trust of y in situation α. All three types of trust have values in the range [-1, 1), with
1 representing maximum trust, −1 representing maximum distrust, and 0 representing
‘no trust’, or unknown trustworthiness. An agent will choose to cooperate with another
if the appropriate trust value exceeds a certain threshold.
Griffiths’ Multi-Dimensional Trust builds on Marsh’s General Trust. In this model,
the view is taken that overall trust may have different aspects, each of which may be
considered separately. For example, I may have a high degree of trust that you will deliver
a product on time, but a low degree of trust that the product will work properly. Thus,
trust is decomposed into a number of dimensions. In each dimension d, trust of agent α
(T dα) falls in the range [0, 1], with 0 representing complete distrust and 1 complete trust.
To evaluate the trustworthiness of agent α in a particular situation, the evaluating agent
assigns a weight ui to each dimension i reflecting its relative importance. A performance
value for the situation can then be calculated by taking a weighted product of the trust






To choose between potential partners, the agent chooses the one with the highest per-
formance value. After the transaction is complete, the agent updates his trust values for










α − ((1− T dα)× (ωf × T dα)) (3.3)
where ωs and ωf are weighting factors for success and failure respectively, specifying the
agent’s disposition.
Direct experience models like these have limited applicability to a market of size
comparable to eBay, since they rely on direct experience with agents. Because of the
immense size of the market, a buyer would not be able to gain experience with more
than a tiny fraction of the sellers in the marketplace. Further, the high frequency of one-
time transactions (which occur because any given seller’s offered goods are not likely to
match a buyer’s needs repeatedly) compounds the difficulty in gaining experience with
sellers.
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A major disadvantage of these models is that a buyer must learn which sellers to trust
and distrust. This means that buyers are vulnerable to unscrupulous sellers until they
have learned to avoid those sellers, providing the dishonest sellers with an initial window
of opportunity to cheat. The models address this problem to a degree by favouring known
reputable sellers, but this is only possible when such a seller is offering the needed good
at the moment of purchase—this occurs infrequently in large markets with a diverse
range of goods, such as eBay.
With reference to the problems identified in Section 2.1.2, these systems tend to
be resistant to the reputation lag problem (since they rely only on direct experience,
not on receiving the (delayed) feedback of others) and the ballot-stuffing/bad-mouthing
problems (for the same reason). However, in the form presented, they are vulnerable to
the value imbalance problem (since the value of the purchase is not taken into account
when considering the trustworthiness of the user), the re-entry problem (since there is
an incentive for disreputable users to re-enter the market, because unknown sellers are
treated differently than disreputable ones), and the exit problem. Further, the re-entry
problem can combine with the initial window of opportunity in a dangerous way: a seller
may re-enter the market each time that sellers learn of his dishonesty, in order to take
advantage of the initial window repeatedly.
Tran and Cohen
In the work of Tran and Cohen [30, 31], both buyers and sellers are learning agents—
buyers learn to avoid purchasing low quality goods, while sellers learn to maximize
profit. In this model, buyers and sellers make decisions based only on their own experi-
ences.
In this system, each buyer b maintains ratings rb(s) for each seller s; ratings fall in the
range (-1, 1), with a beginning value of 0. Each buyer b also maintains an expected value
function f b(g, p, s) for each seller s, the expected value that the buyer will derive from
buying good g at price p from the seller.
A buyer maintains sets of known reputable sellers (i.e., those with ratings above
a reputable threshold Θ) and known disreputable sellers (those with ratings below a
disreputable threshold θ). Sellers who fall into neither category are considered to be
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at least non-disreputable. A buyer first attempts to choose from the reputable set the
seller who provides the maximum expected value. If there is no reputable seller offering
the good, the buyer chooses a non-disreputable seller who again provides the maximum
expected value for the good. In addition, with a small probability the buyer chooses to
explore (rather than exploit) the marketplace by randomly choosing a non-disreputable
seller. This allows a buyer to discover new sellers.
After a purchase, the buyer adapts using reinforcement learning, updating both the
reputation rating and the expected value for the seller. Expected value is updated using
f b(g, p, s)← f b(g, p, s) + α∆ (3.4)
where ∆ is the difference between the actual value received and the expected value, and
α is the learning rate. If the seller provided a good of at least the value demanded by the





rb(s) + µ(1− rb(s)) if rb(s) > 0,
rb(s) + µ(1 + rb(s)) if rb(s) < 0
(3.5)
where µ > 0 is called the cooperation factor. If the value provided is less than that





rb(s) + ν(1− rb(s)) if rb(s) > 0,
rb(s) + ν(1 + rb(s)) if rb(s) < 0
(3.6)
where ν < 0 is called the non-cooperation factor. The values for µ and ν can be varied
so as to give greater weight to transactions of higher value, providing protection again
value imbalance. Additionally, these parameters can be set so as to make trust easier to
lose than it is to earn.
In this system, sellers also employ reinforcement learning; the learning simply focuses
on how to maximize profit by choosing the parameters of the goods offered.
As a direct experience model, the work of Tran and Cohen shares many character-
istics with the Marsh/Griffiths models discussed above. Again, this model is of limited
applicability to very large markets, if repeated transactions between traders are rare, due
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to the lack of direct experience gained with individual sellers. Further, although the sys-
tem explicitly favours known sellers, it is still subject to the initial window of opportunity
when buyers use sellers with whom they have no experience.
Due to its reliance on directly acquired information, this system is resistant to the
reputation lag, ballot-stuffing, and bad-mouthing problems. Further, by considering the
value provided by the seller, the model provides protection against value imbalance. The
model is vulnerable, however, to the re-entry problem (since unknown and disreputable
sellers are treated differently) and the exit problem. Further, as with the previously-
discussed models, this system suffers from the potentially dangerous combination of
re-entry with the initial window problem.
3.1.2 Witness Information models
Witness information models are those in which the agent makes use of information sup-
plied by other agents (instead of, or in addition to direct experience) in evaluating the
trustworthiness of a potential partner.
Sporas and Histos
In [36], Zacharia et al. introduce two systems, Sporas and Histos.
Under the Sporas system, each agent has a single, global reputation score, which is
updated after each transaction. According to [27], Sporas is an ‘evolved version’ of an
eBay-like system, making use of a related mechanism. However, it incorporates many
interesting features:
• In order to eliminate the re-entry problem, new users do not begin with better
reputations than disreputable users.
• If an agent rates another more than once, only the most recent rating is considered,
to minimize the impact of ballot stuffing.
• To combat the creation of new accounts for the purpose of ballot stuffing, more
weight is given to ratings from users with established reputations.
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• A ‘memory’ factor is used to de-emphasize older ratings.
The Histos system allows for personalized ratings by making use of a ‘web of trust’
model. A digraph is maintained in which nodes represent agents and edges represent
ratings. When an agent seeks information about another, unknown agent, all paths (of
less than a specified length) from the first agent to the second are found; reputation
scores are determined by composing the scores along each of these paths, reflecting the
trustworthiness of recommending agents along the path. Histos relies on a large number
of rankings, since paths must be found between nodes. To bootstrap the system, or in
the absence of paths between two nodes, the system relies on the Sporas system.
As discussed above, Sporas is resistant to ballot-stuffing and provides no incentive
for re-entry. However, both models are vulnerable to the reputation lag problem (since
they rely on the information provided by others), the value imbalance problem (since
reputation changes are not linked to the value of transactions), and the exit problem.
REGRET
Like Griffith’s model [12], the REGRET system [26] also takes a multi-dimensional per-
spective on the modeling of reputation.
In this model, each agent maintains a database of ‘impressions’ of previous transac-
tions, where impressions record the agents involved in the transaction, the particular
dimension of the transaction being rated (for example, delivery time), and a rating. The
ratings fall in the range [-1, 1], where 1, 0, and -1 represent maximally positive, neu-
tral, and maximally negative ratings, respectively. An agent’s individual, subjective view
of another agent’s reputation is the average of the ratings from impressions that match
the desired transaction parameters (e.g., where required delivery time was less than 5
days), weighted to place greater emphasis on more recent transactions. The number and
variability of the ratings are used as measures of the reliability of the estimate.
REGRET takes an ontological view of the multi-dimensionality of reputation—the
opinions in multiple dimensions can be combined into a rating for a higher-level di-
mension (e.g., opinions on price and product quality might be combined into a general
opinion of a seller’s quality.) The REGRET system also allows an agent to incorporate the
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views of other agents. Based in the idea that members of a group ‘share a common way
of thinking’, agent A’s view of another agent B can be combined (using weighted aver-
ages) with the opinions of members of A’s group about B, opinions of A about members
of B’s group, and opinions of members of A’s group about members of B’s group.
In [26], the authors discuss the use of this system in a marketplace scenario. In this
environment, no ‘groups’ exist—all agents are considered to belong to the same group.
Here, the model devolves into a combination of direct experience and a global reputation
value. Under these circumstances, REGRET does not diverge from the eBay system in any
way that substantially addresses the problems identified in Section 2.1.2, and therefore
faces the same vulnerabilities.
Yu and Singh
In the model presented in [35] by Yu and Singh, a trader estimates the trustworthiness of
a potential partner by using both its own experience, and advice from other agents. Their
model makes use of referral networks, in which each agent has a set of ‘acquaintances’
(other agents for which the agent maintains reliability models). The agent also keeps a
subset of acquaintances as a ‘neighbourhood’, a set of agents from whom the agent would
ask for recommendations, and whom the agent would recommend to others. When asked
for a recommendation, an agent may provide one from its own experience, or may for-
ward the query to its neighbours—hence the term, ‘referral network’. An agent modifies
its model of an acquaintance based on its own experience, ratings of the acquaintance
provided by others, and the validity of recommendations provided by the acquaintance.
While many systems combine recommendations from agents, the authors have chosen
to do so using the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [16]. They believe this method
is superior to others due to its ability both to consider the trustworthiness of the sources
of recommendations, and to distinguish the case where an agent believes another to be
unreliable from the case where it does not believe another to be reliable (based on lack
of evidence). This is in contrast to the Bayesian approach, which ‘cannot distinguish
between lack of belief and disbelief’—if an agent is not known to be reputable, it is
considered disreputable.
Only to the degree that an agent relies on its own experience rather than witness
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information, this system is resistant to the ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing problems. It
appears to be vulnerable to the re-entry problem, since it explicitly treats those with no
reputation and poor reputation differently. The model is vulnerable to the reputation lag
problem (since it relies on the information of others), the value imbalance problem (since
reputation changes are not linked to the value of transactions), and the exit problem.
The Beta Reputation System
In [15], Jøsang and Ismail introduce the Beta Reputation System (BRS), a model based
in statistical theory. BRS makes use of the well known beta probability distribution,
which allows the estimation of the probability of a binary event occurring, given the
observed number of successes and number of failures in the past. Based on these two
input parameters, a probability density function (PDF) can be derived—this function
allows the determination of the likelihood (based on the observations) that the actual
probability of the event occurring on any given trial falls within any given range.
In BRS, an agent uses the beta distribution to estimate the likelihood that another
agent will fulfill his commitment, based on past experience with that agent. An agent X
will combine its own evaluation of another agent T (based on experience) with ratings
for T provided by other agents in the system.
The authors acknowledge that recommending agents may not be trustworthy; for this
reason, the authors introduce ‘reputation discounting’, a process by which an agent Y ’s
recommendations are modified before they are added to the sum of all other recommen-
dations received, based on the evaluating agent X ’s view of Y ’s reliability.
In a later paper [34], an alternative method for dealing with unfair ratings is intro-
duced. Here, the authors take an endogenous perspective, the view that unfair ratings
might be detected and excluded based solely on their statistical properties. The essential
idea is that extremely high or low ratings (relative to the bulk of ratings) may be of du-
bious validity, so removing such recommendations from consideration may yield better
predictions. In particular, the removal of extreme ratings may limit the ability of agents
to manipulate the results by intentionally giving inaccurate reviews (e.g., ballot stuffing
and bad mouthing.)1
1This is not unlike the ratings systems used in sports such as diving and figure skating. In these sports,
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By allowing different ratings to have different weights (e.g., more expensive pur-
chases might be weighted more heavily than less expensive ones), BRS can provide
protection against the value imbalance problem, and the filtering algorithm provides
some protection against ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing. Unfortunately, however, if
many agents are providing unrealistically high or low ratings (as in a coordinated ballot-
stuffing or bad-mouthing attack), these ratings will not appear to be so extreme in the
context of all collected ratings, undermining the effectiveness of the algorithm.
The authors acknowledge the vulnerability of BRS to re-entry. The system provides
no protection from reputation lag (since agents rely on the recommendations of others),
nor from the exit problem.
TRAVOS
The TRAVOS system, described in [29], has much in common with BRS. It, too, makes
use of beta distributions to predict the likelihood of honesty of an agent, based on the
total numbers of observed successes and failures; the expected value of the resulting beta
distribution is the evaluating agent’s level of trust. (Unlike BRS, it limits these ratings to
binary events: complete success, or complete failure.)
As with BRS, TRAVOS allows the evaluating agent to combine its own experience
with recommendations of other agents, essentially by adding the number of successes
and failures reported by recommenders to its own counts. TRAVOS provides a specific
decision rule, however, to determine when an agent should seek out recommendations
from others to supplement its own experience: if the agent’s confidence is below a pre-
defined threshold, then the agent seeks out these recommendations.
In contrast to BRS, TRAVOS takes an exogenous approach to cope with the issue of
unfair ratings by recommenders, making use of information beyond just the statistical
properties of the ratings. When evaluating the credibility of a recommendation, the
evaluating agent considers the degree of accuracy of ratings previously provided to the
agent by the recommender. Essentially, TRAVOS reduces the weight of recommendations
competitors’ performance is rated by a number of judges. A competitor’s score is calculated by accumulat-
ing the scores of all judges, except the highest and lowest scores, which are discarded—this is an effort to
prevent a single judge from manipulating the scores.
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from unreliable sources by ‘pulling’ them towards the uniform distribution (i.e., the no-
evidence case)—the lower the level of confidence in the recommender, the further the
values are ‘pulled’.
Unlike BRS, TRAVOS provides no protection against value imbalance, because it does
not allow ratings to be weighted based on transaction value. TRAVOS may provide
greater protection than BRS against ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing, however: the
credibility of ratings is determined based on the actual accuracy of past recommenda-
tions, rather than against current recommendations from other agents, which may have
been manipulated. A key problem with TRAVOS, acknowledged by the authors, is that
an agent’s behaviour is assumed to be consistent over time. This assumption may un-
dermine the protection against ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing discussed above. An
agent who is part of a coalition may provide unfairly high ratings for coalition partners,
but fair ratings for agents outside the coalition. If the agent provides a large number of
recommendations for non-coalition agents, he may be considered credible.
As with BRS, TRAVOS is vulnerable to re-entry, reputation lag (since agents rely on
the recommendations of others in some cases), and the exit problem. It should be noted
that TRAVOS is also vulnerable to the initial window problem. If the agent has no expe-
rience with a seller, he will seek recommendations, but if he has received no recommen-
dations in the past either, the current recommendations cannot be properly evaluated.
3.2 Transactional models
The Trunits model is difficult to classify into the information source categories identified
in [27], because it is not a predictive model. Under Trunits, a buyer does not form
a belief of a seller’s trustworthiness based on personal experience, nor does he consult
with others to gain their opinions. Instead, Trunits make use of ‘units’ of trust that flow in
the course of transactions, with a seller’s quantity of trunits determining her established
level of trustworthiness. Here, we consider models that are also ‘transactional’, making
use of an accounting system, or relying on units that flow during transactions.
Peer-to-peer systems, like those used for sharing files, work well only if there are suf-
26 Toward Secure Trust and Reputation Systems for Electronic Marketplaces
ficient numbers of users providing content. Unfortunately, these systems can be plagued
with ‘free-riders’ who download large quantities of files without serving any content.
Further, attacks have been made on such systems by users serving useless content dis-
guised as more desirable material. In such attacks, the goals are to waste bandwidth and
make it more difficult for users to find the files they seek. For these reasons, there has
been significant interest in trust/reputation in the peer-to-peer community, with some
proposals being transactional in nature.
Gupta et al.
One such proposal is that of Gupta, Judge, and Ammar [14]. Under their system, rep-
utation scores are maintained using one of two mechanisms. Under the debit-credit
policy, reputation is increased when a user contributes resources, and decreased when
he consumes resources. The credit-only policy handles contributions in the same way,
but ignores consumption. (The authors note the vulnerability of the credit-only policy to
ballot-stuffing.)
While this proposal is described as a reputation system, it essentially models value,
not trustworthiness: a user’s ability to download is directly tied to the value of its contri-
butions, meaning that uploads are effectively being exchanged for downloads. Thus, the
reputation score is serving as currency, and is a proxy for value rather than trust.
Mojo Nation
At the suggestion of a reviewer of one of our papers, we examined a system employed
by a now-defunct company called Mojo Nation[21]. Mojo Nation was a “peer-to-peer
content distribution technology”, in which agents are both consumers and providers of
network resources such as bandwidth and storage space. A ‘digital currency’ known as
Mojo is employed to execute transactions, using a system of micro-payments. Essentially,
when an agent consumes a resource provided by another, it makes a micro-payment of
some quantity of Mojo—this Mojo may be used by the resource provider to consume
resources later. As the author claims, this mechanism makes the system resistant to at-
tacks such as denial-of-service. As with the previous system, however, resources provided
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are essentially being exchanged for access to resources—Mojo is taking the role of cur-
rency. As such, Mojo simply models value, addressing none of the issues of trust in a
marketplace any more than the exchange of money does on its own.
Grothoff
[13] discusses the economic system underlying GNUnet, another peer-to-peer file sharing
system. The author states that GNUnet uses trust, rather than money, as its currency.
Further, GNUnet makes use of the concept of risk, an idea central to Trunits.
Essentially, the GNUnet economic system operates as follows:
• When an agent wishes to request a resource, it offers some quantity of trust to the
potential service provider. This trust is risked by the requester.
• If the load on the service provider is low enough that it can easily service all re-
quests, it does not actually collect the trust risked by requesters. If resource demand
exceeds what can be accommodated, however, it prioritizes requests by the quan-
tity of trust risked, and charges each serviced node the quantity of trust offered.
This system is designed to promote the fair allocation of resources. Specifically, it is
designed to allow free access to plentiful resources, while charging a ‘fee’ for scarce
ones. It is clear, however, that the ‘trust’ used in GNUnet is, again, really a unit of value,
since it is exchanged for access to scarce resources. As such, it does not address the issues
of trust in a marketplace any more than the exchange of money does on its own.
3.3 Mechanism design approaches to trust
The Trunits model has a strong connection to the area of mechanism design [19]—
Trunits attempts to eliminate dishonest behaviour by providing a strong incentive for
sellers to behave honestly. Buyers, in turn, ultimately trust the system, beyond simply
trusting individual sellers.
In this section, we consider some mechanism design approaches to the issue of trust.
Researchers in mechanism design have largely taken a different perspective than many
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trust and reputation researchers: rather than providing a model to be used in a wide
variety of circumstances (and leaving issues/vulnerabilities outstanding), they have in-
stead attempted to provide provably correct solutions to smaller problems. As such, the
proposals described below do not constitute ‘complete’ trust/reputation models. We ex-
amine them to understand the strengths and limitations of current work in this area, and
to discover techniques that may be applied in our own work. In the interest of brevity,
the systems are not examined in great detail. Instead, we focus on the following key
questions, where applicable:
• What is the overall rationale/operation of the system?
• To what degree is the system subject to the vulnerabilities we have already identi-
fied?
• What new problems/issues, which we need to address, are revealed in the work?
• What can be learned from the work, and applied to strengthen/extend our method?
3.3.1 Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Trust Revelation
Braynov and Sandholm
Braynov and Sandholm have investigated incentive-compatible mechanisms for trust and
reputation. An incentive-compatible mechanism [19] is one in which the each agent’s
best strategy is to tell the truth—in this case, the mechanism would be designed so
that an agent’s profit is maximized when it honestly declares its trustworthiness. Such a
mechanism would be a powerful tool. In [3] a proof of the existence of such a mechanism
is provided, without a specific implementation. The existential proof is based on some
assumptions, as follows:
• The seller has a certain probability of completing any transaction honestly. This
probability, β, is known to the seller. The expected utility of the seller is dependent
on β (since its cost depends on whether it fulfills the sale honestly or not), as well
other transaction parameters (good purchased, price, quality, etc., composed into
a single variable q).
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• There is a specific value for q that maximizes the seller’s utility.
The mechanism proceeds as follows. First, the seller declares its β value. Based on
this declaration, the buyer chooses the remaining transaction parameters q. Because the
seller’s utility is a function of both β, and q, the buyer can choose a value for q that
maximizes profit at the declared β. If the seller lied about its β, then it will earn a profit
less than it would if it had declared honestly.
Other required assumptions impose important limitations, however:
• It is assumed that β is known to the seller, but whether or not the transaction
is actually completed honestly is required to be random, even from the seller’s
perspective. In reality, a seller often knows with certainty whether it will complete
a transaction honestly.
• More importantly, the proof of such a mechanism’s existence is based on the seller’s
honest declaration of β, followed by the buyer’s choice of q. However, the seller
is extremely unlikely to have a fixed value of β for all transactions—likelihood
of completion almost certainly varies depending on transaction parameters. This
means that β is dependent on q, and undermines the mechanism whose existence
has been proven.
In [4], a specific mechanism of this nature is presented, where the seller’s utility
is dependent on the quantity of good sold. Given price P and quantity q, the utility
function of the seller is defined to be US(q) = Pq − βC(q), where β is the seller’s actual
trustworthiness (i.e., the probability of delivering the promised good), and C(q) is the
cost function of the seller in providing quantity q of the good. The cost function is
assumed to be increasing and convex.
A seller makes a declaration of its trustworthiness, denoted as δ. The buyer then
chooses the quantity to purchase based on the seller’s declaration, using a ‘quantity func-
tion’. The authors prove that there is exactly one quantity that makes truthful declaration
the seller’s utility-maximizing strategy:
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where C ′ is the first derivative of the seller’s cost function, and the cost function is twice
differentiable.
Note that this system does not prevent dishonesty, but rather allows the buyer to
receive truthful declarations of trustworthiness from each agent, which might be used to
choose between traders. While subject to the problems discussed above, this mechanism
suffers from another: it is based on the assumption that the buyer knows the seller’s
cost function with certainty. While the author asserts that this information is relatively
easy to secure, we find this claim dubious. It is often the case that a business will not
even know its own cost function with certainty—establishing that of another is extremely
problematic. Further, the assumption that the cost function is convex is contrary to the
notion of economies of scale, which apply in many circumstances.
3.3.2 Mechanisms based on correcting cheating behaviour
Goodwill Hunting
In [7], the Goodwill Hunting system is proposed. Under this system the marketplace
contains not only buying and selling agents, but also a market operator who acts to
ensure that any excessive profits earned by a cheating agent are subsequently ‘clawed
back’ from that agent.
Under this system, a product’s utility for the buyer is seen as a direct function of
product quality. To initiate a sale, the seller declares the quality of his product. However,
this declaration is made to the market operator, and not to the buying agent; instead,
the market operator publishes a quality value to buyers that may differ from the seller’s
declaration (as detailed below). The price that the buyer pays for a product is based
on its utility, given the published quality. After the transaction is completed, the buyer
reports its perceived quality of the good received.
Initially, the operator will publish the seller’s declared quality without modification.
If the buyer’s reported quality is the same as that published, a fair transaction is deemed
to have occurred. Consider the case, however, where the buyer’s perceived quality is
less than that reported by the agent. Since the price is determined by quality, the buyer
will have paid too much—a price based on a higher expected quality. The difference
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between what was actually paid, and what ‘should’ have been paid is seen as excess profit
for the seller. To rectify the situation, the market operator will devalue future quality
declarations by that buyer. Reducing the published quality will reduce profit on those
future sales—the reduced future profits will eventually offset the unfairly earned profit,
until the situation is rectified. (The reverse is also true—if the seller under-declares
quality, future declarations will be increased, so increased profits will compensate for
money ‘left on the table’. This raises a potential issue—can a system be seen as providing
protection to buyers, when it intentionally overstates product quality to those buyers?)
In the long term, a seller fares no better by misrepresenting product quality.
This system is noteworthy in the active participation of the market operator in the
execution of transactions; rather than simply providing information, the market operator
intervenes to ensure that honest behaviour is most profitable. Our Trunits model takes
a similar approach. However, Goodwill Hunting is based on several assumptions that
drastically limit its applicability. One important such assumption is that sellers cannot
control the order in which products are sold. The author acknowledges that control over
the sequence allows the seller to cheat profitably via the value imbalance vulnerability;
to cope with this, he assumes that inventory levels do not exceed a single unit. Even
under his assumptions, the system suffers from the exit problem, the re-entry problem,
and the ballot-stuffing problem.
Ba et al.
In [1], an economic incentive mechanism is proposed to encourage trustworthy be-
haviour in markets. The authors model individual transactions as instances of the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Noting that defection by both parties is the Nash equilibrium in any
single transaction (i.e., each player’s action is an optimal response to the other’s action),
they present a scheme in which defectors might be punished in the repeated game, mak-
ing cooperation the more profitable strategy. Their proposed system imposes this pun-
ishment even if each sale in the repeated game is with a different partner—they make
use of a trusted third party (TTP) and a cryptographic system to allow this. As in [7],
this scheme makes the TTP an active participant in the execution of transactions.
TTPs are currently used to establish identity on the Internet via digital certificates.
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The authors suggest the augmentation of this scheme by having the TTP track trustwor-
thiness as well as identity. When engaging in a transaction, the agent offers its certificate
to the other, who then verifies it with the TTP. If the TTP verifies the certificate, it con-
firms not only the identify, but the trustworthiness of the agent. Essentially, the scheme
proceeds as follows:
• At the beginning of the transaction, the agents exchange certificates. Each verifies
the trustworthiness of the partner by verifying the certificate with the TTP. (Trans-
actions are also permitted without the use of a certificate, but these provide no
protection against cheating.)
• After successful verification, the game proceeds. If an agent defects, the TTP im-
poses a fine (commensurate with the transaction value) on that agent.
• If the agent pays the fine, it continues to be considered trustworthy. If it does not,
then the TTP ‘revokes’ the certificate, refusing to validate it in the future.
The authors show that, with appropriate parameter values, this mechanism makes honest
play the most profitable strategy.
To eliminate re-entry, the authors depend on the ability of the TTP to research and
firmly establish the identity of every trader, and to investigate and render judgement in
every instance where a buyer is unsatisfied. This seems impractical, if not impossible, in
markets of even modest size, let alone ones of scale comparable to eBay. Removing these
flawed assumptions, the system is vulnerable to re-entry—with no fine imposed until
after a cheating transaction has occurred, this vulnerability renders the system impotent.
Even with the assumptions in place, the mechanism suffers from the reputation lag and
exit problems.
3.3.3 Mechanisms for securing honest reviews
Jurca and Faltings
In [17], an incentive compatible mechanism is presented for eliciting honest reviews
from buyers. The authors acknowledge the difficulties in obtaining (honest) feedback,
and propose overcoming this difficulty by paying buyers for reviews.
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Under this proposal, a separate currency is used within the reputation system, one
that cannot be exchanged for money. Before a transaction occurs, the buyer can ‘buy’
a rating of the seller from an ‘R-agent’, a reputation broker. After the transaction has
completed, the agent has the opportunity to provide a rating of the seller to the R-agent.
The seller may or may not receive a payment for this rating: if the next rating which
comes in matches that provided by the current agent, then she is paid; otherwise, she
is not. If the agent rates the seller honestly, there is a greater likelihood that her rating
will match the next one that is received, and she will be paid; this provides a financial
incentive for honesty.
This paper is particularly relevant as a possible complement to our Trunits model,
since we address only the trustworthiness of sellers. The operation of Trunits is depen-
dent on receiving feedback from buyers, while this mechanism gives financial incentives
for buyers to provide this feedback; the two systems might be used in parallel.
Unfortunately, this model suffers a key problem that must be addressed: it is vulnera-
ble to ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing. Under normal circumstances, an agent’s review
is most likely to match the subsequent one if she is honest. However, if we are ‘stuffing
the box’ with our own ratings, then we skew the probabilities such that honesty may no
longer be the best policy.
3.3.4 Incorporating trust into established mechanisms
Dash et al.
In [6], the incorporation of trust into the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is
considered; specifically, they target a scenario where multiple suppliers are competing
for a buyer’s business. In the VCG mechanism, all bidders submit their (single) bids
for the good (or for the buyer’s business, in this case) privately to the auctioneer. It
has been established that in this well-known mechanism, each bidder’s optimal (utility-
maximizing) strategy is to honestly declare its true valuation of the good [19]. Under
the standard VCG mechanism, however, bidders know with certainty the value that they
will derive from the good—an assumption that breaks down when faced with possibly
untrustworthy suppliers. Essentially, under the proposal of Dash et al. the trustworthi-
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ness of competing providers is addressed by modifying the standard VCG allocation and
pricing functions, incorporating the probability of success (POS).
This paper is interesting as an example of the incorporation of trust into an exist-
ing, established mechanism. However, it provides no system for actually determining
trustworthiness. Instead, it relies on the use of a separate system that provides trust-
worthiness estimates as POSes. Further, it is focused on the task-allocation scenario, in
which the trust of each bidder must be considered by a single buyer. In the standard
market scenario that we address, it is the single seller whose trust must be evaluated by
many buyers.
3.4 Summary of Related Work
In summary, there are a wide variety of approaches being considered to ensure agents
encounter trustworthy partners, but none yet offers complete protection. Many of the
models discussed in this chapter suffer from security vulnerabilities; others do not di-
rectly attack the issue of trust, or are very constrained in the situations/assumptions
under which they apply. Convinced of the importance of security to trust and reputation
systems, and inspired by the apparent lack of secure systems, we set out to develop a




In this chapter, we present a novel model for trust in multiagent systems, Trunits. Trunits
differs from most existing trust models, in that it attempts not to predict behaviour, but
rather to ensure good behaviour by making honesty the most profitable strategy.
Trunits is inspired by the concept of money. Before the advent of money, goods and
services were exchanged by bartering. This placed several limitations on trade:
• Buyers and sellers had to interact directly, in order to exchange goods.
• For two parties to trade, each had to possess something the other needed. The
goods exchanged had to be of comparable value.
• Storing value for later use was difficult, requiring that the value be in an imperish-
able form.
These limitations represent severe bottlenecks on both the speed and quantity of trade.
A primary role of money is to overcome these limitations [23].
Money is an abstract ‘substance’, representing quantities of value. Many forms of
money (e.g., paper money) have no intrinsic value—its only worth is derived from what
someone will give you for it. Money flows in a transaction, mirroring the flow of value
in a barter transaction: the value of the money stands in for the value of a good. Money
frees traders from the requirement for a direct two-way relationship where goods move
in both directions—value gained from one trader can be ‘spent’ with another [23].
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Many researchers working on trust and reputation models for multiagent systems
are concerned with marketplaces, particularly the ‘new’ marketplaces that have recently
become prominent. Such marketplaces may be very large, and buyers and sellers rarely
meet one another directly; eBay is a typical example. The absence of direct relationships
between traders in these scenarios prevents trust from forming naturally. Since we seek
to overcome the requirement for a direct relationship—to allow trust gained from one
trader to be ‘spent’ with another—it seems natural to consider the use of abstract trust
units, or trunits, to play the same basic role in which money has been so successful.
4.1 The Trunits Marketplace
Electronic marketplaces require protocols to enable buying and selling agents to enter
into transactions. Trunits was developed with a focus on advertised price marketplaces.
In such a marketplace, sellers offer products for sale, specifying the nature of each good
and the price at which it is offered. Buyers select goods that they wish to purchase,
accepting sellers’ offers. (Our focus on this scenario does not mean that Trunits need be
inapplicable to other scenarios, however.)
When a seller’s offer is accepted by a buyer, the seller is obliged to fulfill the terms of
the offer. (This may be viewed as a promise, or more formally as a contract.) We consider
a seller’s failure to fulfill his obligation as cheating, or dishonesty. Cheating would include
both the case where a delivered good does not conform to the seller’s promise, and the
case where the seller fails to deliver a good at all. This perspective follows that taken by
other authors (e.g., [29]).
4.2 The Trunits Model
The movement of money in a transaction mirrors that of the flow of value in a direct
bartering situation. Similarly, the flow of trunits should mirror that of trust in a direct
trading relationship. The two ‘flows’, however, are fundamentally different in nature.
The flow of value in a transaction is an exchange process, wherein each trader receives
something of value, in exchange for providing the other with something of value. In
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contrast, we see the ‘flow’ of trust in a transaction as a risk process. We outline this
process below, focusing on the buyer’s trust of the seller as the primary issue:
• Before a buyer will purchase something from a seller, the buyer must have sufficient
trust in the seller. The degree of trust required is dependent on a number of factors;
the price of the item is likely a major one.
• After purchasing the good, the buyer will evaluate it, relative to her expectations.
– If the good met her expectations (i.e., it was at least as good as was advertised
by the seller), then the seller is likely to gain more of her trust.
– If the good did not meet her expectations, then the seller is likely to lose some
of her trust.
Based on this view, we suggest a model that makes use of abstract units of trust, and
in which trust of the seller is not tied to a specific buyer:
• The seller has some quantity of trunits, representing all of the trust gained from
all buyers to date. For a buyer to consider purchasing something from a seller, the
seller must possess a sufficient degree of trust, i.e., must hold sufficient trunits. The
required number of trunits is tied to the price of the good.
• After purchasing the good, the buyer will evaluate it, relative to her expectations
(i.e., to the claims of the advertisement).
– If the good met her expectations, then the seller gains some additional quan-
tity of trunits.
– If the good did not meet her expectations, then the seller loses some quantity
of trunits.
As a seller executes honest transactions, his trunit balance grows, allowing future
profitable transactions. In contrast, dishonest sales curtail future transactions. This pro-
vides the fundamental incentive for honesty. The number of trunits gained is propor-
tional to the size of the sale. Honest execution of small transactions will allow a seller
to continue making small sales, and to grow his sales volume, but will not allow him to
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immediately jump to disproportionately large sales for which he has not demonstrated
trustworthiness.
4.3 The Basic Trunits Mechanism
With this general model as a foundation, we formalize a basic mechanism that builds on
the model. This mechanism uses the notion of a market operator, who is responsible for
administering the marketplace. The operator maintains accounts and trunit balances for
each trader, holds trunits in escrow during the course of a transaction, collects feedback
from buyers and updates trunit balances, etc. We focus on marketplaces where the mar-
ket operator is an identifiable entity (e.g., eBay Inc. operating the eBay marketplace);
where such an entity is identifiable, it is considered to be a trusted third party. Trunits
might be employed, however, in situations where there is no such identifiable operator.
An example of such a scenario would be a peer-to-peer system. Under such circum-
stances, the activities of the market operator must still be performed; we may view the
‘market operator’ as the implementer of the system, or simply as the enforcement of rules
by the system.
4.3.1 Mechanism overview
When an agent wishes to make a sale, we require him to put up a quantity of trunits to
‘cover’ the sale. These trunits represent the trust that the seller is risking by engaging in
a transaction. We require that the number of trunits risked be directly tied to the value
of the transaction, using the formula:
V = rτ (4.1)
where V is the value (selling price) of the transaction, τ is the number of trunits, and r
is the required risk ratio, a (positive) parameter set by the market operator. The trunits
are put into escrow with the market operator, pending completion of the transaction.
Upon completion, if the buyer rates the transaction as unsatisfactory, then the seller
loses the τ trunits placed in escrow. If, on the other hand, the buyer rates the transaction
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as satisfactory, then the τ trunits are returned to the seller, along with some additional
quantity of trunits related to the value of the transaction, for a total of:
(1 + p)τ = (1 + p)V/r (4.2)
where p is a premium or reward of additional trust for acting in an honest manner. p is a
(positive) parameter set by the market operator. (It is suggested that p be less than 1, in
order for trust to be harder to earn than it is to lose (as suggested in [30, 31]), but this
is not a strict requirement.) In the basic mechanism presented here, the same values of
r and p are used for all traders and all transactions.
From a buyer’s perspective, no evaluation or computation is required prior to pur-
chasing to determine if a seller is trustworthy—if the seller possesses enough trunits for
a transaction, then by definition, she is trustworthy for that transaction. The market op-
erator will not allow a transaction to be executed unless the seller has sufficient trunits.
From a seller’s perspective, honesty results in a growing trunit balance and the ability to
engage in more sales in the future, while dishonesty will reduce the potential for future
sales.
4.3.2 An Example
To illustrate the mechanics of the system, consider the following example:
• A seller has 20 trunits.
• The required ratio r = 5.
• Since value and trust are related by V = rτ , the maximum transaction value that
the seller can cover is 20× 5 = $100.
Suppose now that the seller engages in a sale for a price of $50:
• Since V = rτ , the seller must place 50/5 = 10 trunits in escrow.
• If the buyer is unsatisfied, the seller loses the 10 trunits in escrow. She now has 10
trunits remaining, meaning that she can now cover transactions with a maximum
value of $50.
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• Suppose the reward ratio p = 0.2. If the seller is satisfied, then the seller’s trunits
are returned to her, and she receives an additional pτ = 0.2 × 10 = 2 trunits. She
now holds a total of 22 trunits, and can cover transactions with a maximum value
of 22× 5 = $110.
4.3.3 Important properties of the mechanism
The intention, illustrated in this example, is that trunits themselves will be valued, de-
riving from the fact that they enable profitable transactions. Under this mechanism, the
more trustworthy a seller becomes, the greater volume/value of sales she can execute.
One possible downside of this policy is that it restricts the total volume of trade, since
sellers may not possess enough trunits to sell their desired volumes of goods. It has the
beneficial consequence, however, that trustworthy traders tend to dominate the market
due to the larger sales volumes they can achieve. In many scenarios, this is a favourable
trade-off in the eyes of buyers and market developers/operators. (In turn, having willing
buyers makes a market attractive to sellers.)
Discussion of ‘market dominance’ can raise concerns of monopolistic behaviour. It
should be noted that where the same risk-ratio r applies to all traders, a seller cannot
use a large trunit balance to make its offering more attractive than that of other sellers;
any seller with sufficient trunits to cover a transaction can compete. In fact, unlike many
models, Trunits is quite egalitarian: a new and an established seller competing for a sale
will be treated equally if they have enough trunits to cover the sale, regardless of their
total accumulated trunit balances. In contrast, models such as BRS [15] and TRAVOS
[29] treat buyers with longer histories differently than those with shorter histories, even
if they have been honest with the same relative frequency. (Price-based monopolistic
behaviour is an orthogonal issue to that of trust, and falls outside the scope of our model.)
Beyond the clear advantage of ‘egalitarianism’ for new sellers, there may be an ad-
vantage for buyers as well. When different sellers have different degrees of trustwor-
thiness, a buyer may feel compelled to chose the ‘most trustworthy’ seller, even if that
seller’s good does not match his preferences as well as one offered by a less trustwor-
thy seller. Under trunits, however, each agent with sufficient trunits can be considered
equally trustworthy—the buyer is then free to choose products that best match his needs.
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An obvious question is, if trunits have measurable value, how does this system differ
from one in which the seller puts up a cash bond for each transaction, which is lost in the
event of dishonesty? There are several key issues that highlight the differences between
the two mechanisms:
• If the seller puts up a cash bond, and is determined to have been untrustworthy in
executing the transaction, what happens to the bond? If it is paid out to the buyer,
then the buyer has a financial incentive to rate the seller as untrustworthy even
when the seller has been honest. If the market operator keeps it, then the market
operator has an incentive to structure the system to encourage unfairly negative
ratings, to the detriment of sellers.
• How large does the bond have to be for a transaction? If the bond is not at least
as large as the seller’s cost to furnish the purchased good, then the seller realizes
greater profit from simply cheating the buyer (by keeping the money without pro-
viding the good) than from honestly completing the transaction. For example, if
the price of the item is $100, the cost of the item to the seller is $60, and the value
of the bond is $50, then the seller realizes a profit of $50 from cheating the buyer
and conceding the bond, but only $40 from honestly executing the transaction.
Thus, the amount of capital used to cover transactions must be of the same order
as the revenue realized from the transactions. In the case of a high-volume seller,
this financial requirement is likely to be unworkable, due both to the enormous
amount of capital that must be devoted to bonds rather than to operations, and the
financing cost of this capital.
• A bond scheme cannot easily accommodate the growth of trust that Trunits em-
ploys. If the value of a bond is to increase after each successful transaction, that
money must come from somewhere—from the market operator (in which case the
mechanism may not be financially sustainable), from the seller (in which case it
constitutes no real gain for the seller), etc. In contrast, the market operator creates
trunits without cost, so there is no obstacle to trust growth: trunits are closer to the
notion of licenses than to cash bonds.
42 Toward Secure Trust and Reputation Systems for Electronic Marketplaces
• Consider a transaction in which a buyer unfairly rates a seller as untrustworthy. In
the case of a cash bond, the seller loses actual money. In the case of the Trunits
model, the seller incurs an opportunity cost (i.e., he forgoes the opportunity to
engage in a certain quantity of profitable business in this particular marketplace in
the future), but does not lose actual money. One might argue that the unfair penalty
in the case of the cash bond is more severe. Further, the loss of actual money could
undermine the financial solvency of the seller, while the loss of Trunits will only
impact his ability to operate in this particular market.
4.3.4 Why a buyer can trust in the system: The incentive for honesty
As noted by Dellarocas [8], “sellers care about buyer feedback primarily to the extent that
they believe it might affect their future profits.”1. As discussed above, honesty increases a
seller’s trunit balance, and hence her possible future sales, while dishonesty reduces both.
This provides some degree of incentive for honesty; the question must be asked, is it a
large enough incentive? Will honesty be the most profitable policy for sellers, motivating
them to make trustworthy choices, and thus allow buyers to trust in them? Here, we
present a simple analysis of the operation of trunits, to establish that the incentive does
in fact exist. Moreover, the analysis is intended to further illustrate the operation of the
system, to provide an intuitive understanding of the incentive for honesty provided by
Trunits. In Chapter 6, we perform more rigorous analysis to establish the safety and
security of the system with precision.
Here, we consider the expected profits of the seller when executing transactions over
a period of time. The unit of ‘time’ employed is that required for the completion of a
transaction, from the initial sale until the buyer ultimately provides feedback. Note that
a seller may be harmed by unfair feedback from a buyer—the seller might lose trunits
despite having honestly provided the good. Trunits makes no effort to prevent buyer
dishonesty, focusing on regulating the behaviour of sellers.2 For the purposes of this
1It can be argued that predictive models also have an incentive effect—if the seller knows he is being
modeled, he may act honestly in order to improve his prospects for future sales. We discuss this issue in
Chapter 7.
2It should be noted, however, that while Trunits does not discourage unfair feedback from buyers, it
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analysis, we assume that buyers provide fair feedback; we address this issue in detail in
Chapter 6.
At the beginning of each unit of time, the value of goods that can be sold is limited by
the number of trunits available. We assume here that the seller engages in transactions
of the maximum allowed value, since doing otherwise would incur opportunity costs in
terms of both profit, and trunits if the sale is an honest one. (We relax this assumption
in Section 4.3.5.) The seller might execute a single large transaction, or split the trunits
in order to execute several smaller transactions. Where the same ratio r is used for every
transaction, and assuming that the cost of the goods to the seller is the same in both
cases, these scenarios have equivalent outcomes under our model: the total value of the
transactions, the total profit, and the total trunits gained are the same in both cases.
For example, consider two alternatives, a single transaction with a price of $10, or two
transactions at prices of $5 each. If r = 5, the single transaction requires 10/5 = 2
trunits, while the pair of transactions requires 2 × (5/5) = 2 trunits. If p = 0.2 and
c = 0.5, the single transaction yields 2×1.2 = 2.4 trunits and a profit of (1−0.5)×10 = 5
when executed honestly, while the pair of transactions yields 2 × (1 × 1.2) = 2.4 trunits
and a profit of 2 × ((1 − 0.5) × 5) = 5. For this reason, we simplify the analysis by
considering only the case where a single transaction is made in each time period. Under
these assumptions, in a period of time consisting of h units, our seller engages in a
sequence of h transactions.
Profit on a transaction is the difference between the selling price and the cost incurred
in selling the item. We express cost, c, as a fraction of selling price. c would include both
the actual cost incurred in the creation/provision of the good, as well as expenses such
as the commission charged by the market operator. Given that the value of a transaction
V = rτ , profit on a honest transaction is
P = (1− c)rτ (4.3)
Let τ0 represent the seller’s available quantity of trust before the first transaction in
a sequence. If all transactions from the first to the i-th are executed honestly, then after
does not provide an incentive for unfairness either; an individual buyer receives no compensation if he
reports that the seller was dishonest.
44 Toward Secure Trust and Reputation Systems for Electronic Marketplaces
the i-th transaction the seller’s quantity of trust is:
τi = (1 + p)
iτ0 (4.4)
This quantity of trust available after the i-th transaction will allow the next transac-
tion to be of value r(1 + p)iτ0. The profit earned from executing transaction i + 1 will
then be
Pi+1 = (1− c)r(1 + p)iτ0 (4.5)









(1 + p)i (4.6)
The summation above is a geometric series, so it can be represented in closed form
as:
PSh = (1− c)rτ0
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Note that we have established, with precision, the value of a quantity of trunits (if used
honestly and maximally) in terms of the future sales it allows. This valuation can serve
as the basis for rational decision making by agents.
Now, consider a seller who has engaged in a transaction with value rτ0. She has
two choices: either fulfill the transaction honestly, or cheat the buyer. In either case,
the seller receives revenue rτ0. When cheating, she loses all (τ0) of her trunits and
realizes a maximum profit on the transaction of rτ0 (in the case where she fails to supply
the purchased good at all). If she is honest, she will gain pτ0 trunits while earning a
profit of (1 − c)rτ0. While cheating results in a larger immediate profit, honesty may be
more profitable in the long run, since the trunits will allow her to engage in additional
transactions in the future. Let h be the seller’s horizon, the number of sales she can
foresee making in the future, including the current one. For honesty to be economically
advantageous, her total expected profit over the transactions in her horizon must be
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greater than that realized by cheating on this first transaction. Setting this inequality,
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(4.8)
In the inequality above, note that τ0 disappears—the existence of the incentive for
honesty is not dependent on the value of the transaction. Charting this inequality for
several values of p yields the graph displayed in Figure 4.1. Points above the curves
indicate combinations of cost ratio c and horizon h for which the honesty incentive exists.
It is evident from the chart that, unless sellers have extremely low profit margins, honesty
is economically advantageous with even very short horizons. For example where p = 0.5
and c = 0.6, the minimum such horizon is 2 transactions.
Further, it should be noted that the above analysis assumes no cost to the seller in the
event he decides to cheat. This is a very conservative assumption—given possible costs
incurred outside the mechanism itself (penalties imposed by the market operator, reme-
dies within the legal system, etc.), the incentive for honesty is likely to be even larger
than stated above.
It is unlikely that a seller’s cost structure will be known. Since the incentive mecha-
nism is sensitive to the value of c, it is valuable to understand the impact c has on the
incentive. Solving the same inequality for c, we obtain:
c < 1− p
(1 + p)h − 1 (4.9)
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Figure 4.1: Minimum Horizon for which the incentive for honesty exists.
This inequality yields a chart, shown in Figure 4.2, which is a reflection of the previous
one; points under the curves indicate combinations of c and h for which the incentive is
evident. It is clear in this graph that the incentive exists even for very high cost ratios.
For example, with p = 0.5 and a horizon of only three transactions, the incentive exists
for cost ratios up to almost 80%.
One potential problem is obvious: if the seller’s desired number of future transactions
is below this threshold, then the economic incentive for honesty is no longer clear. This is
a problem common to most trust/reputation systems—if the seller intends to make only
a small number of sales and then exit the market, the impact of dishonesty on his repu-
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Figure 4.2: Maximum cost ratio for which the incentive for honesty exists.
tation is of little consequence. This is an instance of the exit problem that was identified
previously, and will be discussed throughout this chapter and the following one.
While this analysis highlights the existence of an incentive for honesty, it gives the
impression that the incentive is dependent on market parameters. In fact, the incentive
exists essentially regardless of the values of p, r, and c, as discussed in the next section.
It is important to note that the analysis above depends on certain assumptions: the
seller knows his minimum horizon, the seller will continue to find buyers, buyers will rate
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the seller fairly, etc. To eliminate these assumptions, our analysis might introduce proba-
bilistic elements. For example, instead of having a known horizon, after each transaction
an agent might engage in a subsequent transaction with some probability δ. Under these
circumstances, an agent’s decision would be made based on expected revenues, rather
than on the ‘guaranteed’ revenues assumed above.
While these issues of uncertainty and risk are important to the incentive for honesty,
we do not incorporate them into our analysis at this point, for several reasons. First,
while certain of these issues may appear important here, analysis conducted later in this
thesis reveals them to be of lesser relevance. For example, as explained in the next sec-
tion, the incentive for honesty exists regardless of an agent’s horizon, obviating the need
to introduce probabilistic handling of this issue. Second, certain issues point to limita-
tions in the Basic Trunits mechanism. For example, the ability to find buyers in the future
essentially speaks to the exit problem: if a seller cannot find any further buyers, the seller
essentially exits the market. Basic Trunits provides only limited protection against the
exit problem (as detailed in Section 6.4.1); rather than incorporating probabilistic han-
dling of this issue into the current analysis, we instead develop a mechanism in Chapter
5 that directly addresses the problem.
These issues are discussed in further detail in Section 8.2.
4.3.5 The incentive for honesty in the general case
The analysis above illustrates the operation of the mechanism, and establishes the pres-
ence of an incentive for honesty under certain circumstances. Moreover, it gives an
intuitive feeling of the the interplay between market parameters and the nature of the
exit problem, and importantly, provides a basis for establishing the value of trunits. It
considers only a simplified scenario, however: a sequence of non-overlapping honest
transactions of maximum value. In this section, we remove these simplifying assump-
tions. Instead, we consider any arbitrary transaction, which may coincide with or over-
lap other sales by the same seller. If, on any given transaction, the rational seller will be
honest, then every sale should be conducted honestly.3
3Note that this proof, considering any arbitrary single transaction, necessarily ignores issues of
collusion—the seller is assumed to be acting alone. The issue of collusion is discussed more directly in
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We consider any seller engaged in a single transaction (i.e., a buyer has agreed to
purchase a good for price V , where V = rτ). The τ trunits used to cover the sale are not
necessarily the seller’s entire balance, but any arbitrary portion of his balance. The seller
now has a choice to make: cheat, or be honest? We assume that the seller makes his
choice based solely on his own economic motivation—in particular, he is acting alone.
Further, we assume that if there is one buyer interested in purchasing the good, there
is at least one additional buyer interested in purchasing it at the same price. (Since
an honest sale results in trunits, which have value based on their ability to be used in
future sales, at least one subsequent buyer is required to establish this value. Note,
however, that this subsequent buyer need not be interested in strictly the same product:
any combination of sales that uses the received trunits is sufficient.) We feel that this is
a realistic assumption, given the assumed large market size, and that we are operating
under traditional advertised price conditions.
If the seller cheats, the maximum profit he can realize from the sale is rτ—where he
fails to ship the good at all, so he incurs no cost. By cheating, he also loses his τ trunits.
If the seller is honest, he ships the product and realizes a smaller profit, (1− c)rτ , where
c is the cost incurred in selling the item, as a fraction of the sale price. However, after the
sale he has (1 + p)τ trunits returned to him. Since there is at least one more buyer who
wishes to purchase the same item, the seller can use the trunits to engage in another
sale with this new buyer. Since the seller decides independently whether to cheat or
be honest, he can cheat this second buyer—in fact, he need not even have one of the
items in inventory. Cheating this second buyer returns a profit of rτ , and causes the
buyer to lose τ trunits, leaving him with pτ remaining. The total profit earned (so far) is
(1− c)rτ + rτ = (2− c)rτ > rτ (since c < 1).
Thus, a rational seller will be honest on the current transaction, since he can make
more money by waiting to cheat (and earning honest profits in the interim) than by
cheating immediately and destroying the trunits used to cover the transaction.
This is not meant to imply that the rational seller will cheat on the subsequent trans-
action. Rather, on any given transaction, the seller can make more money in total by
delaying his cheating than by cheating immediately. It follows that the rational seller
the rigorous security examination presented in Chapter 6.
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will never cheat, since it always makes sense to engage in ‘just one more’ honest trans-
action. Thus, the value that one might earn by cheating on the subsequent transaction is
actually a lower bound on the profit from future honest transactions using those trunits.
We note this lower bound here because it is direct, and because it would be obvious to
any rational seller, even those whose computational capacity is limited.
It must be noted that this analysis is valid only when the seller actually has inventory.
If the seller has no items to sell (or more precisely, will never have more items to sell),
then he cannot defer cheating until the next transaction—for a transaction to occur, it
must be a dishonest one. This is an instance of the exit problem, which afflicts most
models of trust/reputation. We discuss a solution to this problem in Chapter 5, with an
extension to Basic Trunits known as Commodity Trunits.
4.3.6 The Start-up problem
The trunits mechanism, as described to this point, results in a ‘chicken-or-egg’ problem:
you earn trunits only by engaging in honest sales, but you need trunits in order to engage
in sales. There are a number of possible ways to allow sellers to enter the market without
an existing balance of trunits:
• New sellers might simply be provided with an initial quantity of trunits upon entry
to the market. In the general case, this is not an advisable option—it opens the
door to the re-entry problem, since new users would be in a better position than
maximally disreputable ones. This option may be applicable, however, in scenar-
ios where sellers’ true identities can be established with certainty, or some means
external to the mechanism can prevent re-entry.
• One possibility is to allow a new seller to put up a cash bond in order to be fronted
with a loan of some trunits. Once sufficient trunits had been earned, the seller
could repay this loan, reclaiming her bond. This system incurs some of the disad-
vantages of the cash bond system described earlier, but such bonds are in use only
for short periods of time. (As a generalization of the above, trunits could be loaned
to bonded sellers any time they had insufficient quantities to engage in desired
transactions; note that this would address the potential restraint of trade cited as a
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possible problem in Subsection 4.3.3.) We examine this option in detail in Chapter
5.
• New sellers might gain entry to the market by using a trusted broker. Such brokers
exist on eBay today—they maintain high reputations, and sell products on behalf
of other people in exchange for a fee. If the brokerage transaction were executed
inside the system, then the new seller could gain trunits from the transaction.
• One possible extension to this system, detailed in Chapter 5, is to adopt a ‘free-
market’ approach, eliminating the required ratio r, and allowing sellers to offer
any product/trunit combination they see fit. In this scenario, market forces would
determine the value of trunits. Under this system, a new entrant could sell products
using zero trunits, if they were discounted enough to motivate buyers to take the
risk. In doing so, sellers could earn trunits for later use.
The appropriate choice of these methods depends on the scenario to which the mecha-
nism is being applied.
4.3.7 The Basic Trunit mechanism’s handling of key problems
As discussed earlier, a system ideally would prevent each of the problems identified in
Chapter 2, without introducing substantial new ones. We provide a rigorous examination
of the protection provided by Trunits in Chapter 6. Here, we briefly discuss Trunits’
handling of each key vulnerability to further illustrate the operation of the system, and
to highlight its value.
The Reputation Lag problem
The Trunits mechanism deals directly with this vulnerability by compelling the seller to
place trunits in escrow to cover transactions, forcing him to wait until the trunits have
been returned before he can use them in another transaction. The Trunits mechanism
regulates the rate at which transactions can occur: if the seller holds τ trunits, then the
maximum value of transactions he can engage in during one unit of time is rτ , regardless
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of timing or circumstances. In effect, the Trunits mechanism prevents the use of the ‘same
trust’ to support multiple simultaneous transactions.
The Value Imbalance problem
The Trunits mechanism deals directly with this vulnerability by basing both the quantity
of trunits required to cover a transaction, and the size of the reward, on the value of the
transaction.
Revisiting the example from Section 2.1.2, assume that the seller executes five honest
transactions at $1 each. Using r = 5 and p = 0.2, V/r = 5/5 = 1 trunit required in
total to cover the five transactions. Executing these transactions honestly would result
in a new trunit balance of (1 + p)τ = (1 + 0.2) × 1 = 1.2 trunits, or enough to cover a
$6 transaction. The seller is unable to use the reputation gained from the five smaller
transactions to cheat a buyer out of $1,000, as he might be able to do under the eBay
system.
The Ballot-Stuffing and Bad-Mouthing problems
Collusion is a notoriously difficult problem to combat, one which has seen little progress
to date from trust and reputation researchers. As presented, Trunits provides no obvious
impediment to bad-mouthing. It is possible, however, to configure a Trunits marketplace
so as to make ballot stuffing unattractive. The key lies in an idea suggested in [2]:
if transaction costs (e.g., commissions) are larger than the expected future gain from
a ballot stuffing transaction, then there is an economic disincentive to engage in such
transactions. While this technique can be employed in Trunits, it places a strict limit on
the allowable premium p. This approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Other possibilities for coping with these collusive attacks are discussed in Chapter 7.
The Re-entry problem
In [11], Friedman and Resnick suggest a solution to dealing with the re-entry problem:
new entrants to the market should incur a cost, such that the cost of re-entry exceeds the
benefit. In [9], it is established that in marketplaces with binary feedback mechanisms,
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the policy of ‘optimal social efficiency’ is one where new users begin with the worst
possible reputation (i.e., the same as very disreputable users).
In the Trunits mechanism, new and maximally disreputable users are treated the
same, providing no incentive for re-entry, and consistent with the optimal policy. Further,
this system is fully compatible with charging fees for new accounts.
The Exit problem
The Trunits mechanism, as described above, is vulnerable to the exit problem. In fact,
while the exit problem is common to most trust/reputation systems, it could potentially
be magnified under the Trunits mechanism.
Consider a user who has accumulated a large quantity of trust/reputation, and who
has decided to leave the market. This user may decide to use her reputation to cheat
users before exiting the marketplace. Under the eBay system, the user might engage in
numerous dishonest transactions, but there would be a practical limit on the number
that could be completed. Buyers would have some warning—seeing a string of negative
transactions in the feedback profile, it would be obvious that the seller’s behaviour had
deteriorated, and buyers would stop trading with her despite her remaining positive
reputation score. In contrast, under the Basic Trunits mechanism the seller would be
free to use every available trunit for the purposes of deception, until her supply was
exhausted.
Note that, while the vulnerability might be magnified if the seller actually decides
to execute a ‘cheating exit’ from the market, Trunits provides protection against such an
event. First, as has been discussed, trunits have value, in terms of the future profitable
transactions they make possible. This value can be determined with some precision, and
may be strong incentive for the seller to stay in the market. Alternatively, this asset might
be profitably transferred to another seller (e.g., sale of the company), rather than used
for dishonest purposes. Additionally, we might allow the user to sell the trunits them-
selves, providing a more attractive (i.e., profitable) alternative to the cheating exit. While
allowing the sale of ‘trust’ is counter-intuitive, it has has many beneficial properties, and
does not undermine the incentive for honesty. These issues are examined in Chapter 5.
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A new problem: Surplus trust
The Trunits mechanism, as described here, suffers from another potential problem, not
yet noted in another model: that of surplus trust. A seller may accumulate trunits beyond
what is required to cover his regular transactions. Such surplus trunits could be used to
cheat buyers, without having a negative impact on the regular transactions.
For example, consider a seller who has a fixed production capacity, so he can only sell
five items per week. Assume that the seller has enough trunits to cover sales at this rate.
Also assume that the trust reward p = 0.2. For each honest transaction, the seller will get
back the trunits used to cover that transaction, plus a 20% reward. The trunits that were
returned are all that is required to cover his future sales as well, since his production
capacity is fixed; this means that the 20% reward is strictly in excess of his needs. The
seller may now use these surplus trunits to cheat buyers; as long as he does not spend
his original trunits on dishonest transactions, he will continue to be able to sell his entire
production without impediment.
A solution to this problem was discussed in reference to the exit problem, above:
allowing the sale of trunits. Such a policy would be strong incentive for sellers to cash
in unneeded trunits rather than using them to deceive users, if trunit sales were more
profitable than cheating. This issue is explored in Chapter 5.
4.3.8 Other noteworthy properties
In closing our overview of the Basic Trunits mechanism, it is worthwhile to highlight
some other important properties of the system.
Potential Advantages:
• The basic Trunits mechanism is very simple computationally, particularly for buy-
ers, who do not need to perform any calculations to determine a seller’s trustwor-
thiness.
• The storage requirements for the mechanism are minimal, since a single trunit
balance must be kept for each seller.
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• In many systems, it is clear that trust has an impact on profitability (since being
trustworthy allows more products to be sold, and/or fetches higher prices for prod-
ucts), but it is very difficult to measure that impact. This complicates many issues,
including both strategic decisions by sellers, and buyers’ interpretation of sellers’
histories/reputations. The basic Trunits mechanism allows the value of trust to be
determined with some precision, serving as the basis for rational decision making.
Potential Disadvantages:
• While it is possible that an encryption-based scheme might allow this system to be
implemented in a decentralized form (perhaps similar to that used in [14]), the
model strongly favours a centralized implementation, with some sort of trust man-
agement infrastructure required. In this way, it resembles the electronic payment
systems (where payments are transfers from one account to another, managed by
institutions or firms) more than that of cash payments (where individuals hold
their own funds). It is easy to envision the market maker providing such an in-
frastructure, in the same way in which eBay has provided a funds transfer system
(PayPal).
• In this form, Trunits is not suitable for use in auctions, with the possible exception
of descending price auctions (i.e., ‘Dutch’ auctions). Since the ultimate selling price
(or even the maximum possible price) is unknown at the beginning of an ascending
price or sealed-bid auction, the number of trunits required to cover the selling price
would also be unknown. If the auction is one where the price proceeds downward,
the seller might be required to have enough trunits in his possession to cover the
maximum possible selling price; however, if the prices proceed upward, there is no
way to set a maximum requirement beforehand.
• Unlike many systems, this model requires feedback from sellers on every sale. Un-
der a system such as eBay’s, if a buyer does not rate a seller, the seller’s profile
simply includes less information about his behaviour. In contrast, if a buyer doesn’t
rate a seller under Trunits, the seller’s trunits are not returned from escrow. Im-
plementations of Trunits, then, must require that buyers furnish feedback in every
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case. (Alternatively, given that it is an established aspect of consumer behaviour
that dissatisfied customers tend to be much more vocal than satisfied ones, the
system could consider the lack of feedback to constitute a positive response, after
some period of time has passed.)
• Under Basic Trunits, sellers build up trunit balances over time. Moreover, the in-
centive for honesty is dependent on sellers engaging in transactions beyond the
current one. These two properties both mean that Basic Trunits may be less suited
for marketplaces with substantial numbers of small sellers (e.g., individuals) who
are very transient. The extended mechanism proposed in Chapter 5 overcomes this
limitation.
Basic Trunits has many desirable properties, but also presents certain limitations. In




The Basic Trunits mechanism, as described in Chapter 4, has valuable properties, for ex-
ample: it provides a strong incentive for honest behaviour; it provides protection from
many of the attacks to which many existing models are vulnerable; it has minimal com-
putation and storage requirements; it allows the value of trust to be measured with
precision, allowing rational decision-making by agents. The Basic Trunits model also
faces limitations. As noted in Chapter 4, there are a number of possible extensions or
modifications of Basic Trunits that have the potential to address these limitations. In this
chapter, we discuss one such direction, which we term Commodity Trunits.
Commodity Trunits directly addresses the common and difficult exit problem vulnera-
bility, as well as the start-up and surplus trust difficulties particular to the Trunits system.
The direction taken here is mechanistic in nature—we seek to create an environment in
which rational sellers behave honestly. It might be argued that the approach described
here diminishes the claim that the result is a model of trust—aspects of what we propose
(particularly, allowing trust to be traded as a commodity) are difficult to reconcile with
any ‘real-world’ notion of trust. We discuss this issue in Chapter 7.
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5.1 Revisiting the Start-up problem
In Chapter 4, we noted that the Basic Trunits model faces a ‘chicken-or-egg’ problem—
one needs to make sales to earn trunits, but one needs trunits to make sales. To allow
new sellers to get started in the market, we suggested several possible approaches for
investigation. One such proposal was the use of loans to provide an initial quantity of
trunits to the seller. This loan would be secured by a cash bond; when the seller re-
pays the trunit loan, the bond is refunded. More generally, we discussed the possibility
of providing trunit loans at any time, alleviating unnecessary restraint of trade by al-
lowing traders to sell goods even when their trunit balances are insufficient. In fact, in
this chapter we explore a more general concept, one that encompasses these ideas: the
treatment of trust as a tradable commodity. Allowing traders to buy and sell ‘trust’ may
be counter-intuitive; as shown in the sections that follow, it is an approach that is both
safe and beneficial. Trunit loans can be seen as a special case of allowing the sale of
trunits: buying trunits, and then reselling them at the same price is equivalent (from the
borrower’s point of view) to taking out a secured loan. It is clear that, if sellers can buy
trunits, the start-up problem disappears. In the following sections, we verify the safety
of this approach, and then discuss its implications for the system, including a discussion
of key outstanding problems from Basic Trunits.
5.2 Safety requirements for trunit sales
To ensure that allowing sales of trunits is safe, some conditions must be established.
We draw our notion of safety from the field of formal methods, where system safety is
defined in informal terms as, ‘nothing bad happens’ [25]. Here, we mean specifically
that the introduction of trunit sales does not undermine the incentive for honesty in any
case for which it existed under Basic Trunits. This, in turn, would mean that it is safe
for buyers to participate in the market, since they won’t be cheated. (We address the
concept of ‘safety’ more formally in Chapter 6, in defining what it means for a system to
be secure.)
We denote the selling price of a trunit as b. In this section, we assume that all trunits
Extensions to Trunits 59
are bought and sold at this price; we relax this constraint in Section 5.5.
For a seller to wish to buy a trunit, he must expect to profit from the purchase (i.e.,
to increase his profits from sales). For the seller to make a rational purchase decision,
he must understand both the purchase price, and the expected change in profit. In
Chapter 4, we established that (given an initial quantity of trunits τ0 and a horizon of h
transactions), the profit on a series of transactions can be determined using formula 4.7.
This formula understates the profit to be earned from the quantity of trunits, however. At
the end of the sequence of h transactions, the seller still possesses trunits, which might
be used to engage in further profitable transactions, to cheat sellers, or (as discussed
below) sold for a profit. Thus, we modify formula 4.7 to account for the trunit balance at
the end of the sequence. To determine a lower bound on the value of the trunits, we base
our calculation on the assumption that the seller uses all left-over trunits to cheat at the
end of the sequence. This serves as a lower bound, because the mechanism permits the
seller to cheat at will (if he is willing to sacrifice the trunits), so he can assuredly achieve
at least this level of profit. The profit to be earned from a quantity of trunits τo, then, is
PSCh = (1− c)rτ0
(
(1 + p)h − 1
p
)
+ r(1 + p)hτ0 (5.1)
where again, c is the cost of goods to the seller (as a fraction of selling price), r is the
required ratio of trunits to selling price, and p is the premium for honesty. The profit to
be earned, then, from any individual trunit can be determined by setting τ0 = 1, yielding:
Pτh = (1− c)r
(
(1 + p)h − 1
p
)
+ r(1 + p)h (5.2)
For a rational agent to purchase a trunit, then, his expected profit from the trunit must
exceed the purchase price, i.e., b < Pτh .
A seller can use any sum of trunits τ immediately to cheat, yielding a profit of rτ . For
the sale of trunits to be safe, it must be the case that it costs more to buy them than can
be earned by cheating with them; otherwise, the seller could profit by buying trunits,
and then cheating buyers with them immediately. This requires that bτ > rτ , or b > r.
Together, this requires that r < b < Pτh. This introduces no conflict since, given the
allowable ranges of the parameters, formula 5.2 yields Pτh > r.
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For example, consider a marketplace in which the required ratio r = 5, the reward for
honesty p = 0.2, the seller’s cost to furnish goods c = 0.5, and the seller’s horizon h = 3
transactions. Suppose the seller has the opportunity to engage in a transaction requiring
10 trunits (i.e., with a value of V = rτ = 5(10) = 50), but has no trunits available.
If the seller acquired enough trunits to execute the sale, she might do so honestly or
dishonestly.
If the seller were to cheat (maximally), her profit from the sale (excluding the cost
of acquiring the trunits) would be V = rτ = 50. For the same 10 trunits, using formula
5.1 we can determine the expected profit to the seller if she were to purchase them and
engage in honest sales to her horizon:
PSCh = (1− c)rτ0
(
(1 + p)h − 1
p
)
+ r(1 + p)h
= (1− 0.5)5(10)
(
(1 + 0.2)3 − 1
0.2
)








Now, consider b, the price paid to purchase trunits. If b < r, say b = 4, then the seller
can purchase the required trunits for bτ = 4(10) = 40. This would allow the seller to earn
a profit of 10 by purchasing trunits for 40, then immediately cheating on a transaction
and receiving 50. By comparison, if b > r, say 6, then the seller can purchase the required
trunits for bτ = 6(10) = 60. In this case, the seller loses money by purchasing trunits to
cheat, paying 60 but only taking in 50. When b > r, the seller will purchase trunits only
if they can be used to engage in an honest transaction.
But will the seller purchase the trunits at all? She will only be interested in purchasing
the trunits if they cost less than her expected profit over her horizon—177.4 in this case,
as calculated above. Thus, when bτ < PSCh, i.e., b(10) < 177.4, or b < 17.74 = Pτh,
purchasing trunits is attractive to the seller.
Having established that, with b in the proper range, it makes no sense to buy trunits
and cheat immediately, we revisit our proof of the mechanism’s incentive for honesty.
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5.3 Safety in a single transaction
In Chapter 4, we demonstrated the presence of the incentive for honesty under Basic
Trunits. Here, we revisit this proof under the extended Commodity Trunits scenario.
In Section 4.3.5, we showed that for any single transaction, the seller makes more
money by being honest than by being dishonest. Note that this is true for any trunit
balance—the source of the trunits was not discussed, and in fact, is not relevant. (Cer-
tainly, the trunits must come from somewhere, but the honesty incentive exists for any
of the possible sources.) Thus, we consider only the seller’s choice of how to use the
quantity of trunits.
With the trunits used to cover the sale, there are now three choices:
1. Cheat, and realize profit of rτ , while losing the τ trunits.
2. Sell the trunits, and realize a profit of bτ , while relinquishing the τ trunits.
3. Act honestly, earning (1 − c)rτ , keeping the τ trunits and gaining an additional
pτ trunits, for a total of (1 + p)τ . These trunits can then be used in one of three
ways: cheat on future transaction(s), sell the trunits, or engage in future honest
transaction(s). We need only consider one choice, though, to clarify the situation.
Since the trunits can be sold at price b, the (1 + p)τ trunits will fetch b(1 + p)τ on
the market. The total profit in this case, then, is (1− c)rτ + b(1 + p)τ .
Since, b > r, bτ > rτ ; selling the trunits is more profitable than cheating. Since c 6 1 and
p is positive, (1− c)rτ + b(1 + p)τ > b(1 + p)τ > bτ > rτ , so engaging in an honest sale is
also more profitable than cheating. Cheating, then, is the profit minimizing choice; there
is an economic incentive to be honest even with the introduction of trunit sales. For any
single transaction then, a rational seller will choose to be honest, since this is the profit
maximizing strategy.
Note, too, that unless c and p have their maximum and minimum values (1 and 0)
respectively, (1 − c)rτ + b(1 + p)τ > bτ , meaning that engaging in honest sales is more
profitable than simply selling trunits—agents are encouraged to engage in honest sales.
One critical point must be noted. As discussed earlier, if the seller has no further
goods to sell, engaging in honest trades is not possible. Without the sale of trunits, his
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only (profitable) option was to cheat with the remaining trunits. Now, there is another
choice; moreover, it is more profitable to sell the trunits than to cheat.
5.4 Addressing key problems
As discussed earlier, the initial motivation for considering trunit sales/purchases was the
start-up problem. The Commodity Trunits mechanism successfully deals with this issue.
However, several other key problems are solved as well.
5.4.1 The Exit problem
The exit problem is a weakness that plagues most other systems with which we are
familiar: if a seller intends to leave the market, there is no remaining incentive for her
to maintain her good reputation. She is free to cheat as many buyers as she can before
completing her exit.
Under Basic Trunits, the seller who wished to extract value from her trunits had two
choices—cheat eventually, or engage in trades to infinity. Under Commodity Trunits, a
third choice has been added to this set: sell the trunits.
Under this mechanism, the exit problem disappears—for any quantity of trunits, the
seller earns more money by honestly selling the trunits than by using them to engage in
cheating transactions. This is an extremely important property, and a key result: we are
unaware of any other system that solves the exit problem.
5.4.2 The Surplus trust problem
To our knowledge, the surplus trust problem was first identified in our consideration of
the Basic Trunits mechanism. It occurs when a seller has a fixed production capacity, and
hence, a fixed quantity of trunits required to sell the goods he produces. Due to trunit
growth via honest transactions, the seller continually accumulates more trunits than
required to maintain his regular business (since he is reusing the same trunits to honestly
sell his goods). These surplus trunits can be used for cheating, without consequence.
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Commodity Trunits changes this situation dramatically. Again, any given trunit can
be used to cheat (for a profit of r) or can be sold (for a profit of b). Since b > r, selling
the trunits is more profitable than cheating. A rational seller, then, will not cheat, but
will sell his trunits instead; the problem disappears.
5.4.3 The Ballot-Stuffing problem
Under Commodity Trunits, a solution to the ballot stuffing problem is available. The
motivation for ballot stuffing is the expectation of higher future revenue, based on the
artificial increase in reputation. In [2], the idea is introduced that if transaction costs
(e.g., commissions) are larger than the expected future gain from a ballot stuffing trans-
action, then there is an economic disincentive to engage in such transactions. (If no such
fees are used, this technique cannot provide protection.) Under Commodity Trunits, bal-
lot stuffing is unattractive if the cost of a fake transaction is greater than the value of the
trunits obtained.
Consider a coalition (including both buying and selling agents) that is choosing be-
tween two methods of obtaining trunits: ballot-stuffing, or purchasing the trunits hon-
estly. Here, we decompose the selling agent’s cost c into two components: operating
expense coe, including all costs in furnishing the good for sale, and selling expense cse
(specifically, commission charged by the market operator). All cost components are ex-
pressed as fractions of selling price, and c = coe + cse.
In a ballot stuffing transaction, the coalition incurs no operating cost to furnish the
good since the sale is a false one, but it will pay the commission imposed by the market
operator. Let τ represent the quantity of trunits covering the sale, so V = rτ is the price
of the sale. An honest transaction receives a premium of pτ trunits. The commission
charged for the sale is V cse = rτcse. To simply purchase the same quantity of trunits on
the open market at price b would cost bpτ .
Ballot stuffing is unattractive, then, if
rτcse > bpτ
rcse > bp
It must be the case that r < b in a well-functioning trunits marketplace. Let r = kb for
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some k, where 0 < k < 1. (As outlined in Section 5.5.4, the market operator can exert
control over r, effectively keeping k constant if desired.) Then:
kbcse > bp
kcse > p (5.3)
Since 0 < k < 1, it is possible to maintain to this relationship: the market operator
controls both p and the commission rate, so they can be set to make ballot-stuffing un-
profitable. It does, however, require p to be set lower than the commission rate changed
by the market operator, resulting in very slow trunit growth (or very high commissions!).
Slow growth may or may not be acceptable to marketplace participants. Additionally, it
is worth noting that even if transaction costs cannot be set high enough to guarantee that
ballot-stuffing is unprofitable, they can still substantially reduce the gain realized from
engaging in the activity, and hence reduce the motivation to engage in it.
Note that the ability to make ballot-stuffing unprofitable derives directly from the
explicit nature of the incentive mechanism. The practicality of such an approach may be
impossible to prove under systems that do not offer an explicit, measurable incentive.
5.5 New issues raised by Commodity Trunits
The Commodity Trunits mechanism provides individual agents with the desired incentive
for honest behaviour, while eliminating certain key problems. That said, there are issues,
particularly at the system-wide level, that must be considered. These issues are examined
in this section.
5.5.1 Limitations of the market operator
The proposed mechanism is dependent on sellers being able to buy and sell trunits when-
ever they want. If a seller cannot buy trunits when needed, sales will be constrained. If a
seller cannot sell trunits when he wishes to do so, the possibility exists that he will cheat
instead. A natural question is, who will buy/sell the trunits to/from the agents?
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The market operator is the natural choice for such a role, since all trunits would reside
in accounts within its system, and since it is in a position to enforce the pricing required
for system safety. Unfortunately, in general it does not appear to be financially viable for
the market operator to serve in this role.
Since the market operator can create trunits, it can accommodate the sale of trunits
without problem. Consider, however, both the initial sale to a customer and the eventual
purchase from that customer. For example, an agent may buy 100 trunits from the
seller, at a cost of 100b. It may then engage in numerous honest transactions, with its
trunit balance increasing each time. Subsequently, it may seek to ‘cash-out’ its balance of
trunits, which has grown to, say, 1000. This will cost the market operator 1000b, much
greater than the revenue taken in by the initial sale of the trunits (1000b− 100b = 900b).
Unless the market operator has taken in more than 900b in revenue on the agents’ sales
(commissions, etc.), the operator will lose money in buying back the trunits. We cannot
assume that the market operator is willing or able to sustain continual losses of funds due
to the operation of the system; this approach is not budget-balanced, making it unlikely
to be sustainable in many applications.1 In fact, there may be no identifiable market
operator entity at all; for example, a decentralized implementation might be developed
where trunit balance are stored locally and updated in a secure manner. In this case, a
mechanism that runs at a financial deficit is not practicable.
5.5.2 Trunit movement between traders
Since the market operator cannot afford to purchase all of the trunits, we look to the
other obvious choice—allowing traders to sell trunits to one another. (Allowing the sale
of trunits between traders does not necessarily preclude the market operator buying and
selling as well, when the operator feels it is appropriate. In fact, it is inevitable that
the market operator will be involved in the ‘trunit economy’ in any case—the operator
1If some agents were cheating, and thus trunits were being destroyed, the market operator’s total
revenue on sales of trunits to all agents might be larger than the total expenditure on repurchasing trunits;
in effect, the overall rate of loss due to cheating might exceed the overall natural growth of trunits due
to honesty. However, we cannot rely on this: if rates of cheating are large enough to offset the growth in
trunits, then the mechanism has failed in its very purpose of preventing cheating!
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is required to create/destroy trunits after the honest/dishonest execution of transactions
by sellers.)
We have illustrated above that is safe to allow agents to buy and to sell trunits, as long
as b > r. (We develop more rigorous proofs of this safety in Chapter 6). There is no rea-
son to believe that allowing agents to sell to one another introduces new vulnerabilities—
the incentive for honesty demonstrated above is not dependent on the source/destination
of the trunits.2
It is worth noting that this proposal is consistent with our key requirement for safety.
If an agent could buy trunits for price b < r, then he would be able to profit by buying
trunits and cheating with them immediately. This won’t happen, however. If it were the
case that b < r, the agent with trunits won’t want to sell them: instead, he would keep
them and use them himself to cheat, realizing a larger profit than by selling them. Thus,
trunits sales between agents will only take place under the very conditions that make
such sales safe.
5.5.3 A potential problem: Surplus trunits in the market
Although it is safe for agents to buy and sell trunits where b > r, unfortunately, this
condition is not guaranteed when we allow free buying and selling of trunits among
agents. The problem is essentially an economic one, lying in the ‘natural’ growth of
trunits.
Each time an honest transaction is completed, trunits are created, based on the re-
ward ratio p. Trunits are destroyed when an agent cheats. Given the characteristics of
the system, however, the rate of cheating should be very low (ideally, zero). It is likely
that the growth through trunit creation will exceed the loss from cheating. This suggests
a growing trunit supply.
Trunits are required to cover each sale made. Over time, as the volume of sales
increases (via entry of new traders, or increased activity per trader), the number of
2Note further that the direct sale of a quantity of τ trunits from one agent to another at the price bτ is
numerically equivalent to the sale at bτ from the first agent to the operator, followed by a purchase at bτ
by the second agent from the operator. If we allow any agent to buy and sell trunits from/to the market
operator at will, allowing agents to buy and sell trunits directly from each other is equally safe.
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trunits required to support this activity will rise. This suggests increasing demand.
It is a fundamental principle of basic microeconomics that the balance between supply
in demand will determine the price of a good in a competitive market. Consider the







Figure 5.1: A ‘safe’ market
Supply and demand are balanced in this market, such that the equilibrium price b is
greater than r. As discussed above, there are forces that might increase both supply and
demand. If trunit growth outstrips sales volume growth, the situation depicted in Figure
5.2 will occur.
The increase in supply relative to demand causes the equilibrium price to drop. If it
drops too far, it will fall below r, negating the incentive to sell, rather than cheat. This
has two effects:
1. The problems associated with our earlier mechanism return (meaning that, if they
choose to leave the market, cheating with their trunits is the most profitable op-
tion), and









Figure 5.2: Increase in supply
2. It becomes profitable for agents to buy trunits and then use them immediately to
cheat.
Is it possible to prevent this from happening? We considered several techniques that
the market operator might employ:
• Since all trunit sales take place via the market operator, the operator might simply
try to enforce a price. This is doomed to failure, however. If a price is enforced
that is above the market equilibrium price, then supply will exceed demand—some
agents will not be able to find buyers for their trunits, so their only recourse may
be to turn to cheating.
• The market operator might step in to buy only those trunits that aren’t purchased
by other buyers, in effect ‘soaking up’ excess supply. In this way, the operator acts
similarly to a government enacting monetary policy—buying or selling currency to
control the money supply, and manage exchange rates. The operator’s ability to do
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so is again limited by its revenue stream, however. This approach was investigated
in our experiments, discussed in Section 5.6.
• The operator may decide not to enforce a fixed required ratio r, and let the market
determine the value of trust. This option is discussed in the next section.
5.5.4 A free market for trust
In Chapter 4, we discussed the possibility of allowing a ‘free market for trust’, in which
there is no set required ratio r. Instead, sellers would be free to offer any price/trunit
combination they desired, and buyers could decide how many trunits would be required
for them to consider a transaction safe. Previously, this discussion centred around the
start-up problem and flexibility—for example, a seller could offer an item with few (or
no) trunits in order to get started, while the seller could decide if he was getting an
attractive enough deal to make it worth the risk. Under our extended model, however,
the free market approach would serve a more important purpose.
Consider again Figure 5.2. With b set below r, we are likely to see a surge in cheating
in the marketplace. How will buyers react to this? A buyer who has been cheated, or
who learns of high cheating rates, is likely to increase the number of trunits she demands
to cover transactions, in order to increase confidence in the transaction. This might be
termed ‘trunit inflation’, and will have two effects:
• Since V = rτ , increasing the trunits demanded for a transaction (i.e., τ) effectively
lowers r. As many buyers do this, the market rate will decrease, moving the mar-
ket towards safe conditions—r will decrease until it falls below b, at which point
cheating is no longer profitable.
• As more trunits are demanded, the number required to support the volume of sales
will increase. This will effectively increase demand, as shown in Figure 5.3. This
will increase b, pushing it towards safe territory (i.e., when it exceeds r.)
When b < r, these two forces will push towards rectifying the situation. Thus, one
might expect that b > r will be an equilibrium condition in the marketplace.








Figure 5.3: Increase in demand, restoring safety to market
It is possible, however, that a destructive phenomenon might occur instead. A seller
who has been victimized might not increase his future trunit demands—he may become
disheartened and leave the market instead. This will have the effect of reducing the
demand for trunits, as sales levels fall. If levels of cheating are high, this might occur
with high frequency, overwhelming the beneficial forces described above.
There are clear steps that the market operator can take to encourage the beneficial
forces, and minimize the destructive one. For example, one might expect that buyers
who are actually cheated might be more likely to leave the market, but buyers who
are warned of cheating are more likely to protect themselves by increasing their trunit
demands. The market operator can help to maintain a safe equilibrium by providing
agents with information: a ‘recommended safe ratio’ that buyers should follow, data on
cheating levels, etc. This will allow the market operator to influence r and b significantly,
without the need to actually buy or sell trunits (and without the need for high cheating
levels to move market rates). Furthermore, this activity will help agents; in addition to
providing the information they need to protect themselves, it also relieves them of the
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burden of acquiring and processing the information to make their own decisions.
To illustrate, consider such a market, in which the operator has observed that in most
transactions, buyers are requiring a ratio in the range of 4 to 6 (i.e., 4 to 6 dollars of
sale value per trunit used to secure the sale). Trunits are bought and sold freely in this
market; the operator has noted that trunits are currently trading at a price b = 6.5, but
that as the trunit supply is growing, this price is dropping. The danger exists that, if b
drops below 6, then sellers can profit by buying trunits and using them to cheat buyers
who are requiring ratios of 6 or higher.
To combat this, the operator can inform buyers of the ratios they should use to ensure
their safety. In this case, the operator might publish a maximum safe ratio of 5—since
V = rτ , lowering the ratio increases the number of trunits required to cover a sale,
offsetting the effects of the surplus. If buyers follow this advice, then they will be safe
from cheating, since the profit to be earned from cheating them at a ratio of 5 will be less
than the price of the trunits, even if it drops to 6 as projected. Buyers are free to ignore
this advice, but they do so at their own risk.
5.6 Simulation: Validation of Commodity Trunits
Safety of Commodity Trunits relies on the price of trunits b never dropping below the re-
quired ratio r. The use of simulation to investigate economic markets has a long history
(e.g., [5, 22]). To investigate the feasibility of maintaining this condition in a mar-
ketplace, we ran extensive simulations under a well-defined scenario. Our simulation
method, and our findings, are detailed in this section.
5.6.1 Approach and goals of the simulation
The policies adopted by the market operator play a major role in the operation of that
market. In a Commodity Trunits marketplace, the market operator might be passive or
active: he might simply allow market forces to determine b and r, and hope for the best,
or he might try to actively participate in the market in an effort to maintain a favourable
environment. In our simulations, we model a marketplace that starts from ‘day zero’, in
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which sellers begin with no trunits, and must purchase them to begin trading. Since all
sellers are in the same situation, there is no natural trunit supply—the market operator is
forced to create new trunits and sell them to agents. (There is no technical impediment
to the operator creating trunits at will. In practical terms, however, trunit creation must
be undertaken with care in order to maintain confidence in the operator’s integrity, and
to ensure that excessive supply does not push prices down to unsafe levels.) Thus, our
market operator has already been pushed toward an active role. With this in mind,
and with the suspicion that an active market operator would improve the possibility
of success, we proceeded with an operator that intervenes when necessary to maintain
desired market conditions.3
The goal of our simulation was not to perfectly model agents, and all of the pos-
sible complexity of their strategies. Instead, we sought only to verify that safety can
be maintained. As such, we focused on the interplay of supply and demand in deter-
mining the price of trunits. Instead of introducing the additional complexity of market-
determination of r, we adopted a method discussed in Section 5.5.3: having the market
operator determine r at any given point. In an actual market, this might take the form of
the operator actually enforcing a required ratio, or notifying buyers of the ‘recommended
safe ratio’, with buyers adhering to it faithfully.
Under these circumstances, the goal of our simulation was simplified. If the market
operator can set any required ratio r, he can always set r such that r < b, as long as
b > 0. If b reaches a price of 0, then a seller might earn more by cheating with unneeded
trunits than by selling them, and the mechanism has failed to guarantee safety. Thus, we
investigated the ability of the mechanism, and the operator, to maintain b > 0.
3As implemented here, with agents starting with zero trunit balances, Commodity Trunits requires a
market operator that is an identifiable entity, one that is capable of holding money in order to execute
trunit sales. Further, some of the techniques described below require the operator to make purchases as
well. The possibility that Commodity Trunits might be implemented without an identifiable operator entity
is discussed in Chapter 8.
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5.6.2 Modeling of Agents
Since trunits are only used by sellers, buyers influence the price of trunits only in their
impact on sellers. Buyers affect sellers’ need of trunits in two important ways:
1. Through the goods that they seek to buy from sellers, which require sellers to own
enough trunits to cover the transactions, and
2. Through the quantity of trunits that they demand in order to cover a sale (i.e., by
determining r for each sale, in the free market scenario).
To study trunit pricing, then, we need not model buyers explicitly. From a seller’s per-
spective, the sale of goods to buyers can be modeled using frequencies/rates of sales,
without even identifying buyers. (We assume, without loss of generality, that each seller
sells only one type of good.) In our scenario, the operator sets r, so we do not need to
consider the second point.
Agent properties
Each agent has a set of properties, including the following noteworthy values:
• The price for which it sells its goods (V ). This is a fixed, advertised price, which is
randomly chosen from a uniform distribution with range [1, 100].
• The cost incurred by the agent in selling its goods (c), as a fraction of selling price.
This is drawn from a normal distribution, with mean of 0.5.
• The initial rate of sale, expressed in sales per day. This is drawn from a uniform
distribution, with range [1, 10].
• The rate of change in the agents’ sales volume. This is expressed as an annual
percentage change; it is drawn from a normal distribution, with the mean specified
by an input parameter to the simulation. The rate of change may be positive or
negative.
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• The probability that the agent will decide to exit the market. This is a fixed proba-
bility for all agents, specified as an input parameter and expressed as the fraction
of sellers who will leave the market per year.
• The agent’s conservatism, drawn from a uniform distribution with range [0.5, 1].
This reflects differing temperaments that agents might have, in terms of the degree
of certainty they require before taking a ‘risky’ action. For example, an agent with
a conservatism of 0.7 will sell surplus trunits today unless there is at least a 70%
chance that the price will be higher on a future day within his horizon.
• The agent’s horizon, the number of days he looks into the future when deciding
whether or not to buy/sell trunits today. Horizons are drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution with range [1,10].
Agent behaviour
As noted above, we were primarily concerned with understanding trunit pricing in a free
marketplace, and not with realizing sophisticated trading agents. As such, our goal was
to keep agents as simple as possible, while achieving results that were valid.
Initially, we considered modeling agents using trivial strategies: they would buy
trunits when needed to execute a sale (if it was profitable to do so at the going price)
and sell them when no longer needed. This approach is intrinsically flawed, however.
An agent will buy trunits to make a sale if it is profitable to do so, but calculation of
the profit must consider not only the acquisition cost of the trunits, but also the value of
the trunits after the sale, since this is an asset now owned by the agent. This value is
reflected by the market price of trunits after the completion of the transaction, since the
trunits can be sold at that price. The basic profit formula is
profitnet = profitgross − bt1τ + bt2τ(1 + p) (5.4)
where t1 is the time at which the sale is initiated, and t2 is the time at which the sale
is completed and the trunits are sold. In order to determine whether a trunit purchase
is profitable, then, an agent must have some idea of what the price of trunits will be at
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time t2. This requires the agent to forecast future trunit prices, ruling out the simplicity
of strategy we had originally considered.
If an agent is forecasting future trunit prices, one cannot reasonably exclude more
sophisticated behaviour. For example, consider an agent who has sufficient trunits for
his current sales, but who expects to need more trunits in the future. The trivial strategy
discussed above would have him wait until the trunits are needed before purchasing
them. But what if his forecast reveals that prices are going up? While we want our
agents to be simple, we also want them to be rational, and it would seem that a rational
agent would take this into account. Here, we would likely expect an agent to buy ahead
of time, to take advantage of the lower prices.
This perspective formed the basis of our agents’ strategies. Agents forecast future
trunit prices based on previous prices, using simple regression analysis. For each pre-
dicted future price, there is uncertainty; this uncertainty is incorporated by using predic-
tion intervals based on each agent’s level of conservatism. Our agents’ behaviour, then,
consists of the four following rules:
1. Buy for current need: If trunits are needed for the current day to execute sales,
buy these trunits if it is profitable to do so, considering both the acquisition cost
and forecast selling price of the trunits at completion of the transaction.
2. Buy for future need: Beyond any trunits bought for the current day, if the agent
expects to need additional trunits within its horizon, purchase those trunits today
unless the agent expects (at a confidence level equal to the agent’s conservatism)
that the price of trunits will be cheaper within its horizon.4 Since the rate of sales
for an agent changes slowly, the expected number of required trunits is estimated
using a moving average of past requirements.
3. Sell surplus: If an agent has surplus trunits beyond its expected needs, sell those
4If prices are rising, an agent might speculatively purchase trunits beyond its expected needs, simply
as an investment. Attempting to model such behaviour raises real difficulties, however: one would need
to consider an agent’s available investment capital, returns on alternative investments, the agent’s risk
preference and portfolio composition, etc. For this reason, our agents do not buy beyond their anticipated
needs.
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trunits unless the agent expects (at the required confidence level) that the price
will be higher within its horizon.
4. Speculative sale: If an agent has trunits that it does not need today, but might
need in future, sell these trunits if it is expected (at the required confidence level)
that they can be repurchased for less within the horizon.
While it is possible to envision more sophisticated strategies, we believe that these strate-
gies constitute a reasonable model of agent behaviour—agents prefer to hold trunits as
price increases, and not to hold them as price decreases—a model that is sufficient to
establish the viability of a trunit marketplace.
5.6.3 Simulation execution
Each round of the simulation consists of one day. The following is an outline of the
sequence of events that occur during each day:
1. Each seller’s trunit balance is updated to reflect transactions that completed on that
day, returning trunits to the seller for honestly-executed sales.
2. The set of sellers who elect to exit the market that day is determined. Sellers who
decide to exit the market make no further sales of goods, but continue to participate
in the trunit marketplace until they have sold their remaining supply of trunits
(both those held now, and those still to be returned to them from honest sales).
Once all in-process sales are completed (i.e., no trunits remain to be returned to
the seller), the seller has no further participation.
3. New sellers join the market. The number of new sellers is determined using a
Poisson distribution. The average rate of growth in the number of sellers is an
input parameter to the simulation, expressed as the annual percentage increase in
the number of sellers.
4. For each seller, the number of incoming sales is determined; a Poisson distribution
is used, with the seller’s current sale rate as the mean.
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5. The price of trunits for that day is determined. Essentially, this is a process of
finding an equilibrium price where trunit supply and demand are balanced. This
process, and the role of the market operator in influencing the process, are dis-
cussed in detail below.
• If the price of trunits has hit zero, then cheating may be a profitable strategy.
This is considered a failure of the system, and the simulation terminates.
6. Trunit sales and purchases are executed.
7. Sales of goods to buyers are initiated. Sellers choose whether to execute sales
honestly or dishonestly; honest sales are tracked so that trunits can be returned to
the seller upon finalization of the transaction (i.e., feedback from the buyer).
8. The required ratio r is updated by the market operator if the price of trunits has
dropped below what the operator considers to be a ‘safe’ margin. Here, the operator
ensured that r was 80% of b, at most.
9. Sellers’ rates of sale are updated, based on each seller’s rate of change.
5.6.4 Market operator intervention: Capping price increases
In initial tests, the market operator allowed the price of trunits to float freely without
interference. However, periods of rising prices resulted in a problem, related to the
simple strategies of our agents discussed above. When an agent forecasts rising prices in
the future, he opts to buy now in advance of his need, rather than waiting to purchase
at a higher price. Similarly, agents with surplus trunits do not want to sell immediately;
instead, they would rather wait and sell at a higher price. These two effects increase
demand and reduce supply, further increasing price, and magnifying the effect. The
result is that agents buy trunits up to their maximum foreseen needs. Beyond this point,
since our agents were designed to buy only for need, and not for purely speculative
investments, they buy no further trunits. The result: sharply increasing prices for trunits,
than a nearly instantaneous drop once all sellers have provisioned for their future needs.
This drop results in a market crash, and a failure of the system.
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We recognized that this effect results from the simple regression-based price forecast-
ing that our agents use. In real world marketplaces, prices do not rise indefinitely based
simply on a pattern of increasing price in the past. Real-world traders may ‘sense’ that
prices can’t rise much further; more formally, in many markets there are indicators and
benchmarks to help traders estimate likely trading ranges and peak prices. For exam-
ple, in stock markets where prices are (to a degree) determined by the profitability of
the company, measures such as price-to-earnings ratio can reveal if a stock is over- or
under-priced.
With this in mind, we considered enhancing our agents’ strategies in an attempt to
allow them to forecast peaking prices. Unfortunately, the difficulty in devising such a
system is complicated by the fact that with trunits, there are no obvious measurements
that individual agents might use for such predictions. Moreover, while we realized that
the observed behaviour might be unlikely with real buyers and sellers, it is a possible
behaviour, and as such, we would like our model to be robust enough to deal with it. We
did not want to devise agent behaviour specifically to suit our model.
As was noted in Section 5.5.3, the seller cannot buy unlimited quantities of trunits
for financial reasons, so he cannot completely prevent price drops by buying up excess
trunit supply. The market operator is free, however, to create as many trunits as desired,
so he can completely control price increases—if he does not want price to exceed a
certain level, he can supplement the natural supply with newly created trunits until the
equilibrium price is lowered to the desired level.
Periods of falling prices raise none of the issues encountered by rising prices. When
prices are dropping, agents will tend to buy trunits when needed (if it is profitable to
do so), and to sell excess trunits quickly. (If prices are dropping fast enough, agents
might even sell trunits that they expect to need later, in the hopes that they can re-
purchase them later at a lower price. Such a situation might result in a different sort
of self-reinforcing cycle, where prices drop at an accelerating rate. This effect might
be prevented by using transaction costs (e.g., fees/commissions on the sale of trunits)
to make such speculative sales unattractive. That said, although the ‘speculative sale’
strategy was implemented in our agents, it did not pose a significant problem—no special
steps needed to be taken for us to realize stable, well-functioning marketplaces.)
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With this in mind, we experimented with two possible market operator policies:
1. Cap the maximum trunit price at the initial price, or
2. Never allow the price to exceed the previous day’s price.
When capping at the initial price, we saw dramatic price fluctuations within the allowable
range, again attributable to the simple agent behaviour described above. Such price
fluctuations are not particularly good for agents; it is difficult enough for businesses to
cope with the economic forces at play in the markets for their actual goods, without
introducing unpredictable trunit marketplaces. Moreover, in some cases this instability
resulted in trunit market failures. In contrast, the non-increasing price policy led to very
stable, predictable trunit marketplaces. This policy was used throughout the remainder
of our simulation.
5.6.5 Market operator intervention: Buffering price decreases
While dropping prices are preferred to rising prices, we do not want prices to drop too
quickly, for several reasons. First, if prices are dropping dramatically, it might not be
profitable for agents to engage in sales at all: the gross profit from the sale might be less
than the loss incurred by buying trunits and then selling them at a dramatically lower
price. Moreover, the velocity of a quickly dropping price increases the danger that prices
may crash entirely, reaching zero.
Ensuring that prices do not drop at an inappropriate rate is partly a matter of setting
market parameters properly. If trunit growth does not greatly exceed actual sales growth
in the marketplace, prices should not drop precipitously. (The interplay of market pa-
rameters is examined in our simulation results, presented in Section 5.6.7.) Beyond this,
the market operator can also take a key role in moderating price decreases.
As noted in Section 5.5.3, the seller cannot buy unlimited numbers of trunits to con-
trol price drops, for financial reasons. The operator can, however, buy some trunits in an
attempt to buffer price drops. In the process of creating and selling new trunits (e.g., at
start-up, or when capping upward price increases) the market operator earns revenue.
This revenue can be spent to purchase trunits in times of decreasing prices, ‘mopping up’
excess supply and moderating price increases.
80 Toward Secure Trust and Reputation Systems for Electronic Marketplaces
We experimented with two policies. The first, referred to as limit price drop is quite
simple: (arbitrarily) setting a maximum desired rate of price decrease, the operator buys
trunits any time a drop would exceed this rate. If he does not have enough accumulated
revenue to do so, then prices drop as far as they will naturally. To explain the second
policy, we must first delve deeper into how equilibrium prices are determined in our
simulation.
Imperfectly balanced equilibria
In each day of our simulation, we find an equilibrium price where supply and demand
are balanced; all trades that day are then executed at that price. (This method is a
simplification, based on microeconomic theory, used instead of developing a full bid-ask
marketplace.)
It must be noted that in our simulation, supply and demand are usually imperfectly
balanced. This is a result of the nature of trunits, and the strategies of our agents.
Consider an agent seeking to buy trunits. Based on market parameters, his forecast of
future prices, and his confidence level, an agent determines the maximum price that he
would be willing to pay for trunits. Below this price, he expects to earn profit, while
above this price, he expects to incur a loss. The agent’s individual demand, then, is a
sharp threshold function where he either buys all of the trunits he needs, or none. (In
fact, there are two thresholds, one below which he will buy trunits for immediate use,
and another below which he will also buy trunits for future use.) For this reason, the
overall demand curve for the trunit market consists of ‘steps’, rather than a smooth curve.
For exactly the same reasons, supply behaves in the same manner.
Given the stepwise nature of the supply and demand curves, it is often the case
that no price exists where supply and demand are perfectly balanced. Thus, we have
a dilemma: we must choose between one price, where supply exceeds demand, or a
slightly lower price, where demand exceeds supply. Based in our understanding that the
market operator cannot buy unlimited quantities of trunits, our original policy was to
always choose the slightly lower price. Using this strategy, demand will always exceed
supply; the market operator can create trunits to meet the unsatisfied demand, resulting
in an artificially-balanced equilibrium. While this policy works, it has two undesirable
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consequences:
• The continual creation and insertion of additional trunits into the marketplace ul-
timately increases overall supply, increasing the rate of price decrease.
• The market operator realizes extraordinary revenues from trunit sales, which might
undermine his credibility and traders’ confidence in the market.
Buffering price drops while balancing equilibria
To eliminate these problems, we arrived at a second market operator intervention strat-
egy, referred to as buy at equilibrium. When determining the equilibrium price, the fol-
lowing method is used when a perfect balance of supply and demand cannot be achieved:
• At the lowest price where supply exceeds demand, if the market operator can afford
to buy up the excess trunit supply, he sets this price and does so.
• If he cannot afford to purchase the excess supply, he chooses the slightly lower
price, where demand exceeds supply, and creates additional trunits as necessary.
This policy ensures that the operator never incurs a deficit in running the marketplace. It
avoids the problem of unnecessarily contributing to increasing supply; in fact, it means
that the seller is regularly reducing the overall trunit supply, buffering price drops.
It should be noted that both policies have another, critical benefit: they can foster
traders’ confidence in the market. If the market operator incurs sizable profits by creating
and selling trunits, this may call into question the integrity of the operator. For example,
the operator might manipulate market parameters, encourage unfair reviews, etc., in an
effort to increase demand and sell more trunits. In contrast, if the operator spends all
such revenue in buying back trunits, and manages this function transparently, then it will
be clear that the operator has no financial incentive to ‘cheat’.
These two policies are compared in the simulation results, below.
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5.6.6 Market parameters
Beyond those values described above, other important market parameters, and their
settings in our simulation, include:
• The duration of transactions in our simulation (i.e., the length of time between the
sale, and the arrival of feedback and return of trunits to the seller) is fixed at 14
days.
• The initial number of sellers was set to 100. In some trials with 1000 sellers, very
similar results were obtained to those with 100 sellers, but the simulations were
too time-consuming to permit the full investigation presented below.
5.6.7 Simulation results
Existence of sustainable marketplaces
Initially, we sought to answer two questions: a) Is it possible to sustain a long-term mar-
ket for trunits? b) How will prices change over time in such a marketplace? To answer
these questions, we experimented with parameter values in ranges that we intuitively
considered to be reasonable. The results of one such representative run are depicted in
Figure 5.4. In this simulation, the market was in operation for 10,000 days (more than
27 years). The rate of growth in the number of agents was set at 20% per year, the
average change in agents’ sales volumes was 10% per year, and the rate at which agents
exit the market was 10% per year.
The market price of trunits b never reached zero over the span of 10,000 days, and b
never fell below the required ratio r—cheating was never more profitable than honesty.
This confirms that it is, in fact, possible to sustain such a trunit marketplace. Prices
dropped to levels where their behaviour is difficult to discern in this figure; Figure 5.5
depicts the same result, using a logarithmic scale for the y-axis.
Several points should be noted here:
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Figure 5.4: A single simulation run
• Price drops in a stable, predictable manner. This is desirable, since it makes it easier
for agents to predict future prices. The ability to make accurate predictions makes
the market safer, and hence more attractive, to sellers.
• As this market would continue to run beyond 10,000 days, the pattern suggests
that prices would continue to drop but remain above zero.
• Prices appear to drop very quickly, to very low levels. This might initially seem
to be troubling: agents may not want to invest in trunits, since quickly dropping
prices mean lost value for those holding the trunits. It is worth reiterating, however,
that this chart depicts more than 27 years; price decreases are not as fast as they
may appear. More importantly, these dropping prices are factored into the agents’
decision making behaviour—they did not consider the rate of decrease in prices a
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Figure 5.5: A single run, with logarithmic price axis
deterrent, and continued to buy trunits and execute sales. This means that they
still found it profitable to operate in the market.
• As market prices drop, the numbers involved become so small as to be cumber-
some. (Similarly, since r is lowered as well, the number of trunits required for sales
becomes extremely large.) To remedy this, it is possible to reduce the scale of the
numbers by consolidating trunits. We experimented with this approach—any time
prices would drop below a certain threshold, we would execute a 10-for-1 merge of
trunits. Under such a merge, for every 10 trunits currently held, the agent would
receive 1 new trunit, while r was similarly modified; prices responded accordingly.
In our experiments, this policy was found to be sound, having no impact on market
operation beyond maintaining values in convenient numerical ranges. This form of
merger is an established practice in real-world stock markets, and used for essen-
Extensions to Trunits 85
tially the same reason.
Comparing price buffering methods
As discussed above, we investigated two methods for the market operator to buffer the
speed at which trunit prices drop: limit price drop to a specified maximum rate, where
available resources permit, or buy at equilibrium, where the agent buys trunits if possible
in the process of obtaining a balanced equilibrium price. We ran experiments to compare
these techniques; the results of one run using each method are depicted in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Market operator policies compared
Two patterns are evident. First, buy at equilibrium results in prices dropping at a
slower rate than limit price drop. This is predictable, since the former has the market
operator buying trunits at every opportunity, reducing supply as soon and as quickly
as possible. Second, limit price drop results in even more stable/predictable price be-
haviour than buy at equilibrium. Those implementing markets might choose which of
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these features has higher priority. For the remainder of our simulations, we used buy at
equilibrium.
Investigating the impact of market parameters
The results above verify that scenarios exist under which it is possible to manage a sus-
tainable marketplace for trunits, one that preserves the incentive for honestly. From here,
we investigated the range of market parameters for which we could expect a market to
succeed.
Again, our goal is to maintain a non-zero price for trunits. Supply and demand are
the key determinants of trunit price. Thus, we focused our study on market parameters
that directly impact supply and demand. Supply, driven by trunit availability, is most
directly impacted by the premium for honesty p, since new trunits are created after each
honest transaction. Demand is driven by the need to ‘cover’ sales, so parameters relating
to sales volume are important: the rate at which new agents enter the market, the rate
at which agents leave the market, and the average change in agents’ sales.
Intuitively, it seems that trust should grow slowly, as each agent demonstrates its
trustworthiness. We sought to investigate this intuition in our simulations: values for p
of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 were tested.
It could be argued that we need not study the effects of the three sales-related pa-
rameters individually; increases in the number of agents by 25% and in agents’ sales by
25% are likely to have a similar effect to an increase in agents’ sales by 50% (with no
change in the number of agents), since the impact on total sales volume will be simi-
lar. There may be important differences between seemingly similar sets of parameters,
however. For example, the change in total sales volume will be similar under an agent
growth rate of 25% with an agent exit rate of 25%, and under growth and exit rates of
0%. The impact on the trunit marketplace might be different, however. In the former
situation, agents leaving the market will be selling trunits, while new agents are buying;
these transactions don’t take place in the latter case.
Thus, we tested a range of values for the rate of growth in the number of agents (0%,
25%, and 50%), the average rate of change in agents’ sales (−25%, 0%, 25%, and 50%),
and the rate at which agents exit the market (0%, 25%, 50%, and 75%). All values are
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annual rates. While we believed it was important to include the effects of the separate
parameters in our simulation, for presentation we have consolidated our results using
‘composite growth rates’, reflecting the net effect of the variables. For example, rates of
agent growth of 25%, change in sales of 50%, and agents exiting of 25% are reflected in
the chart as a approximate composite growth rate of 25% + 50%− 25% = 50%.
Five simulation runs were executed for each combination of the four parameters.
Simulations ran for 10 years (3650 days).
Before this simulation, we expected that market failures might result from high values
of p (since trunit creation enhances supply) and for low rates of market growth (since
lower sales volumes result in lower demand). The results of these simulations are re-
flected in Figure 5.7, showing the number of market failures for each combination of
values.
Figure 5.7: Effect of trunit and market growth on market success
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Our expectations were confirmed to be correct: relatively high values of p (0.5, 0.8)
resulted in high failure rates, as did low (specifically, negative) rates of market growth.
In contrast, what we considered to be a reasonable value for p (0.2) resulted in no failures
for any positive level of market growth. High rates of growth resulted in lower failure
rates, with no failures occurring when growth was 100% per year.
Based on these results, we note the following:
• If overall sales growth is positive, the trunits market is very likely to be sustainable
for p values of 0.2 or less.5 (If overall growth is negative, this often has larger busi-
ness/economic implications, aside from concerns about the trunit marketplace.)
• Values of p below 0.2 might yield sustainable marketplaces even under conditions
of sales decline. Further investigation is required to confirm this.
In short, for a range of realistic market conditions, trunit marketplaces are sustain-
able.
5.7 Trunits vs. bonds, revisited
In Chapter 4, we contrast the Trunits model with a bond-based scheme, where a cash
bond would be placed by the seller to cover each sale. Despite the similarities between
the approaches, we showed a number of differences that, while perhaps not obvious
at first, are important. However, in the case where we allow trunits to be bought and
sold, the distinctions between the two methods are further blurred, and merit further
discussion—if a seller puts up money (i.e., buys trunits) to cover his sales, then gets the
money back after successful execution (i.e., sells the trunits), aren’t we simply talking
about bonds? It is worth noting that this similarity with bonds is not necessarily bad.
We did not seek to distance ourselves from a bond scheme because it is ineffective at
inducing trustworthy behaviour—in fact, it is quite powerful in this regard. Rather, we
5This may seem trivial, that a growth rate of 20% in trunits is offset by a positive growth rate in sales.
Note, however, that while growth rates are annual rates, trunits can potentially grow by 20% every 14
days (i.e., the duration of a transaction.)
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acknowledge some key limitations of a bonding system, while noting some of the key
features of Trunits:
• A bond is money. A trunit is commodity, one that may be bought and sold. In effect,
a trunit is a license that allows the seller to engage in sales of up to r dollars at a
time. Cash cannot (or should not!) be created or destroyed by the market operator.
Trunits can be freely created or destroyed.
• In the case of cash bonds, something must be done with the cash in the event the
seller cheats. The problem here is that whoever receives this cash, whether market
operator or buyer, has an incentive to treat the seller unfairly. Since trunits that
are ‘lost’ by the seller are simply destroyed by the market operator, there is no such
incentive under the Trunits model.
• Honest transactions allow the seller to grow his trunit balance substantially, some-
thing that is not possible using standard bonding, since input of additional funds
would be required. This potentially frees the seller from having to put up enormous
amounts of capital to cover a volume of sales—significant capital outlay is required
only if the seller wishes to ‘jump-start’ his sales volume, rather than actually build-
ing trust.
Seamless handling of short- and long-term traders
This last point highlights an interesting property of the mechanism. While long-term
traders can build trust, for traders who wish to conduct small numbers of sales, the
system is very similar to bonding. This is quite positive, in fact. Most trust/reputation
systems make it difficult for a short-term seller to effectively sell goods (or get full value
for them) because his reputation is undeveloped. Using the best known example, un-
der the eBay feedback system, sellers with established histories (obvious from their high
feedback scores) are strongly preferred over new sellers. Moreover, if a system does
allow such new participants to sell effectively, it is very difficult to ensure they will be
trustworthy, given their short-term focus. The method presented here overcomes these
obstacles as well as a cash-bond system, but accomplishes this seamlessly within the con-
text of a system that allows traders to build trust/reputation over the long term.
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Commodity Trunits provides protection against the exit problem; we are aware of
no other system that does so. It can be configured to protect against ballot stuffing.
Further, it alleviates the start-up and surplus trunits issues present in Basic Trunits, while
retaining the beneficial properties of the simpler model. For Commodity Trunits to be
considered safe, it is necessary for the price of trunits to remain above the required ratio
for securing sales. Our investigation shows that it is possible for a market operator to
maintain this safety property under a range of realistic market conditions.
In the next section, we lay out a framework for rigorously analyzing the security
provided by trust and reputation systems. Within this framework, we consider more
formally the security of the Basic Trunits and Commodity Trunits models, arriving at
provable guarantees of the degree of protection offered, and under what circumstances.
Chapter 6
The Security Framework
6.1 The need for rigorous security analysis
In Chapter 2, we presented a catalogue of vulnerabilities in trust and reputation systems.
In Chapter 3, we examined a number of existing models of trust and reputation, and
discovered that such vulnerabilities were common. The results of this study served as
inspiration for the Trunits model; however, they also highlight the need for greater at-
tention to security, and for more rigorous security analysis during the development of
such models. Motivated by work in the field of cryptography, we seek methods for en-
suring the provable security of trust and reputation systems. In this chapter, we develop
a security framework that may be used in the analysis of such systems. We then apply
this framework to analyze the Trunits mechanisms described in this thesis.
6.1.1 What does it mean for a trust/reputation model to be secure?
The Cryptographic Perspective
As noted above, our approach has been inspired by work in the field of cryptography.
“Cryptography is about the prevention and detection of cheating and other malicious
activities” [20], which parallels the aims of designers of trust and reputation systems.
In Cryptography, for an interaction to be ‘secure’, “...all parties to a transaction must
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have confidence that certain objectives associated with information security have been
met”. The set of primary goals in cryptography consists of confidentiality (information
is kept from those who are not authorized to view it), data integrity (unauthorized al-
teration can be detected), authentication (parties identify each other, and the source of
the data can be determined), and non-repudiation (previous communications cannot be
denied by a party) [20].
In cryptography, the view is taken that “Until a protocol is proven to provide the ser-
vice intended, the list of possible attacks can never be said to be complete.” While it
may be possible to establish that a particular cryptographic method offers unconditional
security or perfect security, it is acknowledged that this may not be achievable for all
methods; cryptographers thus consider measures of security that are ‘less than’ uncondi-
tional. Once such evaluation model is that of provable security, where “...‘provable’ here
means provable subject to assumptions.” Provable security “... is considered by some to
be as good a practical analysis technique as exists.” [20]
Security in trust and reputation systems
If our aim is to ensure that a trust/reputation system for marketplaces is secure, we must
first characterize what we mean by security: a set of goals. It is our position that a secure
system for marketplaces is one where participants are protected from harm (at least,
harm due to ‘dishonest’ behaviour, rather than from legitimate competition). Thus, we
define security in terms of a set of safety properties: conditions that, if proven to hold for
the system, ensure participants within the system will not be harmed [25]. As discussed
below, it is extremely difficult to deliver unconditional security in any system that might
be practically applied; instead, we seek to deliver provable security.
In the marketplace scenario, there are three identifiable ‘stakeholders’ who participate
directly in the market, each with their own requirements: buyers, sellers, and the market
operator.1 Development of required safety properties can be simplified by considering
1In some marketplaces, an ‘operator’ can be identified. For example, in the case of eBay, there is a cor-
poration that operates the market, a corporation that has interests that should be protected from dishonest
behaviour. In other marketplaces, however, no identifiable ‘operator’ exists. For example, in a peer-to-peer
system, participants may simply execute trades directly with one another, without a central market oper-
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the needs of each stakeholder group separately. In this thesis, we focus primarily on the
security of buyers, for two reasons:
1. Protecting buyers from cheating sellers is a predominant focus of current research.
This may be because, in the marketplace scenario typically considered, buyers are
more vulnerable than sellers in any given transaction, due to information asymme-
try: the seller has access to information about the actual good that will be delivered,
information that the buyer does not possess [7].
2. The protection of buyers is the explicit goal of our Trunits model, so we are partic-
ularly interested in characterizing the level of buyer security provided.
We discuss the security requirements of sellers, and of the market operator, in less detail,
leaving a deeper examination for future work, as discussed in Chapter 8.
6.2 The Security Framework
Given the marketplace scenario, individual transactions consisting of a sale from one
agent (seller) to another (buyer) are the fundamental unit of activity. We distinguish
between two transaction states. An agreed transaction consists of the terms to which
both parties have agreed: tA = (gp, v, dp, Ab, As, . . . ), where gp is the good promised, v
is the value (agreed price) of the good, dp is the date/time promised, Ab is the buying
agent, and As is the selling agent. (The ellipsis indicates that there may be other system-
or market-dependent parameters.) This might be viewed as a promise or a contract;
it may also be viewed as the transaction at the point both parties have struck a deal,
but have not yet acted, so the honesty or dishonesty of the transaction is undetermined.
A delivered transaction is one where the selling agent has provided the goods to the
buyer, but the buyer has not yet rated the seller: tD = (tA, gd, c, dd, . . . ), where tA is
the agreed transaction, gd is the good delivered, c is the cost incurred by the seller in
providing and delivering the good, and dd is the date/time of delivery. We consider a
ator. In such cases, ‘market security’ might refer to protection of the interests of the implementer of the
market, or simply the protection required for the market to continue to function.
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delivered transaction tD to be honest if it fulfills the seller’s commitments—gd satisfies
gp, dd satisfies dp, etc.—and denote it by the predicate honest(tD). (This parallels the
perspective take in, for example, [29], where ‘successful’ transactions are those in which
an agent meets his obligations, or fulfills the explicit terms of a contract.) The details of
how a good or promise is specified are left to the system designer. For instance any dd 6
dp may be considered honest. We consider a transaction where an agent (intentionally)
fails to fulfill his commitment (whether by providing a good that does not meet the
commitment, or by not providing a good at all) to be an instance of cheating, or dishonesty
on the part of the seller.2
It is possible that a buyer could cheat by withholding payment after receipt of the
goods. We base our framework, however, on the common policy that a buyer must pay
before goods are shipped.
For brevity, we make use of ‘accessor’ functions that return the values of individual
transaction parameters. Each such function has the same name as the parameter that it
returns.
An agent attempting to cheat may act alone, or as part of a coalition. We denote such
a coalition G; an agent acting alone is equivalent to the case where |G| = 1.
We term a set of transactions a schedule. Let TD represent a schedule of delivered
transactions. For any TD, there is a corresponding TA consisting of the same transactions
with the delivery parameters removed. Note that for any TA, there are possibly many
TD, since each transaction in TA might be executed honestly or dishonestly. Executing a
transaction refers to delivering a good (that either meets of fails to meet the advertised
promise), or deciding not to deliver the good at all.
For any coalition of sellers G, consider a TD where tD ∈ TD ⇔ As(tD) ∈ G. For each
transaction in the set, the sellers in G may choose to execute the transaction honestly
or dishonestly. We denote C ⊆ TD as the cheating set, the subset that is executed dis-
honestly. The coalition may have a choice of many different cheating sets for any given
schedule; choosing C is a strategic choice. (We stop short of saying that C is a strategy
2Note that buyers will often also close off a given transaction by computing a rating for the seller. The
timing of when ratings are elicited from buyers may vary by system, however. Thus, we refrain from
defining a rated transaction for generality.
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unto itself, however, since the coalition might also strategically choose the composition
of TD by choosing the transactions into which its members will enter.)
Not all schedules can actually be executed. For example, a seller that cheats repeat-
edly might not continue to find buyers for its products; although it might be possible to
formulate a schedule that includes continued future business, such a schedule may be
impossible under the trust system. For example, if trustworthiness is rated in the interval
[0, 1], and an agent’s score has dropped to 0, he may not be able to engage in further
transactions, even though he has inventory. We define the predicate feasible(t, T ) to
denote that a transaction t can actually be executed within the schedule T , in the system
under consideration. feasible(T ) denotes that every transaction in T is feasible. We do
not define feasibility further, since it will be system- or market-specific.
As we will see, profitability is a key concern when considering the security of trust
systems. The profit to the seller on an individual transaction is the selling price minus the
cost, or P (tD) = v(tD) − c(tD). The profit to a coalition on the entire set of transactions
is





A buyer who engages in no transactions suffers no direct harm from those transactions.
A buyer who enters into a transaction (assuming the common pay-before-delivery policy)
becomes vulnerable at the moment that he pays for a good. From this point, the seller
is in control, and the buyer may be harmed by receiving an inferior good, or no good at
all. A seller may be harmed, for example, by unfair feedback from buyers. For a seller
to wish to be honest, he may need confidence that buyers will provide fair reviews. We
do not address means to ensure the fairness of buyers here, however, since this is an
element of seller security. To establish that a system is buyer secure, then, may require
the assumption that buyers are honest. We discuss how to address this problem, and lift
this assumption, in Chapter 8.
In our framework, for a system to be secure we do not hold the seller responsible
for the buyer’s complete satisfaction—a buyer may have very unreasonable expectations,
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ones that cannot reasonably be met by the seller. Instead, she need only deliver the
good that she was ‘supposed’ to give. When a seller offers a good for sale, she provides
information about that good. This information constitutes the basis for the buyer’s un-
derstanding of the good he will receive. Should he purchase the good, he would expect
that it corresponds to each claim made in the offer—this is the essence of an agreed
transaction, discussed above. This, then, is the basis for our notion of buyer security: a
buyer will be secure under a trust system if
∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.2)
Note that buyer security directly addresses certain issues identified in Chapter 2, such as
the value imbalance and reputation lag problems. Other forms of dishonest behaviour
may not be directly addressed by the buyer security safety properties, since they may not
be directly relevant to the buyer. For example, ballot stuffing would be precluded by this
property if used to lure buyers into cheating transactions, but not if used by a seller to
steal sales from another seller; the later is an issue of seller security.
6.3.1 Levels of buyer security
We might term the previous property, should it hold, as full buyer security (or uncondi-
tional buyer security)—i.e., it is impossible for a seller to cheat a buyer. Unfortunately,
this property would be extremely hard to guarantee in practice. For example, one might
envision a trusted third party who receives both payment from the buyer and the good
from the seller, and only forwards payment to the seller after inspecting the good to en-
sure it fulfills the agreement. Such a system might offer great security, but is unlikely to
be practical or scalable [7].
While it may not be feasible for a system to guarantee this property in every scenario,
it may be possible to achieve it under certain conditions, when certain assumptions hold
for the marketplace. By limiting the guarantee to only those circumstances where the
assumptions hold, we effectively weaken the guarantee, allowing us to specify levels of
security that are weaker than the ideal. We specify these properties in the form of an
implication:
(assumption1 ∧ · · · ∧ assumptionm)⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.3)
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The assumptions denote limitations in the system, which prevent it from fully delivering
on the unconditional guarantee. This does not mean that the system is useless, however.
For each assumption, there are two primary approaches to dealing with it:
External: It may be possible to ensure that an assumption actually holds for the market-
place in question. If the property can be verified to hold for the marketplace, or if
some mechanism external to the trust/reputation system can be used to guarantee
the property, then the system will function adequately despite the presence of the
assumption.
Internal: It may be possible to modify the system to remove the assumption as a re-
quirement for safety. Such modification may yield a more robust system, capable
of working under a smaller set of assumptions. Thus, the presence of an assumption
can provide important guidance for future research, allowing meaningful progress
to be made.
Through the use of these techniques, the goal would be to arrive at a system for which
every remaining assumption can be ensured to hold in the marketplace—such a system
would be secure for that marketplace. It is our contention that clearly stating assumptions
aids understanding of the security delivered, and the limitations of this security, as well
as easing comparisons between possible models.
Rational-agent secure
While we may not be able to guarantee that every sale is executed honestly, we may be
able to design the system so that it is in sellers’ best interests to be honest. Such incentive-
based approaches depend on agents being rational profit-maximizers—operation of the
system depends on agents reliably choosing what is best for them. We believe this to
represent an important and high level of security, stated as:
selling agents are rational⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.4)
More formally, denoting a coalition of selling agents as G:
[∀G : rational(G)]⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.5)
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Recall that this entire statement is a specified property of a system. It does not state that
the implication holds in all cases; rather, for a system to be considered rational-agent
secure, it must be proved that under the system, if selling agents are rational then all
transactions are honest.
Since rational sellers are profit maximizers, the property above can be restated as:
[∀G : ∀TD1, TD2[P (G, TD1) > P (G, TD2)⇒ TD1is selected]]⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD)
(6.6)
For a system to be rational-agent secure, sellers must be able to understand that
honesty is the most profitable policy. Under some systems this may require considerable
computation. For example, determining that honesty maximizes profit may require the
computation of an entire tree of possible future outcomes, which may be beyond the
capabilities of the agent. Where this may be an issue, the set of assumptions should
include the computational capacity required of the agents.
Just as rational-agent security is quite a strong guarantee, it may also be difficult
to achieve. We consider several lower levels of security, derived by adding weakening
conditions to the rational-agent secure property. The assumptions described below are
not mutually exclusive, nor can they be ordered in terms of security. Systems requiring
one or more of the following assumptions may be useful for certain scenarios, or may be
only of research interest, as a stepping stone to a more secure method.
Rational single-agent secure
Ideally, a system would make the buyer secure regardless of collusion between agents.
However, collusion is notoriously difficult to combat. A lower level of security might
protect agents only from sellers who are not part of a coalition:
[∀G : rational(G) ∧ |G| = 1]⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.7)
Rational single-seller-only secure
Under some systems, a seller might be able to execute attacks by acting as a buyer for
some transactions, and as a seller for others. As a weaker extension of single-agent
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security, a system might be secure when sellers cannot act as buyers. (A seller might be
able to open another account to use as a buyer, but that would be considered an instance
of collusion, where multiple user accounts are acting in concert.)
[∀G : rational(G) ∧ |G| = 1 ∧ ∀tD ∈ TD : Ab(tD) /∈ G]⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.8)
Rational infinite-transaction secure
The exit problem is an extremely difficult one to combat, and it may be difficult to prevent
dishonest sales once sellers have exhausted finite inventories. That said, a system may
make it more attractive for a seller to continue to do business than to exit at any point.
Such a system may prevent the exit problem, but requires agents to be able to engage in
infinite transactions (e.g., the seller never runs out of inventory, there are always buyers
willing to purchase the product, etc.):
[∀G : rational(G)
∧ ∀TD[honest(TD) ∧ feasible(TD)
⇒ ∃t /∈ TD : (honest(TD ∪ {t}) ∧ feasible(TD ∪ {t}))]]
⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD)
(6.9)
Other security concerns
Of course, a buyer may require protection in other ways—that the market operator won’t
take her money, that her personal information won’t be sold, etc. However, these issues
fall outside the traditional role of a trust/reputation system, and it is difficult to conceive
of a trust/reputation system preventing behaviour that occurs outside of the marketplace
itself, or that controls the behaviour of its operator.
It may seem very difficult to use these standards in the analysis of many models,
particularly those that are predictive in nature. It is worth reiterating, however, that
unless proofs of such properties can be rendered, systems are of unknown security at
best and (based on the results of our survey in Chapter 3) likely to be insecure.
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6.4 Security analysis of Trunits
This framework was designed with the goal of allowing security analysis of any trust/
reputation system targeting a similar marketplace scenario. Having outlined a frame-
work for establishing security guarantees and enumerated a number of important levels
of security, we provide no general guidance in the construction of such proofs. The rea-
son is simple—proof methods are likely to vary greatly depending on the nature of the
system used.
Here, we revisit our Trunits mechanisms, applying the framework to precisely char-
acterize the degree of security they provide. The purpose of this is twofold: a) to provide
a more rigorous and complete analysis of the security of Trunits than was offered in the
preceding chapters, and b) to illustrate the use of the framework, to serve as an example
for other system designers.
6.4.1 Buyer Security in Basic Trunits
We seek to verify that the essential buyer security property, ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) will
hold. We understand already that certain conditions must be met for Basic Trunits to
work successfully, and that certain limitations exist. We outline these now, as a starting
point for our analysis.
As an incentive mechanism, Basic Trunits relies on agent rationality to ensure desir-
able behaviour: thus, we target rational-agent security. Essentially, under Basic Trunits
an agent makes more money if he fulfills his commitment, so he tries to do so. For this
incentive to hold, the agent must actually be able to fulfill his commitments. If he is
unable to do so successfully (e.g., poor quality control) he might find it more profitable
to cheat, rather than incurring the cost associated with honestly executing a transaction,
and still getting a bad rating. Thus, we assume that agents can control quality in order
to meet commitments if they choose to do so. (We might actually relax this assumption
under Trunits, instead specifying with precision an acceptable range in the degree of
control, but this possibility requires further study; it is discussed in Chapter 8.)
The Basic Trunits mechanism regulates the behaviour only of sellers, so on its own, it
cannot provide provable security in the face of coalitions of both buyers and sellers. Thus,
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we attempt to prove that Trunits provides rational single-agent security. Further, since
Trunits is based on buyer feedback controlling future sales, we must assume that buyer
honesty is ensured through some parallel mechanism. Finally, Basic Trunits provides
no direct impediment to a seller cheating as she exits the market, should she exhaust
her ability to honestly sell goods (e.g., if she has run out of inventory). As will be
shown below, however, there is a strong incentive not to exit the market; our analysis is
conducted under the assumption that the infinite-transaction property holds, where the
agent can engage in infinite honest sales if desired.
This analysis is based on the assumption that selling cost is a fixed fraction c of selling
price. While we do not believe that this constraint is required for Trunits to be secure,
it has been assumed in order to simplify analysis; since it has been assumed, we will
include it as an assumption in our guarantee.
Security guarantee of Basic Trunits
What we seek to prove, then, is:
Basic Trunits is in use ∧
selling agents are rational (A) ∧
selling agents act alone (B) ∧
selling agents can engage in infinite honest transactions (C) ∧
buying agents are honest (D) ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing (E) ∧
cost c is a constant percentage of selling price (F)
⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.10)
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Specified more formally:
[Basic Trunits is in use ∧
∀G : ∀TD1, TD2[P (G, TD1) > P (G, TD2)⇒ TD1is selected]∧
∀G : |G| = 1 ∧
∀TD[honest(TD) ∧ feasible(TD)
⇒ ∃t /∈ TD : (honest(TD ∪ {t}) ∧ feasible(TD ∪ {t}))]∧
buying agents are honest ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing ∧
cost c is a constant percentage of selling price]
⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD)
A note on feasibility
The feasibility of a schedule is important to its profitability, so impacting the analysis of
Trunits. A transaction under Trunits begins when the agreement is made, and ends when
the buyer has rated the seller. Let start(i) represent the start time of transaction i, and
end(i) its time of completion. Let τinit represent the seller’s initial trunit balance, and τi
the trunits required for transaction i. Since every transaction i requires an outflow of
trunits when it begins, but only honest transactions have inflows (including reward) at
completion, the balance of trunits available at any given time is:
τbal(time) = τinit −
∑
i∈TD|start(i)6time




Recall that C is the cheating set, the subset of transactions in TD that are executed
dishonestly.
If, at any time, τbal < 0, then some transaction(s) starting before time required more
trunits than were available (i.e., the transaction(s) would not have been allowed). A
feasible schedule (from the standpoint of the constraints imposed by Trunits), then, is
one for which τbal is never less than 0 for all sellers of all transaction in TD. Consider
any TD and cheating set C, where C ⊆ TD. Note that the addition of a transaction
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(that is a member of TD) to C (i.e., changing an honest transaction to a dishonest one)
does not change the number of ‘outflow’ trunits, but does reduce the number of ‘inflow’
trunits. Thus, the addition of a transaction i to C never increases τbal, but will lower
it (specifically, after end(i)). This means that the addition of a transaction to C might
result in a previously feasible transaction becoming infeasible. Conversely, the removal
of a transaction from C only increases the number of trunits available, so it cannot render
a feasible transaction infeasible.
Proving the guarantee
Since rational sellers choose the most profitable option, our goal is to show that, for any
arbitrary schedule, profit is maximized by executing each transaction in the schedule
honestly. First, we consider only finite schedules. Consider any honest, feasible schedule
TD, and a schedule T ′D with the same set of agreed transactions TA. T
′
D has the non-
empty cheating set C. Since we have assumed that sellers act alone, we omit the G from
our profit formula. For each computation below, we denote each TD by its corresponding
schedule of agreed transactions and its cheating set. Thus, we seek to show that for any
non-empty C ⊆ TA,
P (TA, C) < P (TA,∅). (6.12)
Note that by our assumptions, the seller acts alone. Further, we make use of a Basic
Trunits system that does not allow a seller to sell goods to himself in order to increase his
trunit balance. This means that all cash and trunit flows come only through transactions
with real buyers.
The expected profit function for Basic Trunits requires explanation, regarding the
value of accumulated trunits. At the end of the schedule, the seller will have earned
some profit, and will have some quantity of remaining trunits (denoted τbal(exit), where
exit is the time at which the last transaction is completed). While cheating might increase
profit earned during the schedule, it would reduce the number of leftover trunits—since
trunits can be used to earn future profits, this is a reduction in value gained by the seller.
To measure this value, we introduce one additional transaction that occurs after exit. In
this transaction, the seller uses all remaining trunits to cheat, as he is free to do. We
do not mean to suggest that this is what the seller will or should do. (As we will show
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below, if he is rational he would continue to make honest trades beyond the end of the
schedule.) Instead, we use this to determine the value he can assuredly gain from his
trunits, and effectively set a lower bound on the future profits that could be earned with
them. Thus, for every schedule, the expected total profit will be the sum of the profit
from honest sales, the profit from cheating sales, and the revenue from the ‘final cheat’
(using the remaining trunits) after the schedule has completed:
























(In fact, if the schedule is infeasible, the profit will be less than this, because some of the
transactions will not be permitted to occur. Thus, this represents an upper limit on the
profitability of the schedule.)
Now, consider the same schedule, but with two different sets of cheating transactions
C1 and C2, where C1 ⊂ C2, (i.e., C2 may be thought of as the result of adding cheating
transactions to C1). If the delivered schedule using C1 is feasible, the one using C2 may
be either feasible or infeasible. To compare profits from each schedule, we subtract the
profit of the second from that of the first:



































































































Given that (1− c), p, and r must all be greater than 0, as must all trunit values in the
sets (and hence in the summation), this subtraction yields a positive number. (Further,
note that if C2 yields an infeasible schedule, then its profit will be reduced, increasing
the result of the subtraction.) This means that if C1 ⊂ C2, the profit using C1 must be
higher than that of C2. Given that the empty set is a subset of every set, for any finite TA
and non-empty C ⊆ TA, P (TA, C) < P (TA,∅).
The exit problem
The analysis above shows that for any finite schedule, profit is maximized through hon-
esty, but for the last ‘cheating exit’ transaction. Ideally, the seller will never want to make
such an exit; we now relax the finite schedule constraint, consistent with our stated as-
sumption. Consider any arbitrary feasible schedule TA. A rational seller will maximize
profit by executing every transaction honestly, so the profit formula 6.13 simplifies to:
P (TA) = r(1− c + p)
∑
i∈TA
τi + rτinit (6.15)
Instead of cheating on exit, the seller might consider executing one more honest
transaction t. Assuming that the new transaction yields a feasible schedule (and since
every sale in TA is honest, it must be possible to add a feasible transaction), the new
profit is:
P (TA ∪ {t}) = r(1− c + p)
∑
i∈TA∪{t}
τi + rτinit (6.16)
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Since all of r, p, (1 − c), and τt are positive, P (TA ∪ {t}) > P (TA), meaning that
for any given schedule, it is more profitable for the seller to add profitable transactions.
(Note that adding dishonest transactions does not increase the profit—cheating within
the schedule is no more profitable than during the ‘cheating exit’.)
The result implies that to maximize profit, the seller should never cheat, but should
continue to sell items indefinitely.
In summary, for any schedule, profit is maximized by executing every transaction
honestly, and continuing to add honest transactions to infinity. Thus,
[Basic Trunits is in use ∧
∀G : |G| = 1 ∧
∀TD[honest(TD) ∧ feasible(TD)
⇒ ∃t /∈ TD : (honest(TD ∪ {t}) ∧ feasible(TD ∪ {t}))]∧
buying agents are honest ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing ∧
cost c is a constant percentage of selling price]
⇒ ∀TA : [C ⊆ TA, |C| > ∅⇒ P (G, TA,∅) > P (G, TA, C)]
This yields:
[∀G : ∀TD1, TD2[P (G, TD1) > P (G, TD2)⇒ TD1is selected]∧
∀TA : [C ⊆ TA, |C| > ∅⇒ P (G, TA,∅) > P (G, TA, C)]
⇒ ∀TA : (TA,∅) is selected ⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.18)
Essentially this means that since it will be less profitable for a rational seller to cheat,
she will execute every transaction honestly. Thus, the Trunits mechanism can provide
the user with a guarantee of security, at this level.
The (labeled) list of assumptions given in Formula 6.10 identifies the limitations of
the Basic Trunits mechanism. Understanding these, how can we be sure that the mecha-
nism will be secure? We address each assumption below:
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• Rationality of agents (A) is a fundamental assumption of most work in mechanism
design, and a limitation that we likely must accept; it is not an unreasonable ex-
pectation of sellers in a marketplace, however.
• Sellers acting alone (B) speaks to the issue of collusion, a difficult problem with
which the trust and reputation community continues to struggle. Since it is unlikely
that we can safely assume that agents won’t collude, we must devote effort to
extending the mechanism to make it collusion-proof. This issue is discussed in
Chapter 8.
• The need for infinite transactions (C) can be addressed through enhancements
to the Basic Trunits mechanism, such as the Commodity Trunits mechanism. We
analyze Commodity Trunits in the following section.
• The requirement for agents to be honest (D) speaks directly to the absence of any
system to address the trustworthiness of buyers. Extension of Trunits, or the use
of a parallel system to ensure buyer honesty, is required to address this limitation.
This is discussed in Chapter 8.
• The assumption that sellers can control quality (E) can actually be refined to specify
the degree of control required, as discussed in Chapter 8.
• Finally, the assumption that cost is a fixed percentage of selling price (F) is a special
case of an internal limitation. This assumption is not likely required for the desired
property to hold, but has been added to ease analysis. It might be eliminated with
more detailed consideration.
This analysis gives us a clear picture of exactly what guarantee Basic Trunits provides,
and under what conditions—Basic Trunits has achieved a provable level of security. The
ability to do so appears to be linked to the fact that the incentive for honesty is explicit,
and thus measurable. Based on this guarantee, informed decisions can be made about
whether this mechanism is appropriate for a given scenario. Moreover, clear directions
have been identified for future research, in overcoming these restrictions. Indeed, this is
one of the benefits of our security framework—it allows designers of trust and reputation
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systems for marketplaces to clearly identify meaningful limitations or deficiencies in their
systems.
6.4.2 Buyer Security in Commodity Trunits
In Section 6.4.1, we evaluated the degree of security provided by Basic Trunits. In this
section, we perform the corresponding analysis of Commodity Trunits. The analysis of
Commodity Trunits is simplified relative to Basic Trunits, for several reasons:
• Since trunits have a market price, their (minimum) value can be determined at any
time without the need to evaluate an entire stream of future possible transactions.
This simplifies the evaluation of the decision whether or not to cheat.
• Transactions are never infeasible under Commodity Trunits, since an agent can
simply buy additional trunits when needed to cover a transaction.
The analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that r and b change during market
execution—our profit function cannot rely on the same summations of trunit values used
above, since each sale or trunit transaction will use a different r/b. Thus, we approach
our analysis differently.
We begin with the same set of assumptions as for Basic Trunits, but make several
modifications. The introduction of buying and selling of trunits was introduced specifi-
cally to remedy the exit and surplus trunit problems. Thus, we can eliminate the need
for infinite transactions. In addition, the safety of Commodity Trunits depends on the
selling price of trunits b remaining above the required ratio r.
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Security guarantee of Commodity Trunits
Our goal, then is to prove:
Commodity Trunits is in use ∧
selling agents are rational (A) ∧
selling agents act alone (B) ∧
buying agents are honest (C) ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing (D) ∧
cost c is a constant (for each agent) percentage of selling price (E)
price of trunits b exceeds the required ratio r at all times time (F)
⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.19)
Specified more formally:
[Commodity Trunits is in use ∧
∀G : ∀TD1, TD2[P (G, TD1) > P (G, TD2)⇒ TD1is selected]∧
∀G : |G| = 1 ∧
buying agents are honest ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing ∧
cost c is a constant (for each agent) percentage of selling price
∀time : btime > rtime]
⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.20)
Note that while we have shown that Commodity Trunits provides some protection
from the ballot-stuffing problem, it has not been established that the mechanism provides
protection from other forms of collusive behaviour (e.g., bad-mouthing). For this reason,
we have retained the condition that agents act alone.
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Proving the guarantee
Given that transactions cannot be infeasible under Commodity Trunits, and that we need
not consider an entire set of future transactions to determine the value of trunits, we
do not need to consider entire schedules in the same way that we did for Basic Trunits.
Instead, we can consider the impact of each added transaction individually. Thus, our
proof proceeds by induction on n, the number of transactions in a schedule.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the price of trunits b will vary over time. The precise profit
earned by an agent will depend on exactly when he purchases trunits, and when he sells
them. This issue should not obscure our consideration of whether honesty or dishonesty
is more profitable. With this in mind, we make two important notes:
• If an agent buys trunits at price b, he incurs the same cost whether he intends to use
them for cheating or for honest sales. He might save money by timing his purchase
to take advantage of lower prices, but such savings are not attributable to his choice
of strategy, so we do not consider them here: corresponding trunit purchases (and
sales, for the same reason) are made at the same time and price in both the honest
and dishonest cases.
• An agent might profit by buying trunits at a low price and selling them at a high
price, without even having used them for transactions. Again, such profits (or
losses, in the opposite case) are not relevant to the agents’ choices of (dis)honesty,
so we ignore such activity. (Putting this another way, we assume that the agent
buys only as many trunits as required to engage in transactions.)
Base case: Any single transaction, n = 1: Any seller faced with a single transaction
(requiring τ trunits) has three choices: execute the sale honestly, cheat, or foresake
the sale and instead honestly sell his trunits. We consider the latter two options here,
addressing the first afterwards.
The seller may begin with enough trunits to engage in a sale, or may need to buy
additional trunits. Let τh be the number of trunits already possessed that are used for the
transaction, and τp the number that are purchased, so τ = τh + τp.
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If the agent decides to cheat, he can gain (at most) rτ = r(τp + τh), and incur a cost
of bτp in purchasing the trunits. If he instead decides not to engage in the transaction,
and simply sells the trunits he already possesses, he will gain bτh. Honestly selling the
trunits is more profitable than cheating if:
r(τp + τh)− bτp < bτh
r(τp + τh) < bτh + bτp
r(τp + τh) < b(τh + τp)
r < b (6.21)
By assumption, r < b. Therefore, for any single transaction, forgoing the sale and selling
the trunits honestly is more profitable than cheating.
This result is quite direct and simple. The mechanics of the market ensure that there
is a preferable alternative to cheating: sell the trunits (i.e., engage in no transaction). A
more interesting question is, does it make sense for an agent to actually engage in honest
sales, or should he simply avoid cheating by not engaging in transactions? Consider the
case where an agent must purchase τt trunits (at time tstart) to engage in any single sale
t. He can purchase the trunits at price btstart; after the sale, any resulting trunits can be
sold (at time tend) at price btend. His profit for a single transaction, then is:
P (t) = (1− c)rτt + btend(1 + p)τt − btstartτt
Since a seller would likely only engage in a sale if his expected profit is greater than 0,
0 < (1− c)rτt + btend(1 + p)τt − btstartτt
btstartτt − btend(1 + p)τt < (1− c)rτt
(6.22)
that is, the profit from the sale of the good must be greater than any expected loss
buying and selling the trunits. Ideally, we would hope all agents would have motivation
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to engage in honest sales, so we set c = 1 (the maximum ratio):
btstartτt − btend(1 + p)τt < (1− 1)rτt
btstart − btend(1 + p) < 0
btstart < btend(1 + p)
btstart
btend
< (1 + p) (6.23)
that is, the rate of decrease in trunit prices (per transaction duration, as a fraction of the
ending price) cannot exceed the premium for honesty.
In our simulations, using p = 0.2, this property always held. (We did not test for this
property for other values of p). Thus, it should be expected that in a trunits marketplace,
it will be profitable for most if not all sellers to engage in sales.
Induction step: Assume that honesty maximizes expected profit for any schedule
of n transactions. Consider a schedule of size n + 1. Of the n + 1 transactions, we
choose one arbitrarily, and denote this as transaction i. In the absence of i, the remaining
set of transactions constitutes a schedule of size n.
Now, consider the addition of transaction i to the schedule. The addition of transac-
tion i does not deprive any other transaction of trunits, since trunits can be purchased.
For the same reason, trunits returned upon the completion of i are not required in the ex-
ecution of other transactions. Thus, the n transactions can be executed independently of
the execution of i: in isolation from i, their execution is identical to that of any schedule
of size n. By the induction hypothesis, expected profit from the n transactions alone is
maximized by executing each of them honestly. Now, we need only consider the change
in profitability incurred by the addition of i into the schedule.
The execution of i requires trunits at its start time (t1). If these trunits were to be
purchased on the market (i.e., the seller did not use trunits that he already owned and
was using to execute the schedule of n), the trunit requirement would have no effect on
the schedule of n. Existing trunits may be used, however, trunits that might be required
for the execution of some of the transactions in n. Consider a transaction starting at
time t2, that is deprived of some quantity of trunits τ that are instead used to execute
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i. This will save us from purchasing the τ trunits at price bt1, but require us to purchase
them at price bt2 to execute the later transaction. The net impact on profit is τ(bt1 − bt2).
Note, however, that this implies that under the schedule of n transactions alone, we have
τ trunits available at time t1 that are not required until time t2. Thus, in the absence
of i, we could simply (speculatively) sell the trunits at time t1 and repurchase the same
quantity at t2: the net impact on profit is τ(bt1 − bt2), identical to the case where we use
the trunits for transaction i. Even if we use existing trunits for i, then, profit is identical to
the case where we simply purchase separate trunits for i independently of the execution
of the n transactions.
Similarly, τ trunits returned after the execution of i (at time t3) might be sold sepa-
rately at price bt3, but they might be used instead to cover future sales of a transaction in
n, starting at t4, saving us from buying trunits at price bt4. The net impact on profit, then
is τ(bt4−bt3). This impact, however, is identical to that if we purchased trunits separately
for the transaction in n, and simply held the trunits from i without using them for any of
the n transactions, selling them at time t4 instead of t3.
In short, any mixing of trunits between i and the schedule of n is equivalent to exe-
cuting i completely separately from the n in terms of the profit impact from trunits. Thus,
the additional transaction i has no impact on the profitability of the n due to trunits (nor
does it impact the profits earned directly via the n honest sales): execution of i can be
considered in complete isolation from execution of the n transactions.
i, then, may be treated simply as a single, isolated transaction: an instance of our
base case. As shown above, executing the single transaction honestly maximizes ex-
pected profits. Thus, for any schedule of n + 1 transactions, executing them honestly
maximizes profit. By induction, expected profit for any schedule of size greater than 0
transactions is maximized by honestly executing every transaction.
This proof, while extremely simple, highlights an important point: the properties of
Commodity Trunits allow us to consider transactions essentially in isolation, to determine
their impact on profitability. This eases analysis for us. More importantly, it also allows
agents to easily determine the expected outcomes of their actions. This permits even
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very simple agents to clearly understand the incentive for honesty, which in turn allows
us to be confident that they will make the correct choice. Further, it should be noted that
whether an agent cheats or not depends on only two parameters: b and r.
In summary, for any schedule, expected profit is higher if the agent executes trans-
actions honestly, or forgoes transactions in favour of selling trunits, than if he cheats.
Thus,
[Commodity Trunits is in use ∧
∀G : |G| = 1 ∧
buying agents are honest ∧
selling agents can reliably meet commitments if willing ∧
cost c is a constant percentage of selling price∧
∀time : btime > rtime]
⇒ ∀TA : [C ⊆ TA, |C| > ∅⇒ P (G, TA,∅) > P (G, TA, C)] (6.24)
This yields:
[∀G : ∀TD1, TD2[P (G, TD1) > P (G, TD2)⇒ TD1is selected]∧
∀TA : [C ⊆ TA, |C| > ∅⇒ P (G, TA,∅) > P (G, TA, C)]
⇒ ∀TA : (TA,∅) is selected ⇒ ∀tD ∈ TD : honest(tD) (6.25)
Commodity Trunits delivers provable security. The discussion of the conditions re-
quired to make this guarantee is virtually the same as that for Basic Trunits, so it is
omitted here.
6.4.3 The value of the framework
We have argued that it is necessary to explicitly consider security in the development
of trust and reputation systems, and have proposed a framework for doing so. Applica-
tion of this framework to Basic Trunits and Commodity Trunits revealed that: a) both
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mechanisms were capable of delivering provable security; b) to deliver that provable se-
curity, certain conditions must hold. We believe that the explicit consideration of these
conditions has several benefits:
• It provides a clear understanding of if and where a trust/reputation system might
be safely applied in a marketplace;
• It aids in the comparison of different models of trust and reputation;
• It clearly identifies meaningful directions for future research.
We believe that the benefits derived from this framework would apply to a wide variety




In earlier chapters, we examined the vulnerabilities that commonly afflict trust and rep-
utation models, described the Trunits model and two Trunits mechanisms, presented a
framework for analyzing the security of trust and reputation systems, and applied this
framework to our own proposals. Throughout these chapters, issues were raised that
merit further discussion. In this chapter, we touch on a number of these issues, expand-
ing on ideas raised earlier.
7.1 Is Trunits a model of Trust?
Both Basic Trunits and Commodity Trunits are mechanisms, intended to structure the
marketplace so as to elicit the desired behaviour (honesty) from sellers. The question
might be asked, however, is Trunits actually a model of trust? Commodity Trunits, in par-
ticular, might raise objections: it is difficult to reconcile a notion of real-world trust with
the idea of trust units that are bought and sold as a commodity. Despite appearances,
our model is quite similar to more conventional trust/reputation models in practice, even
predictive models.
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7.1.1 The practical equivalence of predictive and incentive approaches
Superficially, predictive- and incentive-based models seem to be entirely dissimilar: the
former seek to predict the actions that agents will choose, while the latter seek to in-
fluence the choice of action. It is our position, however, that the distinction is a false
one in many cases. We contend that predictive models often act as incentive schemes,
intentionally or not.
Predictive approaches use some record of an agent’s past performance in order to
estimate the likelihood that the agent will be trustworthy in a future transaction. Under
such a model, we might view a seller’s trust rating as reflecting something intrinsic to
the agent: how innately trustworthy she is, or how ‘good a person’ she is. In situations
where agents are economically motivated, however, this view may be flawed. As noted in
[7], “sellers care about buyer feedback primarily to the extent that they believe it might
affect their future profits.” It can be argued that when a predictive model is being used,
if an agent is rational and knows that trustworthiness is being modeled, it will affect her
decisions.
If the seller knows that some predictive model is in use, she could reasonably expect
that her future sales will be impacted by her current activities. Acting badly may decrease
future profitable sales—agents may be less likely to buy from her, lower prices may
be commanded, etc.— while conversely, honesty may increase future sales. Regardless
of her (dis)honest disposition, a rational agent seeking to maximize profit will behave
honestly if she believes that is the more profitable course. In this case, a predictive model
might be viewed as a de facto incentive mechanism.
Given this practical equivalence between predictive- and incentive-based approaches,
Trunits has a great deal in common with existing predictive models. As such, it may
justifiably be considered a ‘model’ of trust, despite its use of unconventional techniques.
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7.2 The importance of security to all models of trust and
reputation
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, vulnerabilities are a significant problem for existing
trust and reputation systems. Given the prevalence of these vulnerabilities, one must
question why they are so common. It may simply be the case that researchers are un-
aware of these issues. We believe that there is some truth to this. Moreover, issues of
system-wide security may not be the foremost concern of researchers seeking to develop
learning algorithms to allow individual agents to make good decisions in marketplaces.
It is our position, however, that security is a critical concern for all developers of trust and
reputation systems, including predictive models. We outline the case for this position in
this section.
7.2.1 Issues of security in predictive models
As argued above, a predictive model may be viewed as de facto incentive mechanism,
albeit with implicit rather than explicit incentives. Unfortunately, the implicit nature of
these incentives may be a source of problems.
Consider a seller in a marketplace where a predictive trust model is in use, a model
of which the seller is aware. He is attempting to make a decision: cheat or be honest?
Understanding that a trust model is in use, he expects that if he is dishonest, his future
sales may decrease, while if he is honest, sales may increase. This provides an incentive
for honesty. Unfortunately, the implicit nature of the incentive leaves pivotal questions
unanswered. How much future business will be lost in the case of dishonesty? How
much will be gained though honesty? In short, is the incentive large enough to make
honesty the more profitable choice? Without answers to these questions, it is difficult for
the seller to make a well-supported decision.
Because the agent faces uncertainty in making this decision, we as market operators
or developers cannot be sure which choice he will make. While the agent is attempting
to make a decision based on the incentive, there is no obviously superior choice: he may
decide to be dishonest, believing it to be the best choice under the incentive. Despite
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the fact that we wish the agent to be honest, we have set up the system in such a way
that he may be lead to dishonesty. There are two key implications. First, although
the model may be a de facto incentive mechanism, it has failed in this role. Second,
because of the uncertainty of the incentive, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not
vulnerabilities exist—the agent may, in fact, be correct in his belief that he has found a
profit-maximizing cheating strategy.
In contrast, incentive-based approaches typically make the incentive explicit and mea-
surable. This allows agents operating in such an environment to make strategic decisions
more easily, since the outcomes of alternative actions can be determined more defini-
tively. Perhaps more importantly, it helps developers to evaluate the incentive provided,
to determine the circumstances under which it does or does not hold. This in turn allows
easier identification of vulnerabilities, or ideally, establishment that no such vulnerability
exists.
One might argue that agents need not be aware that a trust model is in use; to an
oblivious agent, no such incentive is visible, and the agent’s true disposition may be
revealed through its actions. In this case, predictive models do not influence behaviour,
and retain their full predictive ability. We do not believe that the security of a model
should rest on the assumption of agent obliviousness, however, as it seems unlikely that
such a ‘secret’ might be kept. This is reminiscent of the notion of ‘security by obscurity’,
which does not find favour amongst cryptographers.
We do not mean to suggest that predictive approaches are inferior, or that researchers
should only pursue incentive mechanisms. Quite the opposite: we believe that predictive
models hold much promise, and that existing proposals have made significant strides
in the understanding of trust and the development of trust and reputation models. We
mean only to suggest that developers of predictive models should explicitly consider
the incentive-like effects of their models, to make progress towards vulnerability-free
models. System security is a specific goal, and it is unlikely to be achieved without being
acknowledged and explicitly targeted by researchers.
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7.2.2 Vulnerabilities and the ‘aware’ agent
That an agent may be aware of the use of a trust model raises darker concerns for all such
models, regarding vulnerabilities. Consider an agent in a marketplace, who is aware that
a trust model is in use. Given the marketplace scenario, we might expect that such an
agent is a rational profit maximizer.
The agent chooses its actions based on its understanding of its environment. When no
trust system is in use, the agent chooses actions based on the rules of the marketplace,
attempting to maximize profit. If a trust/reputation system is in use, we can likewise
expect the agent to choose its actions based on its understanding of the rules—the rules
have simply been augmented by those of the trust/reputation system, creating a richer
environment. We should expect the agent to try to maximize profit under this new set of
rules just as he did under the original set; a profit maximizing strategy might very well
involve exploiting a vulnerability. If a vulnerability exists in the trust/reputation system,
then, we should expect an agent to exploit it.
This is a key point—not only is a vulnerability a potential problem, but we should
expect agents (human or otherwise) to seek these out, to strategize with a knowledge
of these actions. From this perspective, we believe that all researchers should seek to
eliminate vulnerabilities from their models: security is a critical concern for all trust and
reputation systems.
This is not to suggest that every system must achieve security to be valuable or of in-
terest, or that security is more important than other design goals. Security should inform
design, however, and security analysis should supplement other forms of evaluation.
7.2.3 The key role of security in adoption of trust and reputation
systems
While extensive research has been conducted into trust and reputation systems, current
proposals have inspired little adoption for real-world marketplaces, highlighting the im-
portance of security. Trust and reputation systems generally focus on trust between agents
within a marketplace. In contrast, the issue of security draws attention to a higher-level
issue: trust of the marketplace itself by participants.
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Marketplace developers are under no obligation to make use of a particular trust
model, and traders have no obligation to participate in a given marketplace. For a party
to be eager to participate in a marketplace, it may need to be confident that its interests
will be protected, i.e., that the market will be secure from its perspective. In contrast, a
model that has not been shown to be secure, or worse, contains known vulnerabilities,
raises doubts for potential adopters/participants. This points to the key role of security
for the adoption of trust and reputation models.
7.2.4 The Role of the Security Framework
The previous discussion highlights the importance of security to trust and reputation
models. In this context, our security framework can serve three important purposes:
• It can aid in the precise determination of the degree of security provided by a given
model, allowing the model to be evaluated by adopters/participants for use in a
particular scenario;
• It can provide a sound and objective foundation for comparison of models, without
the bias that may be introduced using other methods (e.g., a simulation may make
use of a scenario that favours or penalizes a given model);
• It can help to identify meaningful avenues of future research, by identifying limita-
tions in a model that relate directly to security.
We believe that the framework presented in this thesis offers a new direction for re-
searchers in the area of trust and reputation, one that will help to address the needs and
foster the confidence of real users.
7.2.5 The Role of Game-Theoretic Concepts
In the areas of game theory and mechanism design [19], there are well-defined solution
concepts and properties (e.g., Nash Equilibria, Incentive Compatibility, etc.) that might
be used in considering the choice of action an agent might take in a ‘game’. These
concepts, however, apply to strategic games where all players have choices to make, and
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an agent’s best choice of action depends on other players’ possible actions. As such, they
do not necessarily apply to all trust/reputation systems. We therefore felt they were less
appropriate to use as the basis for the security framework developed in this thesis. For
example, under Trunits, the seller has the luxury of making his choice after the buyer
has already committed and revealed her action. The seller’s decision of whether or not
to be honest is therefore better seen as a decision problem than as a strategic game.
For this reason, we specify the concept of security based on properties that should hold
regardless of the model used.
Note that developers may find the concepts like Incentive Compatibility useful in
proving that our security properties hold, however. Conversely, game theory and mech-
anism design may provide important insights, useful as we expand our framework to
incorporate seller and market security, discussed in Chapter 8.
7.3 Selecting Basic Trunits or Commodity Trunits
In this thesis, we have presented two Trunits variants: Basic Trunits and Commodity
Trunits. While some of the characteristics of each model may have been apparent in
earlier discussion, here we discuss how and why one might select one model or the other
for use in a given marketplace.
Buying and selling of trunits was introduced into Commodity Trunits to deal with
three issues: the start-up problem, the exit problem, and the surplus trust issue. Com-
modity Trunits provides solutions to these issues, while sacrificing none of the security
offered by Basic Trunits (if the required pricing property for safe operation is maintained,
i.e., the price of trunits always exceeds the required ratio for sales). Thus, Commodity
Trunits may be preferable to Basic Trunits in many situations, because of the enhanced
protection it provides.
That said, Basic Trunits is attractive in its simplicity, and may be useful in circum-
stances where either the enhanced protection of Commodity Trunits is not required, or
obstacles prevent the implementation of the extended system. An example of the former
case would be a scenario in which sellers’ identities can be established with certainty;
since there is no threat of re-entry, the start-up problem can be negated by simply pro-
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viding new sellers with some initial quantity of trunits, and the threat of legal action
(using the known identity of the seller) might prevent cheating exits from the market.
An example of the latter would be the implementation of Trunits in a peer-to-peer sys-
tem. In such an implementation, there is likely no identifiable market operator. Without
an operator who can hold money and engage in trunit sales and purchases (as described
in Chapter 5), it may be difficult to maintain the required pricing property for safe oper-
ation of Commodity Trunits.
Ultimately, the implementer/operator of a marketplace must weigh her priorities and
the nature of the market itself, and select the option that best fits.
7.4 Trunits vs. Existing Models: Important Non-Security
Properties
Much of this document has been devoted to investigating issues of security in trust and
reputation systems. In Chapter 3, we examined the security properties of many existing
models; in Chapters 4 and 5 we explored the Trunits mechanisms from the same perspec-
tive, thus contrasting them with existing work. Security is not the only important issue
for trust and reputation systems, however. Here, we compare Trunits to two existing
models with respect to other key characteristics.
7.4.1 Tran and Cohen
The Tran and Cohen model [30, 31] is an example of a direct experience model, in which
an agent relies solely on its own experience in evaluating the trustworthiness of others.
(An overview of this model can be found in Section 3.1.1.)
Computation and Storage Requirements
Both Tran and Cohen and the Trunits mechanisms require fairly simple calculations: in
the former, after a transaction takes place the buyer performs simple algebraic updates
of his reputation and expected value functions for the seller, while in the later, a simple
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algebraic update of the trunit balance is required. Tran and Cohen requires the storage of
values for each seller and each good, while Trunits requires the storage of a single value
for each seller. It should be noted, however, that because Tran and Cohen is a direct
experience model, every buyer maintains separate values for every (known) seller; if
there are n buyers, m sellers, and g goods, O(mng) storage is required in total. In
contrast, trunit balances are global values, so only O(m) values needed be stored for m
sellers, and no work need be performed by the buyers.
Equal Protection of Buyers
We consider it desirable for every agent in the system to be equally protected (hopefully,
well protected). If, for example, new participants are more vulnerable than established
ones, it can serve as a disincentive for new agents to enter the market. Because Tran and
Cohen is a direct experience model, an agent’s ability to choose good partners is directly
tied to its experience in that market. New sellers, with no experience, choose essentially
at random. Under Trunits, a seller’s ability to engage in a sale is determined by that
seller’s trunit balance, regardless of the identity of the buyer—every buyer receives the
same degree of protection.
Equal Opportunity for Sellers
Just as equal protection may foster the entry of new buyers into the market, equal oppor-
tunity may foster entrance of new sellers—a seller may be more likely to join a market if
he does not feel at a grave disadvantage to established sellers.
Under Tran and Cohen, buyers preferentially choose sellers whom they know to be
reputable. While this is reasonable, it also places new sellers at a disadvantage—they
will only be chosen if a buyer cannot find a known reputable seller, or if a buyer chooses
to explore the market (which occurs with a small probability). In contrast, under Trunits
any agent who possesses sufficient trunits is considered to be reputable for that sale;
an agent does not become ‘more reputable’ if he has a longer history. Thus, a new
seller is on equal footing with an established seller when competing for any given sale.
(An established seller may be able to engage in more sales than a new seller, due to
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a larger trunit balance, but on any given sale, they are equally attractive in terms of
trustworthiness.)
7.4.2 The Beta Reputation System
The Beta Reputation System (BRS) [15, 34] is a witness information model, incorporat-
ing the recommendations of others as potential partners are evaluated. (An overview of
this model can be found in Section 3.1.2.)
Computation and Storage Requirements
Under BRS, each buyer must keep a count of successes and failures for each (known)
seller. For m sellers and n buyers, this requires O(mn) storage, as compared to the O(m)
global values stored under Trunits.
The computational requirements for BRS are noteworthy. Determining a seller’s rep-
utation score (i.e., the expected value of the beta distribution given the recorded number
of successes and failures) requires one simple algebraic calculation. Filtering out dubi-
ous reviews, however, is an iterative process, consisting of: a) summing the ratings from
each recommender in the current set; b) computing a reputation score using the totals
from the previous step; c) for each recommender, computing a reputation score using the
ratings provided by that individual, and removing the recommender from the current set
if the result is too high or too low compared to the result from part b); d) repeating from
part a), until no more agents are removed. The exact amount of work required depends
on the number of recommendations that are solicited. That said, it is significantly more
work than the simple algebraic update that occurs after every sale under Trunits. Note,
too, that the process is repeated under BRS each time a seller is to be considered for a
sale; many sellers may be considered before one is selected. Under Trunits, to determine
if a seller is eligible for a sale requires only a comparison of the required trunits to the
seller’s actual trunit balance.
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Equal Protection of Buyers
Under BRS, a buyer combines its own experience with the reviews provided by recom-
menders. Since the recommendations are of unknown quality, direct experience may be
more credible than the reviews received from others. To this degree, buyers with more
experience may be protected more than inexperienced sellers. As noted above, Trunits
provides equal protection to all buyers.
Equal Opportunity for Sellers
Under BRS, beta distributions are constructed based on the number of positive and neg-
ative experiences with the seller. The shape of the distribution (and hence, its expected
value, or ‘reputation score’) varies depending on the number of experiences with the
seller. Specifically, a larger number of ratings results in a narrower distribution with
a higher peak, reflecting greater statistical confidence. For example, if a seller had 2
positive ratings and 1 negative rating, its reputation score under BRS would be 0.2. If
the seller had 20 positive ratings and 10 negative ratings, its reputation score would be
0.3125.1 Despite the fact that they have cheated with exactly the same relative frequency,
the second seller is favoured, owing to his longer history. In contrast, as noted above,
Trunits treats all sellers with sufficient trunits equally.
1Under BRS, reputation scores are calculated using Rep(r, s) = r−sr+s+2 , where r is the total of positive
ratings, and s is total of negative ratings.

Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
Trust and reputation models for multiagent systems have received significant research
attention. Unfortunately, existing proposals suffer from a number of common vulnera-
bilities; we catalogued these vulnerabilities, and investigated their presence in a number
of existing models.
A vulnerability in a trust/reputation model provides methods and opportunities for
agents to cheat and ‘get away with it’. For an incentive-based approach, this means that
the incentive for honesty fails to hold in some cases, making dishonesty the more prof-
itable choice. Predictive systems, by definition, seek to predict the future behaviour of
agents. It should come as no surprise that it is possible for agents to engage in behaviour
that is not predictable by such a system—they may simply alter their behaviour from pre-
vious patterns. Vulnerabilities in predictive models are more troubling, however: they
provide a means for agents to manipulate the system to improve their ability to cheat,
and/or allow agents to cheat without serious repercussions.
In effect, vulnerabilities allow a dishonest agent to bypass the trust model. An inse-
cure model might fare well in laboratory circumstances where simple/oblivious agents
are employed. When faced with more sophisticated agents (or real-world traders) that
are aware of such opportunities, these vulnerabilities may render the model ineffective,
even irrelevant. For this reason, we believe that security is a critical design criterion for
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trust and reputation systems.
We argue that security has received insufficient attention from developers of trust and
reputation systems. This is validated by the ubiquity of vulnerabilities in existing systems;
moreover, issues related to security are rarely discussed in published work, particularly so
for predictive proposals. It is possible that the developers of predictive models, concerned
with developing learning algorithms and statistical methods to aid individual agents in
decision-making, have not focused to the same degree on system-wide security issues. We
contend, however, that predictive approaches are de facto incentive mechanisms when
an agent knows that its trustworthiness is being modeled—the agent’s behaviour may be
altered in an effort to appear trustworthy. From this perspective, issues of vulnerabilities
and the notion of provable system security are particularly relevant to developers of
predictive approaches.
Motivated by these findings, we set out to develop a model of trust with explicit
attention to security, one that addressed many of these common vulnerabilities. Our
Trunits model is based on the use of abstract units that represent trust, in much the same
way that units of money represent value. The quantity of trunits possessed controls
an agent’s ability to engage in transactions. Agents lose trunits when dishonest, and
gain them when honest; honest behaviour allows increased future sales, providing an
incentive for honesty. Based on this model, we developed two mechanisms, Basic Trunits
and Commodity Trunits.
Basic Trunits is a direct implementation of the model described above. In contrast
to Commodity Trunits, trunits are assigned to a specific trader and are not transferable.
Basic Trunits has a number of attractive characteristics; important properties include:
• Agents are provided with financial incentives for honesty. In contrast to predictive
models, where there is uncertainty regarding an agent’s future actions, under Basic
Trunits we can expect that a rational seller will be honest (when specific conditions
are met, as discussed in Section 6.4.1).
• Basic Trunits provides a solution to the Reputation Lag problem, because trust can-
not be used to support multiple simultaneous transactions.
• Basic Trunits provides a solution to the Value Imbalance problem, because the
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amount of trust earned from a transaction is proportional to the price of the sale.
• Basic Trunits treats new sellers and maximally disreputable sellers the same, the
optimal policy in countering the re-entry problem.
• Basic Trunits provides a partial solution to the exit problem: while there is nothing
to prevent an agent from cheating when it exits the market, there is an incentive
for agents to remain in the market rather than exiting.
• Under Basic Trunits, decision making is extremely simple for buyers (in determin-
ing whether to trust a seller) and sellers (in determining whether or not to cheat).
• Because virtually no computation is required to evaluate sellers, buyers are equally
protected regardless of their own computational capacities.
• Because the honesty of sellers is ensured by the mechanism, buyers are free to
select goods that best meet their own preferences, rather than choosing suppliers
based on their relative estimated trustworthiness.
• Computation and data storage requirements are extremely low for administering
Basic Trunits.
• Basic Trunits is egalitarian, in that sellers with less accumulated trust/reputation
are not at a disadvantage to sellers with longer histories, in any given transaction.
While Basic Trunits is an important step towards secure trust models, it has certain lim-
itations. In particular, it provides no protection against collusion, and is subject to the
surplus trust problem. It also provides no single solution to the start-up problem, the
question of how an agent acquires an initial quantity of trunits.
Commodity Trunits is an extension of Basic Trunits, in which agents are permitted
to buy and sell trunits. Commodity Trunits retains many of the characteristics of Basic
Trunits, while providing important enhancements. In particular:
• Commodity Trunits remedies the start-up problem, by allowing agents to purchase
trunits at start-up.
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• Commodity Trunits alleviates concerns of artificially constrained trading volume—
any time an agent has insufficient trunits, it can purchase the required quantity.
• Commodity Trunits provides a solution to the important exit problem, where an
agent who is leaving the market can cheat freely. Under Commodity Trunits, an
exiting agent finds it more profitable to sell her trunits rather than using them to
cheat. To the best of our knowledge, Commodity Trunits is unique in providing a
solution to this problem, an important result.
• Similarly, Commodity Trunits provides a remedy to the surplus trust problem, in
which an agent can use surplus trust beyond its routine needs to cheat.
The security of Commodity Trunits depends on the ability to maintain a price of trunits
higher than the value that can be gained by using them to cheat. Simulation verified
that it was possible to maintain this price relationship for a realistic range of market
parameters.
We have identified three components of security that must be addressed in order for
a trust system to be considered fully secure: buyer security, seller security, and market
security. We delved into buyer security in detail, providing a framework that might be
used to precisely characterize the degree of security provided by a model. The result
of the application of this framework to a model is a specific set of conditions that must
be met in order for a model to provide a provable security guarantee. Based on these
conditions, the model can be assessed for suitability for use in a given marketplace;
further, the set of conditions can provide clear directions for future research.
We applied this framework to both the Basic and Commodity Trunits mechanisms—
both were provably able to provide a security guarantee (namely, that rational sellers
will not cheat) under specific sets of conditions. While certain of these conditions are
likely to hold for a given market scenario, others are key issues for future investigation,
and are discussed below.
In summary, the Trunits model and mechanisms represent important progress to-
wards secure trust and reputation models. They are valuable in their own right for their
attractive properties. Perhaps more importantly, together with our security framework
they provide a promising new direction for research in this area.
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8.2 Future Work
While our work addresses important issues regarding the security of trust and reputation
systems, it raises other questions and highlights areas that may be fruitful upon further
investigation. Some of these avenues have been discussed in Chapter 7, and we do not
restate them here. Beyond these ideas, however, there are a number of possibilities that
we hope to explore in the future. We briefly record them here.
Addressing seller and market security
At present, our security framework focuses almost exclusively on buyer security. There
are two reasons for this: a) protecting buyers from untrustworthy sellers has been the
predominant focus of work in trust and reputation systems to date; b) our own trust
model shares this perspective. That said, we believe that security must be a primary
design goal for trust and reputation systems if they are to have relevance and achieve
adoption. A complete framework that incorporates both seller and market security is
critical in this quest, and it is our goal to develop this broader framework as future work.
We suggest two starting points for investigation here.
Seller security is more difficult to define than buyer security. Buyers wish to receive
goods as promised—their vulnerability stems from the fact that they provide payment
before receiving and inspecting the good. Buyer protection can thus be specified within
the context of the execution of individual transactions. By comparison, the primary goal
of sellers is profit, which can be attacked in a variety of indirect ways. The example of
ballot-stuffing illustrates this point, wherein a coalition artificially inflates the reputation
of one of its members; the ‘attack’ consists of stealing sales from non-coalition sellers.
Such activity can certainly cause damage, but this damage is more difficult to isolate than
an unfulfilled commitment, and hence safety properties are more difficult to formulate.
This is complicated by the fact that a trust system cannot guarantee certain levels of profit
or revenue, since these will be affected by other business issues: quality of marketing,
legitimate competitive activity, etc.
We suggest that for a system to be secure for a seller, one promising approach may be
to ensure that the dishonest activity of any attacker (dishonestly executed sales, unfair
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ratings, ‘fake’ transactions between coalition members, etc.) should not reduce a seller’s
revenue. Specifically, these activities should not reduce revenue from buyers outside the
coalition. Revenue from coalition members might be reduced by these activities—for
example, cheating by coalition members might remove those agents from consideration
for future transactions. This would not constitute a successful attack on the seller, but
rather the very sort of protection we would hope a trust model would provide.
To protect the market operator (or to ensure the continuing operation of the market
where no operator can be identified), a proposed set of security requirements might
consist of the following:
• Dishonest activity should not cause costs to be incurred by the market, because
violation of this property would allow attacks to render the market insolvent.
• Operation of the trust system should be budget balanced, or profitable.
• Dishonest activity by participants should not cause the market to fail (for example,
by driving buyers/sellers out of the market).
Again, these issues require further investigation, as future work.
Incorporating protection from dishonest buyers into Trunits
Just as our framework focuses on buyer security, Trunits focuses solely on ensuring that
sellers are honest. We intend to incorporate a system for managing the behaviour of
buyers into the model as well. Doing so would constitute progress towards a ‘complete’
model, one that provides seller and market security as well.
It must be noted that Trunits does not preclude the parallel use of another system in
order to provide market/seller security. For example, we might consider using a variant
of Jurca and Faltings’ system [17] (discussed in Chapter 3) to ensure buyer honesty,
basing the system on real money, rather than on the separate ‘reputation money’. The
act of the market operator allowing a transaction is considered a ‘recommendation’, and
the ‘fee’ is either charged to the buyer, or added to the commission paid by the seller. A
buyer is paid out in cash if the subsequent buyer’s rating matches her own.
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Unfortunately, as discussed in section 3.3.3, this model suffers one key problem that
will need to be addressed: it is vulnerable to collusive attacks such as ballot-stuffing and
bad-mouthing.
Addressing collusion
The application of the security framework to Trunits identified several important di-
rections for future development, but dealing with collusion was of special importance.
Collusion is a problem to which most (if not all) current trust and reputation systems are
vulnerable.
Two well-known collusive attacks are ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing, described
in Chapter 2. One solution to ballot-stuffing was presented in Section 5.4.3; here, we
outline some other possible avenues for adjusting Trunits to better cope with collusion.
While the basic Trunits model uses very simple trust ratios to set the risk and re-
ward for transactions, collusion is one reason why more sophisticated functions might
be preferable. A few examples of possibilities to explore in future work are as follows:
• Incorporation of a system to ensure the honesty of buyers is likely to provide pro-
tection against collusion. The collusive attacks described above require coalition
members to act as both buyers and sellers; if buyers have an incentive for honesty,
this will make the collusive activity less attractive.
• In many systems (e.g., [10, 36]) only one rating is considered for each buyer, with
older ratings being discarded. While we might not simply discard trunits from
previous transactions, we can consider reward functions that drastically reduce the
marginal reward from each successive transaction with the same user. This fits
with our real world model—recommendations from ten different users are likely
to inspire more confidence than a single recommendation from a user who has
engaged in ten transactions with a given seller.
• Similarly, we might reduce the reward realized from transactions with new users
(as done in [36]) in order to deter the creation of new accounts for ballot stuffing.
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• One option for implementing the above policies is the use of a probabilistic reward
function, where the likelihood of reward is tied to several factors, including past
number of transactions between this buyer-seller pair and the ‘age’ of the buyer’s
account.
Exploring other techniques for market management
The market operator may attempt to manage market parameters to ensure that growth
in supply doesn’t outstrip that of demand. For example, the operator might decrease p to
slow trunit growth, or ‘tax’ trunits as was suggested in Chapter 4. The market operator
is ideally positioned to do so, having complete access to data on market participation,
sales volume, trunit sales, etc. However, the effects of shifting market parameters during
its operation have yet to be studied.
Decentralization of the mechanism
As presented, Trunits is a centralized model. There is nothing about the mathematics of
the model that necessitates centralization, however. The possibility exists for a decen-
tralized implementation in which trunit balances are stored locally for each seller, and
updated as transactions occur. Such an implementation would require secure storage and
update of trunit balances; a cryptographic scheme such as that used in [14] might per-
mit this. Under a decentralized implementation, there may be no need of an identifiable
market operator, similar to the lack of central nodes in many peer-to-peer systems.
Anonymous marketplaces
Under the trunits model, the buyer does not need any information about the seller to
determine her trustworthiness, beyond knowing that she has enough trunits for the
transaction—the incentive for honesty dissuades the seller from cheating, rather than
the buyer’s ability to connect her action with her identity. This suggests the possibility
that the system might support markets in which buyers and sellers are anonymous to one
another, yet can trust one another. Such a marketplace may be desirable for many ap-
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plications. However, anonymity may have other as-yet unforeseen ramifications; further
study is required.
Exploring alternative methods for addressing Surplus Trust
The Commodity Trunits mechanism provides a solution to the surplus trust problem:
unneeded trunits may be profitably sold. If a market operator did not want to use Com-
modity Trunits, there are other possible means of dealing with this problem. One such
approach is related to a common technique used in other models. Many systems (e.g.,
[35]) emphasize the most recent rankings by either discarding older rankings, or apply-
ing some form of ‘decay factor’ to de-emphasize them. We might employ a similar idea,
with the goal of paring the number of surplus trunits. For example, trunits that have gone
unused over a period of time (i.e., the lowest balance in the account over that period of
time) are likely to be surplus. A portion of these trunits could be ‘taxed’. In a way, this
policy has the effect of emphasizing recent history—your level of trustworthiness (i.e.,
your trunit balance) is tied to your recent activity, even if you were ‘more trustworthy’
in the past. On a more practical level, the goal of the system is to ensure that, if you
are sufficiently trustworthy, you have enough trunits to conduct your business; surplus
trunits are, by definition, in excess of the trunits required to conduct business, and paring
them is not unreasonable.
Adjusting Trunits by lifting assumptions
The Trunits model, as presented in this thesis, operates under certain assumptions about
the marketplace and the agents. Some of these assumptions (e.g., the advertised-price
marketplace) simply reflect the scenario for which the model was conceived. Others, as
revealed in Chapter 6, reflect required conditions for Trunits to offer a provable level of
security. For future work, we can explore the implications of lifting these assumptions.
Lifting the assumption of a human market operator: We have suggested in this the-
sis that Trunits might be implemented without a ‘market operator’ that is an identifiable
entity. For example, in a peer-to-peer implementation of Trunits, tasks of the operator
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(holding trunits in escrow, updating trunit balances after honest/dishonest transactions,
etc.) might be performed in a decentralized manner by the client software. This possi-
bility requires further study, however. Certain techniques discussed in this thesis seem
difficult to employ without an identifiable operator. For example, active buying and sell-
ing of trunits to control their price (as done by the market operator in our simulation)
would be problematic without an entity that can own money and enter into sales. Other
issues, and opportunities, may become apparent with further study.
Lifting the assumption of honest buyers, and of sellers’ perfect ability to fulfill com-
mitments: The security analysis conducted in Chapter 6 included the assumptions that
buyers are honest, and that sellers are able to fulfill their commitments if they choose to
do so. Dishonest buyers and unreliable quality control of sellers can potentially under-
mine the incentive for honesty under Trunits. If a seller cannot be confident of receiving
his reward for honesty, even if he has tried to be honest (and incurred the cost of an
honest transaction), then honestly may not clearly be his profit-maximizing strategy.
It is worth noting, however, that a seller need not be perfectly confident that he will
be rewarded in order for honesty to be the profit-maximizing strategy. Consider the
case where buyer honesty and successful execution of the transaction are random, with
uniform probability across transactions. Let f be the probability of receiving a reward on
an honestly executed sale:
f =prob(a seller can fulfill his commitment if he intends to do so)× (8.1)
prob(a seller is rated honestly by a buyer) (8.2)
Under these conditions, we can modify equation 4.2 to reflect the number of trunits that
an agent can expect to receive after attempting to honestly execute a sale requiring τi
trunits:
f(1 + p)τi (8.3)
Here, we revisit the proof of the incentive for honesty developed in Section 4.3.5. The
expected profit from executing a transaction requiring τ trunits honestly, then, (since the
agent can cheat immediately with any returned trunits) is at least:
(1− c)rτ + f(1 + p)rτ (8.4)
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For honesty to have the highest expected profit, it must exceed the profit from cheating
immediately, rτ :
(1− c)rτ + f(1 + p)rτ > rτ
(1− c) + f(1 + p) > 1
Since we want this property to apply for all sellers, let c be the maximum cost ratio, 1:
(1− 1) + f(1 + p) > 1





For a typical reward ratio p = 0.2, this requires the probability of receiving the reward to
be at least 0.83̄.
Note, as well, that as discussed throughout this thesis, Trunits permits the use of a
parallel mechanism to ensure the honesty of buyers, or to rectify the effects of dishonest
reviews. If such a system were in use, we would expect rates of buyer honesty to be
extremely high. Further, the seller might fulfill his obligation even if his quality control is
poor, through the use of warranties/etc. to rectify issues. We would expect f to be quite
high in practice.
Thus, it seems that these two assumptions might be removed. We note, however, that
the assumption that every transaction has the same probability of reward is problematic.
For example, understanding that he might not be guaranteed a reward for honesty, a
seller might begin to model buyers, attempting to choose those that are most likely to
deliver rewards. This introduces another layer of complexity, requiring further study.
Incorporating riskiness into the evaluation of earnings
The discussion in the previous section highlights an important issue. Traders do not
always simply choose the option with the highest expected value—they take into account
the riskiness of projected earnings as well. In the previous section, we discussed two
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important forms of risk to the seller. There are others, however: an important example,
addressed in our discussion of Basic Trunits, is that the seller may not be able to find
buyers in the future.
One might address these issues by incorporating explicit treatment of the riskiness of
future cash flows into the evaluation of the flows. This is common practice in finance:
future returns are ‘discounted’ based on risk. In evaluating alternative courses of action,
the value of future expected returns are reduced in proportion to their riskiness, reflect-
ing the greater desirability of certainty over risk. One well known model used for this
purpose is the Capital Asset Pricing Model [28].
While it is conceivable that such an approach might be useful in the analysis of
Trunits, we have taken a different direction here. Given our goal of establishing prov-
able security, we seek to identify the specific conditions that must hold for a trader to be
guaranteed protection. Thus, we favour the approach employed in the previous section,
where a lower bound (i.e. a specific condition) is established on the amount of risk per-
mitted for a security guarantee to be made. Application of discounting techniques in the
analysis of Trunits may provide further insight, however: how agents will behave if risk
cannot be expressed as a single probability, how sellers might react to different buyers
with different risk profiles, etc.
Moving beyond the marketplace
While it is logical to explore this model completely in the marketplace scenario before
looking beyond, the model may have other applications. For example, in multiagent
systems where agents are motivated to seek delegated tasks from others, such agents are
similar to sellers of a service. This model may be useful under such conditions to ensure
trustworthy collaboration between agents.
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